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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with ecotheology and theological anthropology, in general, and 
in particular, with the interpretation of the imago Dei motif as a source of ecological 
commitment. More specifically, it is an exploration of the theological idea of kenosis as one 
meaningful, sound, and timely understanding of imago Dei within the context of the current 
ecological crisis. Although criticized for its alleged anthropocentric overtones, the notion of 
imago Dei should not be put aside or silenced, but rather reinterpreted. Understood as kenosis, 
it is a source and not a hindrance for ecological concern and ethical commitment inasmuch as it 
elicits a fruitful understanding of humanity. Therefore, this dissertation occurs at the 
intersection between ecotheology and theological anthropology, or in other words it is a 
theological exploration within the domain of theological anthropology through an ecological 
lens.  
Chapter one traces the appearance of ecotheology within contemporary theological 
reflection, its assessment of the ecological crisis, and the different models or strategies that 
theologians have explored in order to link ecological challenges and theology. After defining 
both “ecology” and “ecological crisis”, and identifying some of the manifestations of the latter, 
the chapter examines the specific rationale of ecotheology and shows how and why it calls into 
question three main assumptions of classic theological anthropology, namely, the dignity, 
uniqueness, and role of humanity within creation. It provides a clear understanding of the 
 
 
status of ecotheology, its particular rationale, and its challenge to standard theological 
anthropology.  
Chapter two turns to the interpretation of imago Dei. First, it characterizes and assesses 
three main historical lines of interpretation: essentialist, functionalist, and relational, which can 
summarize and group the contributions of those who have offered a theological understanding 
of imago Dei. Then, the chapter proposes the notion of kenosis as one sound, meaningful and 
timely interpretation of this theological motif. Defined as both making-room or self-limitation 
and self-giving or self-emptying love, kenosis is portrayed through its biblical and systematic 
usage. The chapter argues that kenosis discloses something crucial about God’s agency within 
creation and about Jesus Christ as revelatory of true humanity. Consequently, it can be 
considered as an inspiring and significant anthropological notion in the context of the current 
ecological crisis. Kenosis not only connects the three classic interpretations of imago Dei, but it 
also serves them as a specifier, inasmuch as it provides concrete content and a precise direction 
for understanding humanity as created in the image of God. The chapter ends dealing with the 
main critiques which have been addressed to kenosis as a meaningful notion for theological 
anthropology. 
Chapter three is a constructive one. It explores the fruitfulness of kenosis and its ability 
to shed light upon humanity through the three dimensions of ecology: personal, social, and 
environmental. It shows the inspiring character of kenosis as an anthropological image which 
helps to shape people’s imagination, and the way believers portray and make practical sense of 
the Christian depiction of humanity. First, after highlighting the necessity of ecological 
conversion and a new ethos, the chapter proposes the notions of limit and asceticism as two 
 
 
important anthropological features that kenosis offers to personal ecology, and that may 
inspire us in searching and discerning new ways of life. Then, the chapter addresses the issue of 
the images that may help us in our searching for and voicing new ways of social interaction and 
life. The concept of “civilization of poverty” coined by philosopher Ignacio Ellacuría is 
particularly examined. Rooted in the social dimension of ecology, this concept is in tune with 
the twofold movement of kenosis of self-limitation and self-giving love. Finally, the chapter 
shows how kenosis offers a corrective to the notion of stewardship and enhances what is better 
in it. Inasmuch as the former in its double meaning of self-limitation and self-giving love entails 
clear practical consequences, it complements greatly the latter, which has become a sort of 
default position for many theologians. It is shown how this alliance between these two images 
heightens what is good in each of them, in order to inspire us in discerning and embodying an 
ecologically friendly lifestyle. 
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I. Introduction 
In Laudato Si´ Pope Francis asserts that “there can be no renewal of our relationship 
with nature without a renewal of humanity itself. There can be no ecology without an adequate 
anthropology.”1 Yet, he also acknowledges that historically “an inadequate presentation of 
Christian anthropology gave rise to a wrong understanding of the relationship between human 
beings and the world (…), which gave the impression that the protection of nature was 
something that only the faint-hearted cared about.”2 These two assertions, the connection 
between ecology and anthropology, and the importance of an adequate presentation of 
Christian doctrine on humanity, prompted and framed this project, whose leading questions 
are: How can theological anthropology contribute not only to an awareness of the ecological 
challenges that humanity is facing nowadays, but also to a change of behavior and mentality? 
Does this field have the theological resources, images and concepts, to embrace this task? If so, 
what would they be? How should Christian anthropology be presented in order to avoid not 
only misinterpretations, but also, in particular, any endorsement of a seemingly limitless 
exploitation of other creatures? How can theological anthropology be a positive source of 
renewal, inspiration, and discernment for believers in their search of ecologically friendly ways 
of living? This project, therefore, occurs at the intersection between ecotheology and 
theological anthropology. It is, in other words, a theological exploration within the domain of 
theological anthropology through an ecological lens. 
                                                     
1
 Francis, “Laudato Si’. On Care for Our Common Home,” May 24, 2015, no. 118, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-
si.html. 
2
 Ibid., no. 116. 
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A) Ecological and theological context 
Reality challenges theology. Every era raises new questions and implies novel historical 
processes which demand a theological understanding. Today, a growing ecological sensitivity, 
among other movements, seeks a fresh theological framework to take into account the rising 
ecological problems we face, such as global warming and climate change. There is no doubt 
that we are in the midst of an ecological crisis often characterized by its environmental 
manifestations such as: (a) a depletion of resources, especially those that are not renewable; b) 
diminishing ecosystems and biodiversity; (c) varied forms of increasing pollution that affect the 
natural balance, global temperature, and consequently, the climate; and (d) a permanent risk of 
technological or military disasters associated mostly with nuclear energy.  
Three factors are commonly invoked as the root of these current challenges. First, 
population has grown exponentially over the past century. In the last fifty years, the world’s 
population has approximately tripled, prompting a growing pressure upon the earth in the use 
of resources and the absorption of waste. Second, scientific research and its technological 
applications have increasingly amplified the impact of human action upon the earth. For the 
first time in history, human power threatens the very existence of life, and seems able to alter 
greatly the conditions and forms of life as we know it. The third factor at the root of the current 
ecological crisis is the way people conceive of their roles in the world. Neither the number of 
people, nor their technological and scientific means have triggered the crisis by themselves. At 
the origin of the crisis, rather, there is a way of living, a lifestyle, undergirded by values and 
thoughts, which conceive of humanity as the master of nature, and encourage human 
domination over other creatures. 
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Many think that this paradigm of dominion is directly related to the heritage of Judaism 
and Christianity, both of which attribute human beings to have a special place and role within 
creation. The idea of being created as imago Dei, alongside what many have come to believe as 
the God-given task of ruling over other creatures, seem to be an important cause of our current 
ecological crisis. Christianity is accused of sustaining an anthropocentric worldview, which has 
proven detrimental for the earth throughout history. For some authors, therefore, Christian 
theology needs to be enriched, if not completely transformed, with new perspectives: 
cosmocentrism, geocentrism, and biocentrism. Denying anthropocentrism, others propose to 
unfold the proper Christian outlook upon reality which would be theocentric. As a result, the 
way Christianity speaks of humanity, especially in its relationship with other creatures, is called 
into question. Hence, theological anthropology needs to explore the sense in which ecological 
sensitivity affects or modifies, if it does, the Christian narrative about human beings, and their 
role and place within creation.  
This growing ecological awareness denounces the potential ethical ambiguity of 
affirming a strong sense of human superiority. The notion of imago Dei is especially criticized, 
as it is usually associated with the mandate of subduing and having dominion over the rest of 
creation found in Genesis (1, 26-28). The theological recognition of human beings as God’s 
image-bearers has been historically a fertile ground not only to affirm human distinctiveness, 
but also to substantiate exploitative practices that portray other creatures as mere resources to 
be used for human benefit. Many suspect that the dynamic of differentiation between humans 
and other creatures has become a source of domination, where the earth and even the cosmos 
are seen just as the background of the human salvific story. Accordingly, some believe that the 
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notion of imago Dei should be put aside or silenced because of its alleged anthropocentric 
emphasis and its negative consequences for the relationship between humanity and other 
creatures. Others essay to show that this notion becomes a threat only when it is interpreted in 
a particular way that disconnects humanity from the rest of creation and affirms a unique and 
oppressive superiority of humans over other creatures. What is undeniable is that theological 
reflection inspired by the current ecological crisis has brought the notion of imago Dei to the 
fore, in order to question and clarify what it conveys about human dignity, uniqueness, and the 
role of human beings within creation. 
 
B) Imago Dei as Kenosis: re-imagining humanity 
Accordingly, this thesis is concerned with ecotheology and theological anthropology in 
general, and, in particular, with the interpretation of imago Dei as a source of ecological 
commitment. More specifically, it is an exploration of the theological idea of kenosis as one 
meaningful, sound, and timely understanding of imago Dei within the context of the current 
ecological crisis. Although criticized for its alleged anthropocentric overtones, the notion of 
imago Dei should not be put aside or silenced, but rather reinterpreted. Understood as kenosis, 
this concept is a source of and not a hindrance for ecological concern and ethical commitment 
inasmuch as it elicits a fruitful understanding of humanity. Hence, this project is an exploration 
of kenosis, and its capacity to disclose something crucial about being human. 
What is meant by exploration is a theological exercise of testing the ability of kenosis to 
reveal crucial aspects of humanity, and to stimulate human beings in their discernment of 
pathways to a true and fruitful life in the midst of the present ecological challenges. It is, 
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therefore, a constructive theological exercise which is rooted in biblical, dogmatic, and 
historical resources provided by the Christian tradition. I do not thereby claim to present the 
final argument about the interpretation of imago Dei, but I rather intend to explore one 
interpretation which seems to be fruitful and timely.  
Focusing on kenosis, and its capacity to articulate an inspiring understanding of 
humanity, this thesis asserts the still relevant character of imago Dei as a way to structure 
theological anthropology. Therefore, it states that the significant theological move for dealing 
with anthropocentric tendencies within Christian doctrine is neither to dismiss this notion nor 
to expand its classical understanding in order to encompass other creatures. Rather, what is 
necessary is to reinterpret it so that it carries an ethical component which can illuminate the 
relation between humanity and other creatures, as well as foster among humans an ecological 
commitment toward the flourishing of all kinds of life. At the same time, the thesis affirms that 
this reinterpretation simultaneously aims to both found, and safeguard the dignity of human 
beings, and to legitimate and promote the human ethical commitment toward the fulfillment of 
other creatures. 
Ecotheology, namely the theological reflection inspired and nurtured by a growing 
ecological sensitivity, has put into question the notion of imago Dei for its historical association 
with the motif of dominium terrae. For some, it is precisely by subduing and ruling the earth 
that humanity embodies God’s image. In this sense, the fact that human beings bear the image 
of God is not just an expression of their distinctiveness, but it also implies a special task vis-à-vis 
other creatures, which is characterized by the notions of dominion and subduing. While 
ecotheology has been reinterpreting these notions and tempering them with other biblical 
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expressions such as “till” and “guard” which voice humanity’s role within creation, it has also 
been searching for other root images that may rightly portray the role and task of human 
beings within the created order. Many are the images and notions that have been proposed 
and explored in this respect, such as caretakers, guardians, priests of creation, earthkeepers, 
co-creators, and stewards. Each of these images has its strengths and weaknesses, and 
discloses a particular understanding of divine agency, the purpose of creation, the relationship 
between humanity and its Creator, and the role and task of humanity in relation to the rest of 
creation. 
These images, as Ernst Conradie states, are not innocent; they are open to metaphorical 
innovation and creative usage.3 They raise the question about a suitable theological narrative 
able to inspire an ecologically friendly way of living. Indeed, theology needs an adequate 
presentation of Christian anthropology, one that may help theology to re-imagine humanity in 
the context of the current ecological crisis. I believe that imago Dei understood as kenosis, 
provides one needed overarching image, not only to revise the theological depiction of 
humanity, but also to help believers to make practical sense of the Christian understanding of 
the role and place of human beings vis-à-vis other creatures. Defined as both making-room or 
self-limitation and self-giving or self-emptying love, kenosis discloses something essential about 
divine agency, and crucial aspects of humanity in its interaction with other creatures, which can 
stimulate us in our discernment of pathways to a true and fruitful life. Kenosis not only helps 
theology in relating humanity to God, but it also offers a meaningful portrayal of the 
relationship between human beings and other creatures. 
                                                     
3
 See Ernst Conradie, An Ecological Christian Anthropology: At Home on Earth? (Aldershot, Hants, England; 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 217. 
7 
 
C) Argument and Methodology 
 Three assumptions guide both the argument of this project and the organization of its 
chapters. First, imago Dei must be viewed and interpreted through the lens of Christology, in 
line with the biblical stance that presents Christ as the true image of God. Hence, this project 
assumes as a starting point the statement of the Second Vatican Council in its Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: the truth is that only in the mystery of the 
incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light (GS 22). Historically, the notion of imago 
Dei has never been univocally understood, and the history of its interpretation revolves around 
three main perspectives: substantialist, relational, and functionalist. Since Vatican II, the 
theology of imago Dei has experienced a revival. Nevertheless, it is primarily the trinitarian 
understanding of this concept, and not the Christological, that has been explored by 
ecotheology. In this sense, the most common stance has been to propose the intra-Trinitarian 
mode of relationship as the paradigm of humanity. If God is to be understood as persons-in-
mutual-relationship, then human beings, made in the image of the triune God, are to be 
understood as persons-in-mutual-relationship. Instead, this dissertation aims to unfold the 
Christological understanding of imago Dei as a crucial resource for the needed renovation of 
theological anthropology in the midst of the current ecological crisis, and as an important 
source to legitimate and sustain ecological commitment. 
 The interpretation of imago Dei as kenosis will be therefore based on the exegesis of 
Philippians 2:5-11. Jesus’ kenosis not only has revealed God’s true nature, but it has also 
disclosed what being created in the image of God and bearing God’s likeness mean for 
humanity. In this sense, the twofold movement of Jesus’ kenosis – self-limitation and self-giving 
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– elucidates what the notion of imago Dei implies for humanity. The only way through which 
human beings can be the image of God is by becoming the image of Christ, who is the true 
image of God. What Jesus’ kenosis shows is that what is really almighty in God is God's love, 
because God is power-in-love, and this love does not threaten but rather is precisely what 
enables creatures to unfold and move toward their fulfillment. Therefore, as it will be shown, 
the Christological understanding of kenosis has to be the normative understanding, which 
governs all other theological uses of this notion. This understanding evinces both the dynamic 
and performative character of the image, which is not only susceptible of being renewed – this 
is what Christ has accomplished – but it also entails consequences for humanity in its 
relationship with other creatures. 
The second assumption is that the theological rationale about humanity is to be 
preferred as a theological starting point over other scientific approaches. It is not a matter of 
religious fundamentalism that despises scientific research and claims a literal understanding of 
the Scriptures which would provide the proper explanation of reality. In the wake of Rahner’s 
assertion about theological anthropology, I aim to explore how the notion of kenosis can 
disclose, in a radical and critical form, something about humanity which can be expressed 
differently through other disciplines. This thesis assumes that an adequate interpretation of 
imago Dei requires a well-founded theological perspective, and not merely an understanding 
based on other scientific or philosophical approaches. Consequently, the expected renewal of 
theological anthropology, in the face of the ecological challenges we are dealing with, has to be 
carried out through theological resources: biblical, systematic, and historical. These own 
resources can guide theology in its revision of those elements that have given rise to a wrong 
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understanding of the relationship between human beings and other creatures. Moreover, they 
can enable theology to unfold an ecologically friendly depiction of humanity, and to inspire 
believers in their search and discernment of new ways of life. As a result, theology will be 
equipped to perform its double task of a Christian critique of the values, beliefs, and practices 
that underlie the ecological crisis, on the one hand, and the ecological reformation of 
Christianity both in its teaching and in its practice, on the other. 
Accordingly, this thesis proposes that the notion of kenosis must come to the fore in 
theological reflection on humanity before the current ecological crisis. It is a meaningful, sound, 
and timely interpretation of imago Dei, which not only intertwines the substantialist, relational, 
and functional understanding of what it means to be God’s image-bearers, but it also serves 
them as specifier, giving them specific content and orientation. It is Jesus’ own kenosis that 
reveals the true face of divine power – power in love – which decidedly aims at the well-being 
and fulfillment of creation. This twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving love can 
certainly inspire a desirable renovation in theological anthropology. We need a new way of 
portraying humanity in relationship with other creatures and inhabiting the world. We are also 
looking for new ways of living that may lead us to a true and fruitful life. Kenosis offers us a 
meaningful and timely image; one that deserves to be considered and deepened in the face of 
the challenges we are to deal with nowadays.  
The third assumption that guides both the argument of this project and the organization 
of its chapters is that ecology cannot be reduced merely to its environmental dimension. The 
environmental challenges that humanity is currently facing are just a symptom or manifestation 
of a wider and deeper ecological crisis. This is important to keep in mind, for the way in which 
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the notion of ecology is understood determines, so to speak, the way in which the ecological 
crisis is acknowledged and defined. Yet, some exhibit a tendency to describe the ecological 
crisis only through its environmental manifestations. In some cases, the notion of ecology and 
environment seem even to be interchangeable. Nevertheless, the disproportionate suffering of 
those who are the most marginalized and impoverished must be considered as part of any 
discussion of ecology. Environmental concerns should not overshadow other challenges such as 
hunger, poverty, overcrowding, overconsumption, forced migration, and lifestyle integrity, 
which are also part of the current ecological crisis. While human flourishing should not be 
disconnected from the life and welfare of other creatures, caring for the earth should not mean 
that human beings are ignored or forgotten. The notion of environment is certainly related to 
the notion of ecology, but it does not exhaust its significance. 
Therefore, the notion of ecology must be understood to have at least three dimensions: 
personal, social, and environmental. It is not only wider than the notion of environment, but 
entails, in addition a personal and a social component. If ecology refers to interaction and 
interrelatedness, then it has to take into account all human dimensions of relationality, without 
confining itself just to the human-nature relationship. Therefore, “personal” and “social,” as 
well as “environmental,” are dimensions that necessarily pertain to an ecological analysis of 
human existence. If ecology relates to the way humanity both thinks of and embodies its 
inhabitance on the earth, it has to do, therefore, with the person in its social and environmental 
interactions. In a certain sense, all human life and experience is an ecological event. It will be 
accordingly shown that kenosis enables theology to activate and foster discernments within the 
spheres of personal, social, and environmental ecology, which not only can change views that 
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disconnect human beings from the rest of creation by ascribing to them an ambiguous 
dominion over other creatures, but also can lead us toward more ecologically friendly ways of 
living. 
 
D) Overview of the chapters 
Chapter one traces the appearance of ecotheology within contemporary theological 
reflection, its assessment of the ecological crisis, and the different models or strategies that 
theologians have explored in order to link ecological challenges and theology. The chapter 
proposes a broad understanding of ecology as the way human beings not only grasp, but also 
imagine, their mode of inhabitance on the earth. Ecology has to do, therefore, with the manner 
in which humanity both thinks of its presence and role within creation, and also draws the 
theoretical and practical consequences of its dependence on and interrelatedness with all other 
beings. In this sense, ecology cannot be reduced merely to its environmental dimension, but it 
rather has a personal and social component as well. Accordingly, the ecological crisis refers to a 
critical moment in which our lifestyle and the values that sustain it are being judged and called 
into question for their destructive results. It is a crisis inasmuch as we are confronted with 
current and future life-threatening scenarios, which can be seen as unavoidable consequences 
of human practices and beliefs, and humanity needs, therefore, to make a decision about it. 
The manifestations of the crisis that are studied within the chapter show the tight 
interconnection between the personal, social, and environmental components of ecology. 
After defining both “ecology” and “ecological crisis”, and identifying some of the 
manifestations of the latter, the chapter examines the specific rationale of ecotheology and 
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shows how and why it calls into question three main assumptions of classic theological 
anthropology, namely, the dignity, uniqueness, and role of humanity within creation. Despite its 
lack of definite method, ecotheology has grown as an independent field within theological 
reflection, and has unfolded around some methodological tools such as the dialogue with 
scientific accounts of life and cosmology, some specific themes, some general strategies, and an 
overarching sensitivity that tries to take into account the challenge which the ecological crisis 
represents for theology.  In dealing with this challenge, theology needs not only practical 
criteria but also inspiring and sound images about human life upon the earth that may 
enlighten our discernment of pathways to a true and fruitful life. The chapter provides a clear 
understanding of the status of ecotheology, its particular rationale, and its challenge to 
standard theological anthropology.  
Chapter two turns to the interpretation of imago Dei. First, it characterizes and assesses 
three main historical lines of interpretation: substantialist, functionalist, and relational, which 
can summarize and group the contributions of those who have offered a theological 
understanding of imago Dei. Then, the chapter proposes the notion of kenosis as one sound, 
meaningful and timely interpretation of this theological motif. Defined as both making-room or 
self-limitation and self-giving or self-emptying love, kenosis is portrayed through its biblical and 
systematic usage. A thorough exegesis of Philippians 2:5-11 structures this second part of the 
chapter. As to the systematic use of kenosis, recourse will be made to Jürgen Moltmann, and 
Denis Edwards.  
The chapter argues that kenosis discloses something crucial about God’s agency within 
creation and about Jesus Christ as revelatory of true humanity. Consequently, it can be 
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considered as an inspiring and significant anthropological notion in the context of the current 
ecological crisis. Kenosis not only connects the three classic interpretations of imago Dei, but it 
also serves as a specifier for them, inasmuch as it provides concrete content and a precise 
direction for understanding humanity as created in the image of God. The chapter ends dealing 
with the main critiques which have been addressed to kenosis as a meaningful notion for 
theological anthropology.  
Chapter three is a constructive one. It explores the fruitfulness of kenosis and its ability 
to shed light upon humanity through the three dimensions of ecology: personal, social, and 
environmental. It shows the inspiring character of kenosis as an anthropological image which 
helps to shape people’s imagination, and the way believers portray and make practical sense of 
the Christian depiction of humanity.  
First, after highlighting the necessity of ecological conversion and of a new ethos, the 
chapter proposes the notions of limit and asceticism as two important anthropological features 
that kenosis offers to personal ecology, which may inspire us in searching and discerning new 
ways of life. Then, the chapter addresses the issue of the images that may help us in our 
searching for and voicing new ways of social interaction and life. The concept of “civilization of 
poverty,” coined by philosopher Ignacio Ellacuría, is particularly examined. Rooted in the social 
dimension of ecology, this concept is in tune with the twofold movement of kenosis of self-
limitation and self-giving love. Finally, the chapter shows how kenosis both offers a corrective 
to the notion of stewardship, and enhances what is already good in it. Inasmuch as the former 
in its double meaning of self-limitation and self-giving love entails clear practical consequences, 
it complements greatly the latter, which has become a sort of default position for many 
14 
 
theologians. The chapter shows how this alliance between these two images heightens what is 
good in each of them, in order to inspire us in discerning and embodying an ecologically friendly 
lifestyle. 
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II. Ecotheology Challenges Classic Theological Anthropology: Dignity, 
Uniqueness, and the Role of Humanity within Creation 
Contemporary concern for the environment has developed and intensified over the last 
decades. Understood as a turn to ecology, this concern has its theological manifestation in what 
has been properly called ecotheology. The latter offers its own perspective on the ecological 
debate through a retrieval, critique, and deepening of religious symbols and traditions.4 This 
chapter consists of tracing the appearance of ecotheology within Christian contemporary 
theological reflection, its assessment of the ecological crisis, and the different models or 
strategies that theologians have explored in order to link ecological challenges and theological 
reasoning. The principal goal of this chapter is to unveil the specific rationale of ecotheology 
and to show how and why it calls into question three main assumptions of classic Christian 
theological anthropology, namely, the dignity, uniqueness, and role of humanity within 
creation. The chapter aims to provide a clear understanding of the status of ecotheology, its 
particular rationale, and its challenge to standard theological anthropology. It is worth noting 
that this challenge has not been widely received. It is not uncommon to encounter theology 
books and reflections about humanity which ignore these themes, and which seem to assume 
that the mystery of humanity can be theologically unfolded without any apparent reference to 
                                                     
4
 Some multi-religious projects have explored the ways in which different religious traditions deal with ecological 
challenges. It is worth noting, among the most important, the Religions of the World and Ecology Book Series 
edited by Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim (Harvard University Press) which is the outcome of a two-year 
conference series (1996-98) hosted by the Center for the Study of World Religions at the Harvard Divinity School. 
This ten-volume publication examines the ecological implications of the beliefs, attitudes, rituals, and doctrines of 
various world religions in order to discover what they might offer to both the larger interdisciplinary dialogue on 
the environmental crisis and to the more immediate, pragmatic aspects of public policy and environmental ethics. 
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the rest of creation. When this relationship is mentioned, it is at best usually one-sidedly 
reduced to the notion of dominium terrae.  
 
A) The Emergence of Ecotheology: a Theological Assessment of the Ecological Crisis 
 
1. The rise of ecotheology 
 
The rise of Christian ecotheology does not have a precise date of birth. Some relate its 
appearance to the article authored by the medieval historian Lynn White in which he states the 
responsibility of the Jewish-Christian mindset for the origin of our contemporary ecological 
crisis.5 This religious framework, according to him, holds an anthropocentric vision of reality 
which has demythologized the world, allowed the appearance of modern science along with its 
technological application, and, finally, has stressed a privileged role and position of humanity 
within creation with exploitative consequences. According to White, Christianity “is the most 
anthropocentric religion the world has seen.”6 White’s thesis has greatly influenced the 
subsequent theological reflection about ecology, to the extent that the two main centers of 
gravity of the latter have been chiefly the degree of anthropocentrism of the Christian 
narratives and the relationship between worldviews and practices.  
                                                     
5
 In this famous article Lynn White points out that the notion of imago Dei is one of the elements of the Jewish-
Christian mindset that is at the root of our current ecological crisis. The other elements being the linear conception 
of time, the notion of creatio ex nihilo, the mandate of dominion over the other creatures which humanity receives 
from God, and the search for understanding God's mind as one religious motivation in scientific investigation. All 
these factors have demythologized the earth and fostered the development of science and its technological 
application triggering the current ecological crisis. Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” 
Science 155 (1967): 1203–7. 
6
 Ibid., 1205. 
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White’s thesis has been highly criticized and countered.7 The contentious points are 
mainly four. First, it is said that White’s interpretation of biblical teaching regarding creation is 
partial and inaccurate. He focuses on a few texts (Gn 1, 26-28), and he does not construe them 
against the background of biblical scriptures in order to balance the alleged mandate to 
dominate the rest of creation which humanity receives from God. Second, his assertion that the 
Jewish-Christian worldview is at the roots of the appearance of modern western science and 
technology is at least arguable. Third, his main argument presupposes that environmental 
destruction has streamed mainly from western culture, which is historically inexact. Other 
cultures have suffered from ecological degradation without any Christian influence.8 Finally, 
White overlooks other historical factors that have contributed to the current ecological crisis 
and to which we should also turn our attention.9  
Despite this criticism, others have followed the same path in pointing at religion and the 
Jewish-Christian worldview as one of the main sources of our current ecological crisis. Arnold 
Toynbee, for instance, states that monotheism – and Christianity as a monotheistic religion – is 
the deepest historical cause of some of the main problems of our societies nowadays, such as 
pollution and resource scarcity. Monotheism has put an end to the ancient belief in nature’s 
                                                     
7
 See, for instance, Jeremy Cohen, “The Bible, Man, and Nature in the History of Western Thought: A Call for 
Reassessment,” The Journal of Religion 65, no. 2 (April 1, 1985): 155–72; Lewis W. Moncrief, “The Cultural Basis of 
Our Environmental Crisis,” in Western Man and Environmental Ethics: Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology, 
ed. Ian G. Barbour (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub, 1973), 31–42; and Rene Dubos, “A Theology of the Earth,” 
in Western Man and Environmental Ethics: Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology, ed. Ian G. Barbour (Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley Pub, 1973), 43–54, and A God Within (New York: Macmillan Pub Co, 1973), chapter 8. 
8
 See, for instance, Clive Ponting, A New Green History of the World: The Environment and the Collapse of Great 
Civilizations, Rev Upd edition (New York: Penguin Books, 2007). 
9
 Some other historical factors that have influenced the current ecological crisis are: 1. The change in the notion of 
nature from the Greek physis to the Latin natura, which already implies a distance between humanity and other 
beings; 2. Cartesian dualism (res cogitans, res extensa) and the positivist approach to reality which that entails; 3. 
Capitalism and the Industrial revolution. See, for instance, Juan Luis Ruiz de la Peña, Teología de la creación 
(Santander: Sal Terrae, 1996), chapter 6. 
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divinity. The latter was a decisive limit to human greed and exploitative practices toward 
nature. Therefore, in order to face and overcome what seems to be a pathway toward an 
irreversible disaster, humanity must abandon monotheism and return to a pantheistic 
worldview, which is not only older but was once also universal.10 The former Catholic 
theologian Eugen Drewermann asserts as well that Christian radical anthropocentrism is the 
major source of human destruction of nature.11 Christianity has shaped this anthropocentric 
stance from Hebrew and Greco-Roman influences. From the former, it gets the idea that nature 
is a kind of enemy which has to submit itself to human and divine will. Humanity is explicitly 
entrusted to rule over the earth as God rules over it (Gn 1:26-8). From the Greco-Roman 
culture, Christianity inherits both the idea of nature as an ensemble of rational laws and the will 
to govern it. This one-sided emphasis on rationality distanced humans from external nature and 
from their own bodies with disastrous consequences. Drewermann thinks that the 
Christocentrism of the New Testament deepens rather than softens Christian anthropocentrism 
inasmuch as the idea that God has become human in Christ strengthens the privileged position 
of humanity within creation. It implies as well that God is concerned with the fate of each 
individual and not just with the fate of a people in general, as Christ himself has been an 
individual. In this sense, Christianity eventually makes the entire fate of nature dependent on 
humans. For, given that all creatures are allegedly punished because of Adam’s sin, they need 
human collaboration in order to be redeemed. Drewermann states that the radical 
                                                     
10
 See Arnold Toynbee, “The Religious Background of the Present Environmental Crisis,” International Journal of 
Environmental Studies 3, no. 1–4 (1972): 141–46. 
11
 See Eugen Drewermann, Le progrès meurtrier : La destruction de la nature et de l’être humain à la lumière de 
l’héritage du christianisme (Paris: Stock, 1994). 
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anthropocentric worldview of Christianity has had devastating consequences for both human-
nature and the human-human relationships.12   
Other theologians think that ecotheology has developed not primarily as a reaction to 
the criticism that set Christianity at the roots of the ecological crisis, but it has progressively 
emerged rather through the dialogue between theology and the new ecological sensitivity. In 
this sense, ecotheology would have its origin in the pioneering work of some figures such as 
Teilhard de Chardin and Joseph Sittler. Sittler, for instance, has been theologizing in an 
ecological mode since the 50’s, well before the recent awareness of the environmental 
challenges and their wide analysis from a theological viewpoint. Since the beginning, he has 
unfolded his career with ecological concerns in mind. For Peter Bakken, for instance, Sittler is, 
on the one hand, an indication of how an earth-affirming theology runs deeper than the simple 
desire to defend Christianity against the charge of being responsible for the ecological crisis, 
and, on the other hand, “a good antidote to the repetitiveness, dullness, and stridency of much 
Christian ecotheological writing.”13 In this sense, even though White’s article is a milestone in 
the formation of ecotheology, inasmuch as it entails a defensive attitude within religious circles 
that fosters theological reflection about Christianity and nature, ecotheology does not 
historically begin as a mere apologetic endeavor.  
Others assert that ecotheology had not been really shaped until the final decade of the 
last century. Prior to the 1990’s there is certainly some theological reflection on ecology and 
theology. In this sense, it is worth noting the work of some theologians such as Paul Santmire, 
                                                     
12
 See Matthias Beier, A Violent God-Image: An Introduction to the Work of Eugen Drewermann (New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2006), especially chapter 2. 
13
 Steven Bouma-Prediger and Peter W. Bakken, eds., Evocations of Grace: The Writings of Joseph Sittler on 
Ecology, Theology, and Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 18–19. 
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Jürgen Moltmann, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Jospeh Sittler, John Cobb, and a few others, who 
had already indicated the importance of linking ecological challenges and theological reasoning. 
Nonetheless, ecotheology as a field of research and teaching came later. Heather Eaton, for 
instance, gives the credit for stimulating and consolidating the field of ecotheology to the work 
of what became the Forum on Religion and Ecology, currently at Yale University in the USA.14 
Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grimm, in the wake of the work of Thomas Berry and inspired by 
him, have been encouraging and supporting for the last twenty years on-going thinking about 
the intersection of religions and ecology.15   
Despite the differences on how the history of ecotheology is told, and on how far its 
origins are traced back, there are some common traits in these accounts that can be identified. 
First of all, ecotheology is not just a reactive effort that aims to defend the relevance of 
Christianity and its contribution to ecologically friendly practices, against those who blame it for 
being one of the main sources of current environmental challenges. Ecotheology does not arise 
just as a response of what has been called the “ecological complaint” against Christianity. 
Secondly, ecotheology has been historically fashioned through the encounter of theological 
reflection and the rising ecological awareness.16 In this sense, ecotheology is the manifestation 
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 See Heather Eaton, “Mapping Ecotheologies: Deliberations on Difference,” Theology 116, no. 1 (2013): 23–27.  
15
 See note 1. The Forum on Religion and Ecology (http://fore.research.yale.edu/ ), has already its counterparts in 
Canada: http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/fore/ (FORE, Forum on Religion and Ecology), and in Europe 
http://www.hf.ntnu.no/relnateur/ (The European Forum for the Study of Religion and the Environment). See also 
Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim, “Intellectual and Organizational Foundations of Religion and Ecology,” in 
Grounding Religion: A Field Guide to the Study of Religion and Ecology, ed. Whitney Bauman, Richard Bohannon, 
and Kevin O’Brien (New York: Routledge, 2010), 81–95, and John Grim and Mary Evelyn Tucker, Ecology and 
Religion (Washington: Island Press, 2014), chap. 5. 
16 One may examine the evolution of this worldwide ecological awareness through the key notions and emphasis 
of some of its milestones, namely: from ‘limits to growth’ (the MIT report to the Club of Rome, 1972), to 
‘sustainable development’ (the Brundtland report, 1987; the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002), to 
the social dimensions of eco-justice (at least from Rio de Janeiro, 1992), to reflections on carrying capacity (or 
footprints) and the ability of the biosphere to absorb the waste products of the industrialized economy (Kyoto, 
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within theology of a much larger process of a new ecological awareness, which has pervaded 
not only other fields of knowledge but also human practices and believes. Ecological sensitivity 
has been permeating not only the political arena but also other aspects of human life such as 
education, economy, arts, city planning, and daily practices. Christian ecotheology has been 
increasingly trying to take into account this new consciousness and its implications from a 
theological viewpoint. Thirdly, even though Lynn White’s article should not be defined as the 
starting point of ecotheology, it has undoubtedly influenced the way in which theology has 
framed its reflection about ecology. White’s thesis has undeniably been a catalyst for 
ecotheology. It has impacted the subsequent debate to the extent that two of its main foci have 
been the degree of anthropocentrism of Christianity and therefore its responsibility in the 
ecological crisis, and the way that worldviews and ecologically friendly practices mutually affect 
one another. Last, but not least, it is undeniable that a new theological field has been 
consistently growing up in the last fifty years. Since roughly the middle of the past century, 
Christian theological reflection has been increasingly interested in what can be called ecological 
issues, and it has developed different strategies in order both to connect environmental 
challenges with Christian doctrine, and to foster ecological commitment among believers. A 
significant amount of publications, research projects, and authors have been exploring both the 
criticism which ecological sensitivity raises against the classical Christian mindset and the 
resources which can be found in the Christian tradition in order to nurture an ecologically 
friendly worldview and practice. These publications and authors, grouped under the rubric of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1997), to the recognition of the limits to induce the required political and social change (after Copenhagen, 2009). 
See Ernst Conradie, “The Journey of Doing Christian Ecotheology: A Collective Mapping of the Terrain,” Theology 
116, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 4–17, at 5. To this it should be added the agreement on seventeen worldwide 
sustainable development goals defined at Paris in 2015. 
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what has been called ecotheology, allow for a Christian critique of the cultural habits underlying 
ecological destruction, and for an ecological reform of Christianity.  
In addition to ecotheology, other names have been used in labeling this theological 
endeavor, such as environmental theology, ecological theology, eco-theology, and theology of 
ecology.17 Whatever label one wishes to use, it is without doubt that Christian theology has 
been increasingly exploring the link between Christianity and ecology, and that this has 
generated a new field within theological reflection, which has coalesced around a growing 
number of publications,18 theological journals,19 and authors.  
One may ask therefore about the main questions that both characterize and frame 
ecotheology, and shape its specificity. Assuming the seriousness of the current ecological 
challenges, ecotheology explores what the role of Christianity has been and could be vis-à-vis 
this context. Can Christianity contribute not only to an awareness of the ecological challenges 
that humanity is facing, but also to a change of behavior and mentality? Does it have the 
theological resources to embrace this task? What would they be? What are the needed 
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 This dissertation will use the term of ecotheology in referring to this new field within theological reasoning. This 
notion was coined and popularized by David G. Hallman, a former president of the World Council of Churches [see, 
for instance, David G. Hallman, Ecotheology: Voices from South and North (WCC Publications, 1994).)]. It has the 
advantage of clearly relating ecology, economy, and ecumenism through the Greek root oikos, and therefore of 
depicting creation as a home. Environmental theology is discarded inasmuch as the notion of ecology is a much 
more inclusive notion than the notion of environment. Although other labels which use the adjective ecological are 
not discarded, they seem less suitable inasmuch as this adjective is much more appropriate when describing things 
and processes rather than an academic discipline. 
18
 See, for instance, these three bibliographic compendia: Peter W. Bakken, J. Ronald Engel, and Joan G. Engel, 
Ecology, Justice, and Christian Faith: A Critical Guide to the Literature, annotated edition (Westport, Conn: 
Greenwood, 1995), which surveys bibliography from 1961 to 1993; Christianity and Ecology Bibliography. 
Bibliography and annotations by: Peter W. Bakken Au Sable Institute of Environmental Studies and The Forum for 
Religion and Ecology, 2011: http://fore.research.yale.edu/religion/christianity/bibliography/ ; and Ernst Conradie, 
Christianity and Ecological Theology. Resources for Further Research (Stellenbosch, South Africa: SunPress, 2006), 
or within the same website. 
19
 See, for instance, The Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature, and Culture, which is the official journal of the 
International Society for the Study of Religion, Nature, and Culture. This Journal is the continuation of Ecotheology, 
which was published from 1996 to 2007. See also Worldviews: Global Religions, Culture, and Ecology. 
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revisions and/or retrievals of some of its doctrines and traditions that Christianity needs to 
embrace in dealing with this ecological crisis? Does this crisis truly require this kind of 
amendment within Christianity? Can the rising ecological sensitivity be articulated in a coherent 
way of thinking and approaching reality from a theological viewpoint?  
Revision, retrieval, transformation, and deepening can be the terms which best describe 
the goals which ecotheology has assumed over the last decades. In order to activate the 
dialogue between Christian tradition and ecological sensitivity, theologians have explored 
different theological pathways such as: 1) rethinking the notion of dominion and reinterpreting 
the God-given task specified in Genesis. It is clear that the biblical text does not substantiate a 
limitless exploitation of nature; 2) searching for new and inspiring root metaphors which can 
portray both the God-creation relationship (divine agency) and the link between humanity and 
the rest of creation, on the one hand, and stimulate ecologically friendly deeds, on the other 
hand; 3) exposing other biblical patterns than Genesis and other theological traditions – 
practice included – which go beyond the apparently hierarchical view of reality and any kind of 
dualism which subordinates matter to spirit; 4) defining the proper Christian source for the 
value of creatures; and finally, 5) proposing an array of ethical principles and practical criteria 
which can enrich both people’s discernment and decision-making processes in their searching 
for pathways to a true and fruitful life. In this sense, Christian ecotheology’s development has, 
by and large, traced an arc from a rejection of the license to exploit the environment, to 
responsible and enlightened stewardship, to friendship and sacrament as models of conceiving 
the relationship of humans to the environment.  
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At the heart of this development lies the conviction that ecotheology should not be 
reduced to environmental ethics, and that a merely pragmatic approach to ecological 
challenges has to be avoided. Christian ecotheology must certainly explain, on properly 
theological grounds, why and how ecological sensitivity is essential for believers. In doing so, 
ecotheology needs to revise its understanding of God, creation, nature, and what it means to 
be human, in order to nurture an ecologically friendly theology. The call for an ecological 
pragmatism, which brackets theoretical debates in order to agree on practical strategies and 
principles, has two main problems. First, it misunderstands the real depth of the difference and 
diversity among theological stances and their practical consequences. Second, it loses its 
capacity to critique the ways issues are framed, or to isolate new problems.20 In this sense, 
ecotheology aims to assess the ecological crisis in its religious dimension. It undertakes this task 
by bringing to the fore the theological responsibility in those factors which have originated, 
increased, and supported the challenges we face nowadays. It also explores the theological 
resources – biblical, systematic, and those from tradition – which provide a helpful and timely 
framework in addressing ecological concern.  
2. Ecological crisis: what does it mean?  
Having acknowledged the existence of ecotheology within theological reflection as a 
new and growing field, and having sketched out the main questions that shape its theological 
endeavor, one may ask about the context which has triggered its appearance and fostered its 
development. I turn now, therefore, to those challenges that have awakened a rising ecological 
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 See Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (Oxford-New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 34–40. 
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sensitivity since last century21 and which constitute what has been labeled as an ecological 
crisis. 
Global institutions such as the UN, national leaders, intellectuals from different 
disciplines, and citizens grouped in a large variety of associations, have come to acknowledge 
that we are dealing with what could be called an interlocking crisis.22 In this sense, the current 
environmental challenges are just symptomatic of a larger crisis, one that involves a lack of 
moral vision, imagination, moral character, will, and leadership.23 This crisis of values questions 
some of the presuppositions and assumptions upon which especially western societies have 
built their welfare and development. There is, on the one hand, a sense of urgency that 
something has to be done if we do not want to further endanger the viability of life of all 
creatures on the earth. On the other hand, some believe that humanity is currently paralyzed 
by its inability to react due to its uncertainty about the future24 or due to the excess of 
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 This is not to say that there was no ecological awareness before that time. People like John Muir, Gifford 
Pinchot, and Aldo Leopold, in the American context, are a good example of an early ecological concern. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that this awareness has been heightened since roughly the middle of the last 
century. There are good accounts of the rising of this ecological awareness and movement. See, for instance, 
Roderick Frazier Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989).  
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 See, for instance, World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford 
Paperbacks, 1987), (the document is broadly known as The Brundtland report): n. 11. “Until recently, the planet 
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23
 See Ernst Conradie, “Towards an Agenda for Ecological Theology: An Intercontinental Dialogue,” Journal for the 
Study of Religion, Nature and Culture 10, no. 3 (February 24, 2007): 281–343, at 286.  
24
 See Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), especially chapter 2. Proposing a heuristics of fear, Jonas thinks that humanity 
is diminished in its capacity to deal with the ecological challenges because of the uncertainty and contradictions 
about the real future consequences of our acts. This uncertainty affects the applicability of the ethical principles, 
such as the principle of precaution. 
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confidence in its own scientific and technical resources.25 It is sufficiently clear as well (as the 
ongoing negotiations within the UN of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) have shown) that this paralysis is also related to potential economic 
consequences from resolutions and agreements, and political power and strategy among the 
nations. The agreement reached at Paris (2015) on seventeen worldwide sustainable 
development goals is a clear expression of the fact that environmental challenges are just one 
manifestation, perhaps the most evident, of what is felt as an unacceptable present. Many say 
that the future which the climate change seems to imply provides a gloomy example of what 
can and has gone wrong. In this sense, it can be rightly said that the environmental challenges 
epitomize a wider ecological crisis.  
 The notion of crisis is explicitly avoided by some authors, for it has often been used as a 
rhetorical, polemical device for particular political purposes.26 It is true that it can also evoke 
apocalyptic imagery, and fatalistic feelings that often elicit fear and seldom kindle hope.  Yet, it 
conveys a sense of urgency and a call to action which are kept veiled in other ways of referring 
to the current ecological challenges. A consideration of its etymology can help us both in 
unfolding its scope and in showing what I want to emphasis by using it.  
The notion of crisis comes from the Greek word  and signifies, literally, decision. 
Originally related to the sphere of health, it has been expanded to the domain of morality to 
connote a momentous phase within the evolution of events and ideas. This phase is usually 
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 See Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Pour Un Catastrophisme Éclairé. Quand L’impossible Est Certain (Paris: Seuil, 2004), and 
Petite métaphysique des tsunamis (Paris: Seuil, 2005). In these books the French engineer and philosopher, who is 
also professor at Stanford University, analyzes what he calls “orgueil métaphysique” (metaphysical pride) which is 
basically the denial of what we know about scenarios of the future. According to Dupuy this pride is rooted in 
humanity’s confidence in scientific research and its future technological applications. It is metaphysical because it 
does not truly believe in the existence of the future already predicted, which is therefore beyond reality. 
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 See, for instance, Celia Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology (Winona, MN: Anselm Academic, 2008), 1. 
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characterized by the rupture of a given balance which can be followed by an improvement of 
the situation or by its deterioration.27 The Greek notion of crisis has also the meaning of 
judgment. Labeling this time as an ecological crisis means therefore, that we are living a crucial 
moment in which our lifestyle and the values that have grounded it are being judged and called 
into question. We need to make a decision with regard to the future scenarios which can be 
predicted from our current practices and beliefs. We are confronted then with a vitally 
important moment – a turning-point – which cannot be evaded or ignored. Denying the 
complexity of the ecological challenges that humanity is dealing with is already a form of 
decision and judgment vis-à-vis reality.  
The notion of ecology does not have a univocal meaning.28 Hence, it is best understood 
as an idea that can be shaped in different ways depending on the context in which it is used. 
Ecology is a “culture of layers and mosaics”29 that admits at least a scientific and a more 
comprehensive definition. The German biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) is credited with 
having coined this word in the second half of the 19th century, as a call to a new science based 
on the Darwinian idea of natural selection, and oriented to the study of beings in their 
relationships with their environments. Haeckel thought that this study of the natural world 
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 The Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition: “1. Pathol. The point in the progress of a disease 
when an important development or change takes place which is decisive of recovery or death; the turning-point of 
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Concept and Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and “Pluralism in Ecology,” Annual Review of 
Ecology and Systematics 18 (January 1, 1987): 321–41. 
29
 Astrid Schwarz, “History of Concepts for Ecology,” in Ecology Revisited: Reflecting on Concepts, Advancing 
Science, ed. Astrid Schwarz and Kurt Jax (New York: Springer, 2011), 22. 
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would provide not only scientific information, but it would also unveil the inner order of nature 
and something about the virtues with which humanity might live in harmony. This scientific 
approach would offer therefore the deepest truth of the cosmos. So, ecology for Haeckel was, 
from the beginning, “both a natural science and a worldview.”30 In this sense, Haeckel’s 
understanding of ecology is useful as starting point in any discussion about this notion, 
inasmuch as it connects from the outset the spheres of science and morality. His understanding 
of ecology combines scientific as well as philosophical claims.   
From a scientific point of view, ecology is usually defined as the study of the 
interrelationships among organisms and between organisms, and between them and all 
aspects, living and non-living, of their environment.31 This scientific endeavor focuses therefore 
on the interconnectedness among all beings, and aims to unveil the way in which they interact 
with and affect each other within their concrete and specific contexts. This implies, on the one 
hand, that ecology requires the collaboration of various scientific disciplines. Indeed, it has 
been conceived from the start as a “bridging science.”32 The complex web of interactions 
among all beings, and among them and their environments, cannot be fully depicted without 
the participation of a large array of scientific approaches. On the other hand, this implies that 
ecology tends inevitably to specialization. Scientists do not aim to be experts in ecology as a 
general term. They rather restrict their investigations to particular species in given contexts, 
and to a limited set of variables. In all of these cases, ecology is always about the interaction 
and relation between organisms and their environments. The focus of research is typically 
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narrowed down by different strategies, e.g., naming the object or region of study, or 
establishing the methods or scale of attention which are used. In this sense, ecology as a 
science can be divided into different branches according to criteria such as: disease, animal, 
marine, artic ecology; or physiological, behavioral, population, and ecosystems ecology. This is 
not to say that there are clear-cut boundaries and that there are not blurred zones in the 
interaction among these scientific approaches to reality. The scientific definition of ecology and 
the categorization of its sub-disciplines is still an ongoing process, which has been rendered 
more complex, especially with the rise of the environmental movement.33  
In addition to this scientific understanding, ecology is also conceived of in a broader 
sense. As was mentioned above, Haeckel thinks about ecology not only in terms of a scientific 
endeavor, but also as it were as a comprehensive worldview. In this sense, ecology would 
progressively unveil a cosmic truth – the deep web of interactions and mutual influences 
among organisms and their environments – which would help humanity to live in harmony with 
nature. Rooted in the scientific ecological discoveries, philosophers, ecological activists, and 
other theoreticians such as theologians nowadays hold this broader understanding of ecology.34 
It has become a new cultural paradigm which affirms as its first and principal tenet the 
interconnectedness of all beings. If everything is connected and interrelated, then humanity is 
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dependent on other beings as well as on natural systems.35 Moreover, these are not optional 
relationships. They rather give rise to humanity’s constitution and identity. Ecology as a cultural 
paradigm confronts therefore both the depiction of humans as isolated individuals and the 
classic emphasis on human singularity vis-à-vis other species. Assuming as a starting point the 
interconnectedness of everything, this broader understanding of ecology aims to unfold the 
consequences of this universal relatedness not only for the human understanding of reality but 
also for its praxis. 
In summary, the notion of ecology refers etymologically to the global understanding of 
all the processes which constitute the multiple relationships between living beings – humans 
included – and their bio-physical and social environment. In a broader sense, it can be 
understood as the way human beings not only grasp but also imagine their mode of inhabitance 
on the earth. Ecology has to do therefore with the manner in which humanity both thinks of its 
presence and role within creation, and draws the theoretical and practical consequences of its 
dependence on and relatedness with all other beings. In this sense, ecology cannot be reduced 
merely to its environmental dimension, but it rather has a personal and social component as 
well.  
This reflection about the notion of ecology entails four main conclusions for theology 
and the way it should frame the current ecological crisis. First of all, the broader understanding 
of ecology which is used beyond the realm of science must be informed by and rooted in 
scientific discoveries and assertions about reality. The more the philosophical or theological 
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depiction of ecology is disconnected from the scientific portrayal of reality, the bigger the risk 
of holding a romanticized and false picture of the earth and natural processes. This is not to say 
that science must back up theological assertions, or that theology is tied up with the scientific 
viewpoint of reality and has to derive or read off values from the natural world. It is rather to 
affirm that these two understandings of ecology should not be disjointed, and that the 
philosophical or theological one shall take into account, as one of its indispensable starting 
points, what science believes to be true about nature. From a slightly different perspective it 
can be said that there is no such a thing as neutral scientific knowledge devoid of moral 
consequences, and theology has to both disclose these moral implications and evaluate them. 
Many have noticed that some philosophical and theological understandings of ecology are 
inadequately informed by science. These understandings of ecology still assume, for instance, 
that nature’s main feature is balance or equilibrium, which does not fit the current scientific 
portrayal. While these philosophical and theological approaches portray nature as something 
stable, the scientific approach underlines the notions of change and flux in its description of 
natural processes.36 A false, romanticized depiction of nature supposes that nature possesses 
the enduring capacity to regain balance and stability after a period of disturbance, and that 
human agency should respect and not alter in any way this natural equilibrium. Scientifically 
inaccurate understandings of ecology often imply ethical and theological imperatives that are 
inappropriate. Lisa Sideris states, for instance, that the belief that humanity is duty bound to 
reduce suffering and restore peace in nature is an example of how an inaccurate or incomplete 
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picture of nature leads to questionable environmental action.37 The way in which theology 
refers to nature by means of notions such as those of complexity, richness of experience, 
suffering, violence, cooperation, balance and stability, must be scientifically informed. 
Otherwise theology can be misleading not only for our understanding of the nature and 
challenges of the ecological crisis, but also for our searching and discernment of pathways to a 
true and fruitful life.  
The second conclusion is that the notion of ecology should not be equated with the 
notion of environment. The former is certainly broader than the latter. The environmental 
challenges that humanity is currently facing are just a symptom or manifestation of a wider and 
deeper ecological crisis. This is important to keep in mind, for the way in which the notion of 
ecology is understood determines, so to speak, the way in which the ecological crisis is 
acknowledged and defined. Many have already shown the interconnectedness of all ecological 
challenges through notions such as eco-justice.38 They intend to show how the environmental 
challenges are closely related to social problems of injustice and inequity. Yet, some exhibit a 
tendency to describe the ecological crisis only through its environmental manifestations. In 
some cases, the notion of ecology and environment seem even to be interchangeable. 
Nevertheless, the disproportionate suffering of those people who are the most marginalized 
and impoverished must be considered as part of any discussion of ecology. Environmental 
concerns should not overshadow other challenges such as hunger, poverty, overcrowding, 
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overconsumption, forced migration, and lifestyle integrity, which are also part of the current 
ecological crisis.39 While human flourishing should not be disconnected from the life and 
welfare of other creatures, caring for the earth should not entail that human beings are ignored 
or forgotten. The notion of environment is certainly related to the notion of ecology, but it does 
not exhaust its meaning. 
The third conclusion is related to the previous one. The way in which the ecological crisis 
is depicted and defined, determines the way in which theology can play a part in effectively 
responding to it. Ecotheology should not be reduced to environmental ethics. The latter will 
continue to be a specific area of ethics, a field of interest of a specific group of scholars and 
activists. Nevertheless, ecotheology is wider than this and it requires a whole reinvestigation of 
Christian doctrine.40 The way in which the ecological crisis is theologically understood 
influences unavoidably not only the identification of its causes and manifestations, but also the 
formulation of what has to be done in order to counteract it. In this sense, the ecological crisis 
is the occasion so to speak for a Christian questioning of beliefs and practices that have 
fostered this crisis, and it is also the occasion for an ecological reform of Christianity. Just as 
South American liberation theology has been able to deepen the religious image of God, 
starting from the social and economic challenges of that part of the continent, ecological 
sensitivity likewise may help theology to continue unveiling the true visage of God. Ecotheology 
has to depict not only the relationship between humanity and the rest of creation, but it also 
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has to question the Scriptures, theology, and tradition, in order to unfold and deepen an 
ecologically appropriate image of God. This image of God – the incomprehensible mystery – is 
not made of the projection of human concerns, but it is rather the outcome of the unfolding 
process of what has already been given to humanity by revelation. 
As a hermeneutical science, theology is devoted to rendering intelligible Christian 
notions and images to its believers. It must envisage its role in the wake of God’s self-
communication to creation. In this sense, theology aims to express Christian revelation through 
meaningful and comprehensible categories so as to help to its salvific efficacy and its character 
of good news. It is meant to inspire and nurture the life of believers through its exposition of 
the Christian faith, and this is why it must unfold in a significant and understandable language. 
Nevertheless, theology is concerned not only about orthodoxy; it also aims for orthopraxis. In 
this sense, theology helps to shape people’s imagination and the way believers portray and 
make practical sense of the principal notions and images of Christianity. Therefore the task of 
theology can be defined in terms of an unceasing answering of the following question: How do 
Christian notions and images help people not only to penetrate the divine mystery which 
embraces reality, but also to live their lives toward real fulfilment? Theology’s character and 
purpose are mainly mystagogical. Belief and practice are not to be dissociated. They constantly 
intertwine and shape one another. Always contextually rooted, theology serves and nourishes 
this interaction between creed and deed.  
Theology must respond to the ecological crisis and inspire the imaginations of people 
who are searching for concrete ways to respond and new ways of living. Retrieving some 
biblical and historical perspectives, along with the deepening of other standpoints currently 
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available, ecotheology should contribute to the ecological reformation of Christianity.41 In the 
interplay between people’s lives and beliefs, the current crisis which seems to threaten life’s 
viability, and the sources of Christianity, ecotheology must offer a meaningful and helpful 
understanding especially of humanity, one which would shake up people's imagination and 
would help them to discern pathways to true life. 
The fourth conclusion is that ecology must be understood to have at least three 
dimensions: personal, social, and environmental. The notion of ecology is not only wider than 
the notion of environment, but it also rather entails a personal and a social component. While 
the scientific understanding of ecology reduces it to a sub-discipline of biology, its philosophical 
and more comprehensive definition allows for a systemic approach which displays its personal, 
social, and environmental dimensions together. In this sense, the term ecology can be 
interpreted as consisting of an integrated whole progressively based upon personal, social, and 
environmental ecologies.42 In using those terms I do not intend to retrieve the notions of 
human ecology or social ecology as they have been proposed and developed by some scholars 
and activists over the last century.43 In doing so, I aim to emphasize a more general and basic 
fact. If ecology refers to interaction and interrelatedness, then it has to take into account all 
human dimensions of relationality, without confining itself just to the human-nature 
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relationship. Therefore, “personal” and “social” as well as “environmental” are dimensions that 
necessarily pertain to an ecological analysis of human existence. If ecology relates to the way 
humanity both thinks of and embodies its inhabitance on the earth, it has to do therefore with 
the person in its social and environmental interactions. In a certain sense, all human life and 
experience is an ecological event.44  
I do not intend to technically define and delimit three types of ecology: personal, social, 
and environmental. I rather believe that the notion of ecology is often equated with the notion 
of environment, to the extent that they seem to be interchangeable, and that it is important to 
oppose this reduction by acknowledging and examining the personal and social dimensions of 
ecology. The personal dimension of ecology refers to the domain of personal interactions of 
each individual. It encompasses the whole array of sustainable and healthy dynamics and ways 
of living, which nurture the flourishing and fulfillment of human beings. Personal ecology 
therefore focuses on the primal interaction of every individual with him/herself, and the social 
and environmental consequences that this interaction implies. This is not to concur with a 
management-oriented definition of personal ecology, which would highlight personal balance 
as the guiding goal. From a theological standpoint, personal ecology aims toward personal 
flourishing and fulfillment. Some topics that pertain to the personal dimension of ecology are 
the way people think of and organize their everyday life, pace of life, working and leisure time, 
consumption habits and the discernment of what is necessary for maintenance, the use of 
space and housing, the choice of means of transportation, and the way people relate to their 
own bodies. Personal ecology hence focuses on the basic subjectification process of every 
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individual and the consequences that that entails for his or her interaction with others and the 
environment.  
The notion of social ecology has been proposed and developed specially by the 
American author and activist Murray Bookchin, as an attempt to show the intimate connection 
and dependence between environmental challenges and social problems.45 In doing so he aims 
to provide an intellectual tool which would help in criticizing all hierarchical structures within 
societies and all forms of domination between humans – such as gender, ethnic, and class 
domination – which would lie at the heart of the domination of nature by humanity. Opposing 
these forms of domination and hierarchies, which are the social sources of the ecological crisis, 
requires collective action and major social movements and not just individual changes within 
forms of consumption and lifestyle. In this sense, “social ecology is an appeal not only for moral 
regeneration but also, and above all, for social reconstruction along ecological lines.”46  
In using the notion of social ecology, I do not intend simply to retrieve the work of 
Bookchin or to blindly subscribe to his own approach. By pointing to the social dimension of 
ecology, I want to highlight first of all that if ecology has to do with the interaction and 
interrelations among beings, it necessarily contains a social dimension. The way in which this 
social interaction is conceived of, organized, and embodied by individuals certainly pertains to 
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any ecological analysis of human existence. Secondly, the social interaction between human 
beings affects and influences the nature-humanity relationship. Many have asserted that the 
exploitative practices vis-à-vis nature, are just an extension or expression of pattern of 
domination among humans. This has been especially underscored by some feminist theologians 
through what has been labeled ecofeminism.47 The basic claim is that the oppression of women 
and the oppression of nature are mutually interlocked. Finally, and from a different angle, it is 
also true that environmental conditions and challenges not only influence but in a certain way 
shape as well the social interaction between individuals. It is also manifest that environmental 
challenges and disasters have a direct impact on how social interaction is embodied and social 
structures are established. Some have underlined that environmental problems and their 
consequences often touch the poorest among the poor. Hence, tackling environmental 
challenges implies addressing social problems as well. Likewise, dealing with social inequalities 
and injustices requires taking into account environmental challenges.48 This is just what Catholic 
social teaching has consistently expressed through the idea that there will be no real peace 
within humanity, without being at peace with creation.49 
In pointing to the social dimension of ecology I want to emphasize therefore, on the one 
hand, the social dimension of human interaction which determines and is constitutive of 
individual identities. On the other hand, I want to assert the intimate connection between 
social interaction and social structures, and the environment. Several topics can epitomize the 
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social dimension of ecology, such as forced migration for environmental causes, world hunger 
and the production and distribution of food, production and access to drinking water, energy 
generation and use, and security and health in relation to dangerous diseases. As these 
examples make manifest, it is a false dilemma to think that we need to choose between 
prioritizing environmental challenges or social inequality and injustices. Dealing with the former 
necessarily entails dealing with the latter.  
The environmental dimension of ecology is by far the most acknowledged and studied, 
to the extent that, as I mentioned above, the notions of ecology and environment tend to be 
mistakenly merged. If ecology refers to the way people think of and imagine their mode of 
inhabitance on the earth, it necessarily has to do with the nature-humanity relationship. The 
environmental dimension of ecology, on the one hand, points to the manner in which humanity 
conceives of its presence and role within creation, and on the other hand, draws the moral and 
practical consequences of the human dependence on and relatedness with all other creatures. 
In this sense, environmental ecology focuses therefore on the interaction between humanity 
and all the rest of both living and nonliving beings.  
The environmental dimension of ecology refers to the manner in which the nature-
humanity relationship is not only lived, but also to the presuppositions that govern it, the 
dynamics that constitute it, and its practical consequences for both nature and humanity. All 
these factors – presuppositions, dynamics, and consequences – are inevitably determined by 
cultural and historical contexts.50 Human life has always involved an impact upon the 
environments in which it has unfolded. There is no such a thing as zero impact. Yet, this 
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influence is certainly related to what humans think of their role within creation, the means 
involved in this interaction (e.g. technics and science), and the general goals that they pursue. 
In this sense, modern societies have increased their impact upon the earth to the extent that, 
for the first time in history, human power threatens the very existence of life and seems able to 
alter greatly the conditions and forms of life which we know. The first warnings have been 
raised by scientists who have denounced a destructive way of living characterized by a) 
depletion of resources, especially those which are not renewable; b) diminishing ecosystems 
and biodiversity; (c) varied forms of increasing pollution which affect the natural balance; and 
(d) a permanent risk of technological or military disasters associated mostly with nuclear 
energy.51 The modern human impact upon the earth is certainly growing, cumulative, and 
lasting.  
The environmental dimension of ecology encompasses a large variety of topics such as 
pollution, endangered species, loss of biodiversity, deforestation, waste and depletion of 
resources, and climate change. Despite the current environmental challenges that humanity 
faces, environmental ecology should not be reduced to a problem-oriented approach to the 
human-nature relationship. From a theological point of view, it has as its chief guiding goal the 
flourishing and fulfillment of the entire creation. 
In sum, the way in which the ecological crisis is understood and depicted, determines 
the way in which theology can play a role in dealing with it. Even though based upon the 
scientific approach to reality, the notion of ecology should not be reduced to its scientific 
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definition. Neither should it be merged or identified with the notion of environment. 
Understood in a broader sense, the notion of ecology points to the manner in which humans 
not only conceive of but also embody their way of inhabiting the world. In this sense, ecology 
must be understood through three interwoven dimensions which mutually affect each other, 
namely, personal, social, and environmental. These dimensions of ecology should not be seen 
as watertight compartments, but rather as concentric circles that mutually interact and shape 
the way in which humanity both portrays and lives its existence upon the earth. Ecological crisis 
means, therefore, that we are living a critical moment in which our lifestyle and the values that 
sustain it are being judged and called into question for their destructive results. It is a crisis 
inasmuch as we are confronted with the current and future life-threatening scenarios, which 
can be drawn as unavoidable consequences of human practices and beliefs, and humanity 
needs therefore to make a decision about it. In doing so, we need not only practical criteria but 
also inspiring and sound images about human life upon the earth that may enlighten our 
discernment of pathways to true and fruitful life. Theology and Christian communities can play 
a crucial role in this awareness and transformation of minds and practices because they carry 
the archetypes, symbols, meaning, values, and moral codes around which people coalesce and 
define themselves.52 
 
3. Manifestations of the ecological crisis 
Given this understanding of the ecological crisis, one can ask about the signs and 
manifestations of it. What are the challenges and problems that characterize the current 
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ecological crisis? What are the symptoms and facts that call for a revision of the way humanity 
is thinking of and embodying its life upon the earth? Where are the traces and marks that have 
raised warnings about human behavior detrimental to life to the extent of threatening not only 
the quality and flourishing of the latter, but even its viability? As is mentioned above, the facts 
and data that are provided as a manifestation of the ecological crisis depend on the notion of 
ecology that one is actually using. The bibliography that charts the ecological crisis is abundant 
and diverse, and it ranges from scientific analysis of some data and indicators about specific 
topics such as biodiversity loss, population growth, climate change, and pollution, to more 
philosophical and theological investigations of the causes and roots of this crisis. Without any 
effort to be exhaustive, I aim to present four manifestations of the current ecological crisis that 
not only illustrate the gravity and urgency of the challenges humanity is dealing with, but also 
exhibit clearly the interconnection and mutual dependence among the three dimensions of 
ecology: personal, social, and environmental. These four manifestations are: hunger, migration 
for environmental causes, water, and waste. 
a. Hunger 
 World hunger is certainly one of the most scandalous manifestations of the current 
ecological crisis. It shows at once both the human face of the crisis, and how the three 
dimensions of ecology are deeply interwoven. According to the latest report of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations regarding the state of food insecurity in 
the world, about 795 million people are estimated to be chronically undernourished in the 
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world.53 Even though this indicates a reduction in global hunger of 100 million people over the 
last decade, and a decrease in the prevalence of undernourishment from 18.7 to 11.3 percent 
globally during the same time, it is outrageous that roughly one in every nine people in the 
world still has insufficient food for an active and healthy life. Within developing countries, 
where the vast majority of hungry people live, this proportion goes up to about one in every 
eight people, and the prevalence of undernourishment increases to 13.5 percent. Steven 
Bouma-Prediger offers the provocative image that if the hungry people in the world today were 
lined up shoulder to shoulder, the line of those who have too little to eat to meet their daily 
energy needs would extend around the world thirteen times.54 Both, the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) of halving by 2015 the proportion of undernourished people within 
developing countries seems to be at reach, and the World Food Summit (WFS) goal of halving 
the number of undernourished people by the same were not totally reached. Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Southern Asia are lagging behind in the path of attaining these goals. While the 
former has the highest prevalence of undernourishment – around one in every four people in 
the region remains undernourished – the latter concentrates the highest number of 
undernourished people in the world. 
 Food insecurity is manifestly a complex phenomenon that results from multiple 
causes.55 It is also difficult to measure. The World Food Summit of 1996 established four 
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dimensions of food security: availability, access, stability, and utilization, and the 2013 FAO 
report on the state of food insecurity in the world introduced a suite of new indicators for 
pinning down not only the figures of undernourishment in the world, but also its causes and the 
factors that increase the risk of perpetuating or even heightening this challenge. Many actions 
are required in a large variety of fields in order to counteract global undernourishment. As the 
FAO report states, depending on the context and the specific situation, actions may be required 
in agricultural production and productivity, rural development, fisheries, forestry, social 
protection, public works, trade and markets, resilience to shocks, education and health, and 
other areas.56 From the analysis of the experience of different countries it is manifest that 
hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition are complex problems with multifaceted causes. 
 Global environmental changes (GEC) unavoidably affect the food system. These changes 
in the physical and biogeochemical environment are caused naturally or influenced by human 
activities such as deforestation, fossil fuel consumption, urbanization, land reclamation, 
agricultural intensification, freshwater extraction, fisheries over-exploitation, and waste 
production. The notion of GEC includes changes in land cover and soils, biogeochemical cycles 
and atmospheric composition, biodiversity, climate and extreme weather events, sea level, and 
ocean chemistry and currents, and freshwater quality and availability.57 In future scenarios, 
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climate change is acknowledged to be one of the main factors that heighten food insecurity. It 
will affect all the main elements of food production, namely, land, water, and climate. Even 
though predictions about how climate change will affect our food supply are complex and 
debatable, it can be said that, in the near future, global warming will increase world hunger. For 
some of the world’s staple crops, such as maize and rice, are very susceptible to rising 
temperatures and to more unpredictably extreme seasons. Almost without exception, the 
countries with existing problems in feeding their people are those most at risk from climate 
change.58 Research shows that as soon as 2020 food production will be already affected by the 
mounting of temperatures, shifting seasons, more frequent and extreme weather events, 
flooding, and drought. As a result, there will be supposedly by that time a shortage of the four 
major food crops, namely, rice, wheat, maize, and soybean.59 There will also be consequences 
for fisheries and livestock. One of the paradoxes is that the food system is a notable producer 
of greenhouse gases through agricultural and non-agricultural activities.60 These emissions have 
been growing, especially as diets have been switching to meat and dairy products. In this sense, 
the current food system is one of the causes of global warming and therefore climate change, 
which will affect in turn the food system with disastrous consequences.  
 The amount of food produced nowadays is enough to feed the current world’s 
population. However, due to poor distribution of food, around 14 percent of the world’s 
population is still undernourished. Global food security is not only about producing enough 
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food for the world’s population. Inequalities and complexities of food distribution mean that 
while more than 800 million people are currently malnourished, 1 billion are overweight and 
susceptible to diseases associated with obesity.61 There is also the problem of “hidden hunger.” 
Another billion people are thought to suffer from “hidden hunger,” in which important 
micronutrients, such as vitamins and minerals, are missing from their diet, with consequent 
risks of physical and mental impairment.62 Against this background of undernourishment and 
hunger, it is also scandalous that roughly 30 to 40% of food in both the developed and 
developing worlds is lost to waste. While in the latter the causes are mainly attributable to the 
absence of food-chain infrastructure and the lack of knowledge or investment in storage 
technologies on the farm, in the former pre-retail losses are much lower, but those arising at 
the retail, food service, and home stages of the food chain have grown dramatically in recent 
years, for a variety of reasons such as low food prices which reduces incentives to avoid waste, 
and the higher cosmetic standards of consumption that make sellers discard many edible, yet 
only slightly blemished products.63  
 The challenge that hunger and undernourishment represent for humanity, shows the 
interconnectedness of the three dimensions of ecology. The global challenge of food security 
calls into question not only our relationship with nature throughout the entire food system, but 
also our personal patterns of consumption and solidarity with our neighbors. World hunger and 
undernourishment will not be successfully tackled just by the employment of new and more 
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suitable technology in food production and distribution. The use of certain means of production 
such as organisms genetically modified (GMO), the use of biotechnology, and intensive 
(confined/industrialized) grain-fed livestock systems raise in fact new challenges and ethical 
queries. We need to revise as well the ideas and criteria that both govern the way we relate to 
food consumption, and orient not only food production but also its equitable distribution.   
 Besides the fact that food insecurity prevails in the world’s poorest regions, the 
consequences of climate change upon the food system will affect primarily those who are 
already poor and vulnerable. The theologian Joshtrom Kureethadam speaks of a double 
injustice, namely geographical and demographic.64 While the first injustice refers to the fact 
that the negative influence of climate change on crop yields will be felt most in poor countries, 
the second points to the fact that food insecurity due to environmental changes will have 
particular impacts on specific groups like subsistence farmers, rural and indigenous 
communities, and fisher folk. Some of the most important effects of climate change will be felt 
indeed among the populations, predominantly in developing countries, referred to as 
subsistence or smallholder farmers.65 This double injustice accentuates both the scandal of 
global food insecurity and the urgency of making options and exploring solutions that take into 
account the three dimensions – personal, social, and environmental – of this ecological 
challenge.66 
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b. Migration 
 Environmental factors have certainly been the cause of migration in the past. It suffices 
to remember among many other cases, for instance, the Irish migration to USA following the 
1840s potato famine. The environment has always influenced the distribution of human 
settlements across the world. For many people living in tough environments, migration is the 
chosen option to preserve their livelihoods. Nevertheless, as the Oxford Refugee Studies Centre 
states, two factors render both the present time and the foreseeable future different from the 
past. First, the global scale of environmental change and thus the potential impacts it will have, 
such as forced migration, are new phenomena. No longer will these impacts be episodic or 
localized. Second, human agency is unarguably at the center of environmental change and the 
potential to respond to it.67 Migration as a consequence of environmental changes is already a 
fact, which is affecting livelihoods, communities, and the social and cultural identities of people. 
Yet, what are the concepts that better frame the situation and status of those who migrate for 
environmental causes? Should they be called ecological refuges or environmental migrants? 
How can their status be established and defined? How many people currently are and in the 
future will be displaced by environmental causes? In which areas is this more likely to happen? 
How can this be estimated? What are the responsibilities and duties of governments vis-à-vis 
those who flee their homes for environmental reasons? These are the main questions that have 
articulated the reflection on migration motivated by environmental causes. The tasks of 
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defining the status, estimating the numbers and establishing the rights and duties of those who 
leave their households for environmental reasons, is an ongoing process.  
 The conceptualizing process is essential for research and policy-making. Nevertheless it 
is difficult to establish a clear-cut definition of what an environmental migrant would and would 
not be. The main obstacles to the lack of definition relating to migration caused by 
environmental degradation or change are, on the one hand, the difficulty of isolating 
environmental factors from other drivers of migration and, on the other hand, the confusion of 
forced versus voluntary migration.68 How can the environmental reasons to migrate be 
evaluated when they are interwoven with other motivations and causes? How can their 
influence on the decision to migrate be established? Is environmental migration associated just 
with human displacement caused by sudden and unexpected natural disasters, or can it take 
the form of voluntary resettlements motivated by environmental changes? What about 
relocations ordered by governments as a result of specific projects of risks? When it comes to 
choose a notion to define the status of those who migrate for environmental causes, some 
prefer the term “environmental refugee” – despite the fact that it is legally inaccurate – 
because it is more compelling than the term “environmental migrant” and it evokes a sense of 
global duty and accountability along with a sense of urgency before imminent adversities.69 
Despite the problems of agreeing on a definition, notion, and typology for the people who 
abandon their homes for environmental causes, it is actually a fact that the current 
environmental challenges are provoking migration and human displacements. 
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 Four main reasons are identified as causes for environmental migration.70 The first type 
of migration is related to sudden environmental disasters, such as floods, earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions, tsunamis, droughts, water or soil pollution, etc. In this case, the link between human 
displacement and environmental causes is manifest. Moreover, there seems to be a consensus 
that the number of environmental disasters and their impact upon human migration is 
increasing. Oxfam, for instance, estimates that by 2015 the average number of people affected 
each year by climate-related disasters may increase by over 50 per cent compared to the 
decade 1998-2007, bringing the annual average to more than 375 million people.71 This may 
certainly have an effect upon human displacement. The second type of migration has to do 
with gradual environmental degradation, such as desertification. In this case migration is 
motivated by a slow-onset environmental change or degradation which affects people who are 
directly dependent on the environment for their maintenance. It is certainly more difficult to 
isolate the environmental causes from other factors in this type of human displacement. 
Nevertheless, it is affirmed that overall, a much larger number of people is expected to migrate 
due to gradual deterioration of environmental conditions rather than natural disasters, even if, 
in most cases, their fate does not catch headlines.72 This is why some state the importance of 
identifying and mapping potential environmental ‘hotspots’ and problem locations along with 
monitoring changing conditions and identifying tipping points that trigger migration rather than 
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adaptation.73 The third type of migration is associated with climate change, which is expected 
to affect the environment through the intensification of the occurrence and power of natural 
disasters, and the increasing of global temperature with disastrous consequences to agricultural 
production, water availability, and sea level. This may render uninhabitable some coastal areas 
and increase the number of sinking island states. It can also imply competition over natural 
resources which may lead to conflict and human displacement as one of its consequences.74 
Yet, even though we can intuitively believe that migration caused by climate change is likely to 
be serious in the future, it is hard to predict at present how serious it will be. The final type of 
environmental migration is due to construction of infrastructure development projects, such as 
dam construction. Graeme Hugo offers the example of the Three Gorges Dam project located in 
the lower reaches of Yangtze River in China, which has involved a displacement of more than 
1.2 million people.75 These four types of migration display the complexity and variety of human 
population distribution caused by environmental changes. 
 There is no consensus about the number of people who will have to migrate because of 
environmental changes. Norman Myers of Oxford University, for instance, states that, when 
global warming takes hold, there could be as many as 200 million people overtaken by 
disruptions of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, by droughts of unprecedented 
severity and duration, and by sea-level rise and coastal flooding.76 Nevertheless, this figure is 
highly dependent on how one portrays and envisages the changes within the environment 
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driven by climate change. Moreover, it does not take into account the adaptation measures 
that individuals, communities, and governments may undertake.77 Despite the fact that it is 
highly difficult to predict the number of people who will need to migrate for environmental 
causes, and that this affects the policy-making process and governments’ reactions, it is beyond 
doubt that human displacement for environmental reasons is an increasing phenomenon. 
 It is manifest that environmental changes and degradation are pushing people to 
migrate. This reality is one of the manifestations of the current ecological crisis. It epitomizes 
the urgency of the problems as well as the interconnection between the personal, social, and 
environmental dimension of ecology. Although migration is not always negative, it is true that 
the effects of sudden mass migration are profoundly damaging. The links between 
environmental degradation, climate change, and human displacement are complex. This is why 
more research and data collection are needed, in order to foster suitable policies that can 
protect those who migrate for environmental reasons, particularly the most vulnerable.  
 
c. Water 
 It seems to be a constant truth that the meaning and importance of some things is not 
fully appreciated, inasmuch as they abound and are widely available. When they run into a 
shortage, are scarcely found, or regrettably disappear, then their essential character is finally 
grasped and acknowledged. One understands, for instance, the deep meaning of health when 
sick, and grasps the true significance of freedom when one is oppressed. In this sense, as the 
planet seems to move towards fresh water scarcity, this may be a momentous time to not only 
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affirm the importance of water, but also to protect its availability through sustainable practices 
for its extraction and use. Although we are totally dependent on water which is indeed a sine 
qua non need for life and its quality, this radical dependence is not always noticed when clear, 
fresh water is readily accessible. Yet, we are heading toward fresh water scarcity insofar as the 
increasing world demand for fresh water is surpassing in some regions its available supply, as 
well as exceeding the natural rates of hydrological renewal through the water cycle. 
 In order to visualize the challenge, it suffices to recall some statistics. The UN-Water 
office’s document entitled A post-2015 Global Goal for Water states, for instance, that as 
countries develop and populations grow, the potential demand for water is projected to 
increase 55% by 2050.  Already by 2025, two thirds of the world’s population could be living in 
water-stressed countries if current consumption patterns continue.78 Moreover, the WHO and 
UNICEF 2014 joint report on progress on drinking water and sanitation affirms that despite 
strong overall progress, 748 million people – mostly the poor and marginalized – still did not 
have access to improved drinking water in 2012, 325 million (43%) of whom live in sub-Saharan 
Africa.79 We also know that water use has been growing at more than twice the rate of 
population increase in the last century and that by 2025, 1.8 billion people will be living in 
countries or regions with absolute water scarcity.80 It is important to notice that fresh water 
represents less than 2.5 percent of all available water on earth. Of these fresh water resources 
about 70 percent is in the form of ice and permanent snow cover in mountainous regions, the 
Antarctic and Arctic regions; almost 30 percent is groundwater and mere 0.3 percent of all fresh 
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water is surface water.81 Water supply crises have been identified by governments, scholars, 
industry, and civil actors as one of the most important global risks,82 especially groundwater 
depletion. 
 The reasons for the increase in water withdrawal and consumption are complex. It is 
manifest that population growth along with urban and increasing standards of lifestyle leads to 
growing water demand, inasmuch as it raises the need for drinking water, health and 
sanitation, as well as for energy, food, and other goods and services that require water for their 
production and delivery. The global demand for water is expected to grow especially within 
developing or emerging economies. Nowadays, agriculture accounts for roughly 70% of total 
freshwater withdrawals globally, with the industrial and domestic sectors accounting for the 
remaining 20% and 10% respectively, although these figures vary considerably across 
countries.83 While agriculture is responsible for the 70% of global water withdrawal, it uses 90% 
of the water it withdraws. This is a highly consumptive use of fresh water, which means that the 
water needed for agriculture is made unavailable for other purposes. In contrast, many 
domestic and some Industrial uses of fresh water are nonconsumptive, which means that the 
water is reintegrated into the ecosystem or municipal water supply in some fashion, and 
therefore it is made available for other purposes. 
 Even though data on water use (withdrawals and consumption) and quality are very 
often outdated, limited or unavailable,84 it is a fact that there is an increasing demand and use 
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of fresh water which represents a tremendous challenge for the future. Climate change is also 
expected to alter hydrological regimes and the availability of fresh water, with impacts on both 
rainfed and irrigated agriculture.85 It will reduce precipitation in areas that are already semi-
arid, and increase precipitation in temperate zones as well as increase the frequency of 
extreme events. As the UN Water states it is through water and its quality that people will feel 
the impact of change most strongly. Without proper adaptation and change people will be at 
great risk of hunger, disease, energy shortages, and poverty due to water scarcity, pollution and 
flooding.86 In this sense, water demand and consumption is intimately connected with other 
priority areas such as food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture, as well as health, 
biodiversity, desertification, land degradation, and drought. Therefore, the way through which 
we respond to the challenge of fresh water scarcity will certainly impact how we deal with 
other ecological challenges. Global development goals for food security, poverty reduction, 
energy, and other factors cannot be attained without dependable water provisions. Hence it 
can be said that a global goal for water would contribute to poverty eradication, gender 
equality, enjoyment of the human right to water and sanitation, and universal development 
while conserving the Earth’s finite and vulnerable water resources for current and future 
generations.87 No need to mention that although these ecological challenges affect our entire 
planet, they have a greater impact upon more vulnerable and poorer populations, such as 
women and children in rural areas. 
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 Technology has certainly a role to play in facing fresh water scarcity, but it will not 
resolve all the challenges. It is true that technology can increase efficiency, decrease waste, and 
transform polluted water into usable water. It is also true that already in some countries such 
as Saudi Arabia and Qatar salt water is being turned into fresh water through desalination 
processes. All of this definitely, though minimally, contributes to a larger fresh water supply. 
Nevertheless, technology is not the panacea, and an excessive confidence in its benefits can 
prevent us from examining and revising other aspects of our relationship with water that may 
need to be amended. It is crucial, for instance, that we ask questions about who owns the 
water, who can earn money from it, who must pay for its distribution, and who guides and 
controls its management. It is vital as well to establish certain forms of accountability, and 
clear-cut standards in our use of fresh water. Fresh water scarcity is not just an environmental 
challenge. As an ecological challenge, it also involves personal and social dimensions that need 
equally to be addressed.  
 The American theologian Christiana Peppard emphasizes that we must keep in mind two 
key observations or paradoxes in dealing with the problem of fresh water scarcity.88 First, while 
twenty-first-century fresh water crises are felt most acutely at a domestic level, fresh water 
scarcity cannot be solved solely by reducing domestic demand. Besides the fact that its destiny 
is intimately related to agriculture, fresh water scarcity requires the cooperation of all toward 
sustainable solutions. Second, while the need for fresh water is universal, there is no such thing 
as a universal solution to fresh water scarcity. We need therefore to explore local and 
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contextual solutions. This is why some prefer to speak of water crises in the plural, for it always 
emerges in particular contexts. These two paradoxes about fresh water scarcity may guide our 
search for solutions as well as direct our reflection not only toward the environment, but also 
toward the personal and social components of this ecological challenge.  
 
d. Waste 
 Waste treatment and management is becoming a major challenge nowadays. Yet, waste 
is neither only a byproduct of modern societies nor a new phenomenon. Humanity has always 
needed to deal with substances or objects resulting from human activities that are unable to be 
reused and therefore are meant to be disposed. What is new is that the treatment and 
management of global waste is facing three main challenges: 1) Increasing growth in the 
quantity and complexity of waste streams associated with rising incomes and economic growth, 
2) Increasing risk of damage to human health and ecosystems, and 3) its contribution to climate 
change.89 Waste is generated in many different ways, and each waste product needs a 
particular management solution. Waste composition and size depend mainly on consumption 
patterns and the industrial and economic structures in place. It can be classified according to its 
constitution, namely, municipal solid waste, hazardous waste, and nuclear (radioactive) waste, 
or it can be related to a particular stage of the production process which produces a specific 
type of waste. In this last case, waste is divided into three main groups, namely, waste 
generated as a result of extraction and transformation of raw materials, manufacturing and 
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production of goods (including building construction), and distribution and consumption of 
manufactured products.90  
 Regardless of its composition, the amount of global waste is steadily growing. Based on 
official numbers, Steven Bouma-Prediger offers the images that each year the United States 
generates enough municipal solid waste to fill a bumper-to-bumper convoy of garbage trucks 
that would extend around the planet 3.8 times, and that a typical U.S. citizen throws away 62 
tons of garbage over a 75-year lifetime.91 This is speaking of just one country and of only 
municipal solid waste. The increase in waste generation is not just a management issue. It is 
rather a symptom of inadequate global methods for production and consumption. There is a 
direct link between affluence and waste generation.  Research shows, for instance, that in high-
income countries, an urban population of 0.3 billion generates approximately 0.24 million 
tonnes of Municipal Solid Waste (0.8 kg per capita per day), while in low-income countries 
around the same amount of waste (0.26 million tonnes per day) is generated by 1.3 billion 
people (0.2 kg per capita per day), a quarter of the level in high-income countries.92 
Yet, the ecological challenge that waste represents for humanity is not just a matter of 
quantity. Other types of waste such as hazardous and nuclear waste entail enormous risks not 
only for human health but also for the integrity and life of ecosystems. This kind of waste poses 
a major concern inasmuch as it can have a tremendous environmental impact related basically 
to toxic contamination of soil, water, and air. Hazardous waste can be the outcome of different 
industrial or manufacturing processes or simply discarded commercial products, such as 
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cleaning fluids or pesticides. It is defined by its ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity.  It 
can be liquid or solid, and each product requires a specific treatment. Hazardous waste is 
currently a risk not only for the zones where it is generated, but also to other places and 
regions inasmuch as it is transported from and exported to different countries. According to the 
Basel Convention, which regulates the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, of 
more than 300 million tons of waste generated worldwide in 2000, a little less than 2% was 
exported. However 90% of the exported waste was classified as hazardous.93 Therefore, besides 
the risks that this kind of waste involves for human health and environmental integrity, it raises 
also the question about justice and disparity among countries.  
Among all types of waste, what is especially shocking is the amount of food that is lost 
and wasted worldwide. The FAO estimates, for instance, that 32 percent of all food produced in 
the world was lost or wasted in 2009. This figure is based on weight, and when it is converted 
into calories means that global food loss and waste amount to approximately 24 percent of all 
food produced.94 Food is lost or wasted throughout the whole supply chain. In low-income 
societies food is mainly lost over the early and middle stages of the food supply chain for 
different reasons such as poor storage facilities and lack of infrastructure, poor and unhygienic 
handling which turns food unsafe for human consumption, and inadequate market systems. In 
medium and high-income societies, on the other hand, food is mainly lost or wasted at the 
consumption stage. This is due to reasons such as overproduction and abundance of food, 
standards and patterns of consumption, and food size and appearance. Here again there is a 
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close connection between affluence and the waste of food. Indeed, overall, on a per-capita 
basis, much more food is wasted in the industrialized world than in developing countries. The 
FAO estimates that the per capita food waste by consumers in Europe and North-America is 95-
115 kg/year, while this figure in sub-Saharan Africa and South/Southeast Asia is only 6-11 
kg/year.95 Major supermarkets, in adjusting to consumer expectations, can reject entire crops 
of perfectly edible fruit and vegetables at the farm because they do not have the form or 
appearance which matches marketing standards. Food is also wasted in industrialized countries 
because of its confusing labeling using the terms “use-by,” “best-before,” “sell-by,” or “display 
until.” These misunderstandings mean that people throw away a lot of food that is still good to 
eat, thinking that it might be liable to poison them.96 This becomes more scandalous when we 
consider the figure that food waste at the consumer level in industrialized countries (222 
million tons) is almost as high as the total net food production in sub-Saharan Africa (230 
million tons).97 Besides the issues of justice that this situation creates within a world with still 
nearly 1 billion undernourished people, it is also true that this wastage of food implies that a 
huge amount of resources used in food production are used in vain, and that some of the 
greenhouse gas emissions caused by production of food are also emissions in vain. 
It is manifest that the challenge that waste management and treatment represents for 
humanity cannot be solved just by reducing, reusing, and recycling. It is not merely a technical 
problem which requires only technical solutions. We need to examine as well the personal and 
social components of this ecological problem, which are expressed for instance in cultural 
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assumptions, patterns of consumption, and lifestyle standards. One example that epitomizes 
this is the notion of “planned obsolescence” and the increasing of electronic waste (e-waste). 
Research shows that e-waste recycling involves the major producers and users, shipping the 
obsolete products to Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. Yet, in doing so we are exporting a sack 
full of problems to people who will have to deal eventually with this type of waste.98 It is 
difficult to minimize the amount of waste when the durability of products is deliberately 
sacrificed for the sake of productions gains, or we are permanently encouraged to replace some 
electronic devices still useful by their new formats or updated versions. We are in a throw-away 
culture which needs to revise some of its assumptions and values.99 Focusing solely on the 
environmental issues that the treatment and management of waste involves, and neglecting 
the personal and social dimensions that underlie this ecological challenge, will entail a 
misunderstanding of its causes as well as errors in defining its solutions.  
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B) Models for an Ecological Christian Theology: towards an Ecotheological Rationale 
In choosing these four manifestations of the current ecological crisis, namely, hunger, 
migration, water, and waste, I aim to show the gravity and urgency of the challenges which 
humanity is facing as well as the intimate connection between the three dimensions of ecology: 
personal, social, and environmental. These four manifestations of the ecological crisis, among 
many others, reveal the human responsibility not only in the generation of these problems but 
also in their potential solutions. The anthropogenic character of this crisis is undeniable. The 
fact that humanity already enjoys a leading position within creation has to be the starting point 
for theological reflection. This fact, which goes beyond the debate about the degree of 
anthropocentrism in Christian narratives, is the expression of a new era in which the 
dichotomies between natural processes and culture, on the one hand, and natural processes 
and history, on the other hand, seem to be neither valid nor useful.100 Against this background, 
theology needs to provide images and notions that may shake up people’s minds, and may 
inspire and nourish the way people think of their relationship with others and with nature. 
These notions and images may also guide people’s searching and discernment of paths to a true 
and fruitful life. The ecological crisis has to do not only with environmental challenges such as 
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diminishing ecosystems and biodiversity, but also and especially with the manner in which 
people depict and embody their life and role within creation. 
In this sense, after tracing the appearance of ecotheology, its development and goals, as 
well as the meaning of the ecological crisis and its manifestations, it is worth asking about the 
rationale which underlies this theological endeavor. What are the strategies that ecotheology 
has explored in order to connect ecological sensitivity and theological reflection? If it is not just 
a matter of minor adjustments, then how does ecotheology justify the revisions, 
transformations, and deepening within Christian thought which the manifestations of the 
ecological crisis seem to require? Why and how has ecotheology been shaping a Christian 
critique of the cultural habits underlying ecological destruction, as well as an ecological reform 
of Christianity? What is the specific theological rationale which those stances exhibit? I move 
now therefore to ecotheology and its different expressions. Without any claim of being 
exhaustive, I present some strategies of how ecotheology has been connecting ecological 
challenges with theological reflection. Each one of these strategies has its own starting points, 
presuppositions, rationale, blind spots, and downsides. Given that the focus of this dissertation 
is theological anthropology, I will pay especially attention to the anthropological assumptions 
and implications of these theological stances.  
 
1. Mapping the field: some typologies of ecotheology 
Mapping ecotheology is not an easy task. It has taken different forms and expressions 
over the last five decades. The differences are related to cultural and geographical contexts, the 
use of the Scriptures, types of questions that are addressed, particular or general concerns, 
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Christian denominations, the use of and dialogue with an array of scientific and philosophical 
resources such as biology, astrophysics, and cosmology, intellectual horizons, and goals, and 
the general assessment of Christian tradition. As a result of this, ecotheology is currently 
characterized by a number of different discourses, each one with its own interlocutors, guilds, 
and forms of rhetoric. South African theologian Ernst Conradie, for instance, identifies and 
names some of the current discourses within ecotheology including: explorations in exegesis 
such us the Earth Bible project and the Exeter project; discourses in the field of applied ethics in 
topics like animal issues, food issues, biotechnology, or climate change; various regional modes 
of ecofeminism; interfaith projects in religion and ecology like the one within the Forum on 
Religion and Ecology which incorporate indigenous worldviews; efforts in the renovation of 
liturgy and spirituality through an ecological perspective; the Christian Faith and the Earth 
project on Christian symbols, doctrines and loci; and efforts toward the greening of institutions 
and communities.101 These differences in themes, methods and priorities imply tensions as well 
as dissimilarities in the quality and scope of publications and research within ecotheology. 
For some it is time to move beyond ecotheology inasmuch as it has been already 
successful in naming the significance of theological engagement with ecology, and the risk of 
self-marginalization needs to be avoided. In this perspective, ecotheology does not have a 
particular theological methodology or group of methodologies which have enduring 
significance, but it has rather accomplished the task of raising theological awareness of 
ecological challenges which call for a Christian critique of the practices and beliefs underlying 
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this crisis as well as for an ecological reformation of Christianity. To move beyond ecotheology 
does not mean to abandon theological attention towards ecological concerns. It rather suggests 
that any current theological project that fails to attend to ecological questions where relevant 
fails to be adequate theology as such.102 
Assuming the internal differences in ecotheology some theologians have tried to map 
the field providing typologies which unveil the main strategies and rationale that scholars 
exhibit in linking theology with the current ecological crisis. The main goal of this mapping is not 
to offer a firm and definite map, but rather to group and expose different emphases, centers of 
gravity, methods, and perspectives, through which ecotheology is being unfolded. As I already 
mentioned, without any claim of being exhaustive, I will focus on the typologies offered by John 
Haught, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Willis Jenkins.  
a. John Haught 
 The American theologian John Haught has developed a tripartite typology in order to 
classify the diversity of theological stances within ecotheology.103 A renovated effort in 
ecotheology must take into account all of these three perspectives, which are complementary 
and not mutually exclusive. In this sense, each of these strategies is neither suppressed nor 
superseded by the other two. Each of them displays a particular accent and rationale which 
entails specific outcomes as well. According to Haught, none of these perspectives can be found 
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in a perfectly pure form, and aspects of all three maybe found in the work of any single author. 
However, they differ in method and conclusions, and therefore it is suitable to treat them as 
distinct types. The three theological perspectives are apologetic, sacramental and 
eschatological. 
 The first way of theologically addressing the ecological challenges is the apologetic 
perspective, which Haught also labels as tradition-centered approach. This is the stance which 
the majority of theologians have embraced. It tries to show that there is already a sufficient 
basis in Scripture and tradition for an adequately Christian response to the ecological crisis. 
Responding to the accusation that Christianity is at the root of the ecological challenges 
humanity is currently facing, the apologetic enterprise defends the integrity of biblical religion 
and traditional theology without demanding their transformation. What theology needs to do 
instead is to delve deeper into the Scriptures and tradition in order to dig up all ecologically 
friendly elements which have been ignored or forgotten. In this sense, this perspective 
emphasizes the idea of retrieving what revelation offers through the Bible and tradition in 
order to ground an ecologically sensitive theology.  
 This is the strategy assumed by many scholars and church authorities in the case of 
Catholicism. Haught thinks that the apologetic approach underlines the idea that God has given 
humanity dominion and stewardship over creation, and that this is reason enough for us to take 
care of our natural environment.104 This approach has certainly the benefit of pointing out 
relevant resources in Christian tradition which have not been sufficiently underscored. The task 
of retrieving traditional teachings, overlooked texts, and historical religious figures, is 
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undeniably important for any ecologically sensitive theology. Haught believes as well that a 
good dose of apologetics is actually needed in the face of many simplistic complaints and 
historically inaccurate interpretations of the role of Christianity as a source and cause of the 
ecological crisis. Nevertheless, the tradition-centered perspective does not go far enough in 
opening Christianity to the kind of self-renewal and reformation that the current challenges 
seem to demand. We know that Christian tradition, as the work of Paul Santmire has shown, is 
ambiguous in its depiction of and relationship with nature. Christian tradition is neither 
ecologically bankrupt nor replete with immediately accessible, albeit long-forgotten, ecological 
riches hidden everywhere in its deeper vaults.105 The apologetic endeavor cannot therefore be 
the ground for an adequate ecologically sensitive theology, inasmuch as it affirms that there is 
nothing within Christian doctrines and symbols that needs to be transformed or reinterpreted 
in the face of the ecological crisis.  
The second way of formulating an ecologically sensitive theology is the creation-
centered or sacramental approach. According to Haught, as opposed to the apologetic 
enterprise, this perspective focuses less on normative religious texts or tradition, and more on 
the sacral quality of the cosmos itself. In this sense, it aims to acknowledge and unveil the 
revelatory character of nature. Nature is indeed sacramental, which means that nature in all of 
its beauty and diversity reveals the divine mystery, not just to Christians, of course, but to 
people of many traditions. Haught states that the sacramental approach has assumed different 
forms within Christianity, from natural theology to cosmic spirituality, and that it is found as 
well in different ways and degrees in non-Christian religions and even philosophical stances 
                                                     
105
 H. Paul Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1985), 8. 
68 
 
such as deep ecology. One of the major and distinctive features of the creation-centered 
outlook is its recognition of the intrinsic value of every creature. All creatures are sacramental 
because of their intimate connection with the Creator, and therefore they are the primary 
symbolic disclosure of God. They are valuable in themselves and not just in relation to the 
usefulness or profit that humanity can obtain from them. In this sense, the sacramental 
perspective highlights the continuity of humans with the rest of the natural world, and 
proclaims the intimate relatedness among all creatures. 
Haught asserts that all theological efforts guided by the sacramental viewpoint 
acknowledge the need for revision and reformation within Christianity. To take the ecological 
crisis seriously into account means that we need something more than simply retrieving and 
wheeling out classic texts and teachings. The sacramental perspective is currently revising these 
texts and teachings inasmuch as they must be “carefully sifted and reinterpreted in terms of a 
cosmological, relational, nonhierarchical, non-patriarchal, nondualistic and more organismic 
understanding of the universe.”106 Moving beyond the defensive response which characterizes 
the apologetic endeavor, the sacramental perspective has launched a general revision of 
Christian doctrines and symbols which need to be reinterpreted and sometimes reformed in 
the face of the ecological crisis.  
The sacramental perspective has brought to the fore the theological notion of creation. 
It explores this notion in dialogue with scientific accounts of reality which progressively portray 
an evolving universe that previous theological ages could never have imagined. The aim is to 
renew Christian narratives and their accounts of the relationships between God and creation, 
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God and humanity, and humanity and other creatures. Haught thinks that the theological 
efforts grouped into the sacramental perspective are producing new results through what he 
calls a “recosmologizing” of traditional Christian teachings. First of all, this implies placing a 
fresh emphasis on the biblical theme of creation. Christian tradition has implicitly subordinated 
creation to the theme of redemption, and therefore the original goodness of the entire creation 
has been usually overlooked. There has been an excessive emphasis in the fallenness of nature 
as a consequence of the human fall that has impaired the recognition of the sacral quality of 
the entire creation that God declared to be good. Traditionally, nature seems to be just the 
background of the human salvific history. Conversely, the sacramental perspective states that 
the notions of ‘redemption’ and ‘reconciliation’ mean not only the restoring of the God-
humanity relationship, but also the healing of the entire earth-community and indeed the 
renewal of the whole creation, beginning right now.107 Secondly, along the same lines, the 
sacramental perspective understands Christ as a cosmic reality, and not simply as a personal 
historical savior. The retrieval of and emphasis on cosmic Christology entails that the origin and 
destiny of the whole universe and not just of human beings are in relation with Christ. Thirdly, 
ecotheology, guided by the sacramental approach, highlights the revelatory character of the 
universe. In this sense, the notion of revelation as God’s self-communication should not be 
restricted to human history and the Scriptures. Throughout its 14-billion-year history the whole 
cosmos is the most fundamental mode of the unveiling of divine mystery. Besides the renewal 
of the notion of revelation, the sacramental perspective proposes an ecological understanding 
of God, in which the Trinitarian relationships are the model and epitome of the relational 
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character of reality. The theological conception of the Trinity discloses that communion rather 
than substance is the basic structure of reality. In light of this, theology should see human 
beings inherently related to other creatures, which take part as well in the one single story of 
salvation. Every creature is an expression of God’s self-communication and for this reason 
somehow participates in the very holiness of God. Therefore, the loss of biodiversity impacts 
our sense of God. Finally, the sacramental approach fosters new directions in spirituality and 
ethics inasmuch as it emphasizes the interrelatedness of all creatures as well as a non-dualistic 
vision of humanity. In this sense, there is a close connection between social and environmental 
challenges, and the latter will not be rightly faced without taking into account the former. We 
do not have to choose between attending human inequities and care for the flourishing of the 
larger earth-community. 
 When it comes to evaluating the sacramental approach, Haught asserts that one of its 
advantages is the revision and reinterpretation of the classic sources of Christian faith. It allows 
theology for a hermeneutic of suspicion about some of the same motifs that the apologetic 
perspective holds to be ecologically relevant and normative. Haught offers the example of the 
notion of human dominion or stewardship over creation, which seems to be the default 
position within the apologetic enterprise, but is considered rather inadequate in the 
sacramental viewpoint inasmuch as it fails to underscore that human beings belong to nature 
much more that it belongs to them. The sacramental perspective highlights as well the 
revelatory character of the whole universe and therefore enables theology to affirm that the 
integrity of nature is inseparable from the flourishing of religion. According to Haught this is 
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one of the major contributions of sacramental ecotheology which offers us a deeply religious 
reason for taking care of creation. 
Haught considers that the sacramental perspective of ecotheology has basically two 
drawbacks. First, although it retrieves the biblical theme of creation, it does not consider 
sufficiently that the notion of creation within Scripture is eminently eschatological. In other 
words, creation unfolds within the Bible in a close connection with the fulfillment of God's 
promises vis-à-vis not only humanity but also the whole universe. These promises point toward 
their future fulfillment which somehow governs creation's destiny. In accentuating the 
sacramental character of the cosmos, the sacramental perspective turns our gaze toward the 
original blessing of creation or toward its present goodness as revelatory of God, but it is not 
able to encompass or thematize the future of God’s creation. Second, creation-centered 
theology has difficulty providing a meaningful account of the limits of creation and of some of 
the components of life-systems such as violence, suffering, death, and pain. In this sense, it 
risks offering a romanticized portrayal of nature that stresses its goodness and intrinsic value, 
while omitting its perplexing features which do not readily fit with its allegedly revelatory 
character. This is why Haught thinks that even though the sacramental approach is a necessary 
complement for the apologetic endeavor and is a step forward toward an ecologically sensitive 
theology, it is unable to offer a fully biblical or a distinctively Christian ecotheology. 
Consequently, Haught identifies and proposes a third rationale for an ecologically 
sensitive theology. This is what he calls the eschatological approach, and it is the one that 
Haught personally prefers. Although he thinks that every contemporary attempt to develop a 
meaningful ecotheology must be grounded in the sacramental interpretation of nature, he 
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nevertheless asserts that the biblical account of creation is oriented to the future and this is 
something that an actual Christian ecotheology must take into account. Revelation and the 
Scriptures are future-oriented. They point to the eschatological fulfillment of the divine 
promises. In this sense, the deepening of cosmology needs to be framed by eschatology, which 
is something that the sacramental approach fails to do.  Haught states that the understanding 
of nature as promise is the overarching principle of the eschatological perspective. Indeed, as 
he states, the “notion of nature as promise brings together into a coherent vision the three 
domains of ecology, evolution, and eschatology.”108 According to Haught we should not forget 
that, in the Bible, sacramentality is taken up into eschatology. The eschatological approach 
comprises therefore all theological efforts for building a significant ecotheology which are 
guided by the notion of nature as promise and the eschatological emphasis toward the future 
coming of God. 
Some may object that the eschatological orientation is precisely one of the elements of 
Christianity that has contributed to human carelessness toward nature. Moreover, this 
approach may nurture the idea that human beings do not totally belong to the wider world of 
nature and that they are just pilgrims or sojourners upon the earth. Christianity has indeed 
predicated that humans are just viators in this world and that they need to accept this 
homeless character of their existence as a condition of redemptive liberation. In addition to this 
notion of human homelessness upon the earth, the future orientation of the Bible has 
apparently contributed to generate the ambiguous dream of progress, which has nowadays 
turned into the ideal of unlimited economic growth that has had harmful consequences for the 
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environment and its resources. Therefore, some may say that Christianity is one of the causes 
of the current ecological crisis, exactly because of its eschatological accent which diverts our 
attention from the present to the future, and makes us sacrifice the present world at the 
expense of a promise of future fulfillment. Hence it is not manifest how a future-oriented 
ecotheology may be helpful in dealing with the prevailing environmental challenges.    
Theological efforts guided by an eschatological emphasis need therefore to substantiate 
that hoping for the future fulfillment of divine promises is a condition of, and not a hindrance 
to, ecological commitment. Haught shows that process thought inspired by the work of Alfred 
North Whitehead, and theological stances such as those of Teilhard de Chardin and Jürgen 
Moltmann are a good example of future-oriented theology which is in tune with the biblical 
idea of divine promise and its future realization. Moreover, the new scientific account of the 
evolution of the universe brings to the fore the ideas of change, flux, openness, and novelty, 
which provide an interesting framework for an eschatological ecotheology. What science is 
showing is that the universe is a restless adventure, a process, an ongoing story that has been 
evolving for the last 14 billion years. In this sense, nature is not something finished, fixed, or 
static, as many still may believe, but it is rather an unfinished adventure open to what is 
perpetually new. The universe has been in movement as it were since its beginning, unfolding 
new horizons and opening new possibilities. According to Haught, this scientific account of the 
cosmos allows theology to think of the searching and future of humanity as part of or even an 
expression of the universe’s own searching and movement. As Haught asserts “our human 
hunger for transcendence is a conscious development of a general leaning toward the open 
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future that has always been a hidden feature of the physical universe.”109 Accordingly, theology 
can reasonably claim that religious homelessness, namely the sense of being in transit or 
pilgrimage upon the earth toward a future fulfillment, is perfectly in harmony with a sense of 
being at home within the cosmos. Humanity is part of a wider and larger story in which the 
whole universe looks forward to the fulfillment of divine promises. The eschatological approach 
reminds us that neither the theology of creation nor contemporary scientific accounts of the 
cosmos authorize us to restrict Christian hope to humanity. Divine promises encompass all 
creatures, and the future of humanity is tightly united to the future of the entire universe. 
Ecotheology from an eschatological perspective has two major advantages compared to 
the apologetic and sacramental strategies. First, it resists any attempt to absolutize or sacralize 
the cosmos. Nature is still unfinished and not yet totally revelatory of God. Therefore it is not 
fully transparent to God. In this sense, the future-oriented perspective provides a suitable 
framework which allows theology to deal adequately with the limits of nature and other 
puzzling elements of life-systems such as violence, suffering, death, and pain. Second, 
portraying nature as promise rather than perfection is an effective antidote to those harmful 
practices against the Earth that regard the latter as limitless in its resourcefulness. We are 
bound to care and respect the Earth, not simply because God has given humanity the task of 
being the stewards of creation as the apologetic perspective asserts, or because the cosmos is a 
sacramental expression of the divine, as the creation-centered approach affirms. We should 
care for and respect creation because it is a promise yet to be fulfilled. In this sense, to “destroy 
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nature is to turn away from a promise.”110 Along the same lines, Haught shows that while in the 
apologetic perspective environmental abuse is considered as disobedience to God’s call for 
humanity to be stewards of creation and in the sacramental approach it is interpreted as 
sacrilege inasmuch as environmental degradation entails the desecration of something 
somehow sacred, in eschatological ecotheology the lack of respect and care for creation is 
regarded as a form of despair. A future-oriented ecotheology better honors biblical revelation 
and its emphasis on eschatology as well as it enables theology to combine both the ambiguity 
and promise of nature. 
b. Rosemary Radford Ruether 
 The American feminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether thinks that all current 
Christian ecotheology endeavors can be divided in two different types: covenantal and 
sacramental.111 These two types are rooted in the Scriptures and have evolved through history, 
acquiring a distinctive form in present theological reflection. Therefore, the covenantal and 
sacramental perspectives are biblical themes, which have developed through history and now 
are taken up or retrieved by ecotheology. They are not ready-made ecological ethics or 
spirituality, and they certainly need to be reinterpreted as they are marked by a legacy of 
patriarchalism. However, she thinks that these two perspectives are complementary and 
necessary for a good ecotheology nowadays. They need to be interconnected for a sound 
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ecotheology able to inspire ethics and spirituality. In fact, they are in dialogue within the 
Scriptures and throughout Church history. The covenantal tradition has been deepened 
particularly by Protestant theologians, whereas the sacramental perspective is characteristic of 
the Catholic Church. Radford Ruether believes that while the work of Paul Santmire, James 
Gustafson, James Nash, Dieter Hessel and others represent the covenantal type of ecotheology, 
the sacramental perspective is epitomized by the work of Sallie McFague, Paulos Gregorios, 
Thomas Berry, and Sean McDonagh among many others. 
 The covenantal tradition according to Radford Ruether draws strongly from Hebrew 
Scriptures and claims the Bible as the primary source for ecotheology. She thinks that this 
tradition provides the foundation for a moral relation to nature and to one another that 
portrays forms of right relation, translating these right relations into law as the final assurance 
against abuse. One of the key features of the covenantal tradition is the rejection of the 
dualism between history and nature, which was introduced into biblical hermeneutics in the 
19th century by German exegetes. This dualism misrepresents the biblical data. Drawing upon 
the psalms, the prophets, and wisdom literature, the covenantal tradition shows how nature is 
alive and enters into a lively relation with God. There is an intimate and direct relationship 
between every creature and God. Everything that happens, from human wars or disasters, to 
rain, droughts, or abundant harvests, is seen in the biblical view as events in which the blessing 
or judgment of God is manifested. In this sense, all such events have a moral meaning inasmuch 
as they are the expression and outcome of the respect or breaking of God’s call for right 
relations among creatures. Radford Ruether acknowledges the problems in reading moral 
meaning and divine will into natural events. Nevertheless, she believes that the Hebrew moral 
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sensibility takes on a new dimension of moral truth in which relation to God is the basis for 
both justice in society and prosperity in nature, while disobedience to God’s commands of right 
relation brings both violence to society and disaster to nature.112 The covenantal tradition does 
not affirm therefore that God is punishing or blessing people through natural events, but it 
rather emphasizes the close connection and mutual influence between disrupting the right 
relations that God has established for humans as well as for nature, and their mutual 
interaction. Infringing one of these right relations will necessarily result in fatal consequences 
for the other. The covenant in which God has engaged with the entire creation as well as the 
guidelines which stem from it should orient and govern the interaction between creatures. 
 Radford Ruether states that the covenantal tradition is deeply aware of the limits of 
human dominion over creation. This power and authority is always delegated. Nature is not 
human property, and human beings are called to be stewards of God's creation. In this sense, 
humanity needs to be faithful to what God has determined as right relations among all 
creatures. This perspective is embodied within the biblical view through the sabbatical 
legislation. The seven-day, seven-year, and the fiftieth year cycles, aim to preserve and renew 
the right relationship and just balance between humans, animals, and the land. While a special 
place for humans in creation is recognized, they are accountable for the welfare of creation to 
the true source of life, God. Therefore, humanity has responsibilities of care and protection 
toward the rest of creation. The covenantal tradition underlines the bond that unites every 
creature to the others as well as to the one source of life. This covenantal relation forbids 
human hostility or destructive practices vis-à-vis natures. For each “life form has its own 
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purpose, its own right to exist, its own independent relation to God and to other beings.”113 As 
a result of this, there is an otherness of every creature that human beings must respect.  
 The biblical notion of covenant is framed by patriarchal assumptions; therefore, it is 
androcentric, anthropocentric, and ethnocentric. Nevertheless these assumptions have been 
challenged and transformed through historical movements, such as universal male suffrage, 
abolitionism, women’s suffrage, and civil rights, in order to expand the limits of the covenant 
and encompass other members previously excluded. The anthropocentric bias has been the last 
to be confronted. Some theologians nowadays draw on the covenantal tradition in order to 
ground an ecotheology able both to recognize the value of every creature and describe the 
right relations between God, human beings, and nature. The covenantal tradition intends to 
express these right relations through an ethic which should be translated in turn into laws. This 
is crucial in building an ecological world order. 
 The sacramental tradition is the second type of ecotheology identified by Radford 
Ruether. She thinks that this perspective has been assumed fundamentally by Catholic 
theologians. The starting point of this tradition is the consideration of the community as a living 
whole, not simply the human community, but first of all the cosmic community.  God is not only 
creating or making this cosmic body from afar, but God is also immanent within it. The visible 
universe and the entire creation are the manifestation of God, God’s sacramental body. 
Radford Ruether believes that one of the major features of this type of ecotheology is the 
retrieval of cosmic Christology which has been elaborated in some of Saint Paul's letters such as 
Colossians, the Gospel of Saint John, and the letter to the Hebrews. In these texts Christ 
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appears as both the immanent divine source and ground of creation and its ultimate 
redemptive healer. He is the creator and the redeemer of the cosmos, and not just of human 
beings. He is the beginning and end of all things. In this sense, the theological themes of 
creation and redemption are synthesized and combined in the figure of the Logos-Christ, who is 
at the same time, the manifestation of God within creation, the immanent presence of God that 
sustains the cosmos, and the healing power that leads creation toward its fulfillment and its 
reconciliation to God. 
 Radford Ruether explains that, although this cosmological understanding of Christ as 
both creator and redeemer of the cosmos, and not just of human beings, is central to the New 
Testament perspective, Western Christianity for different reasons progressively overlooked this 
all-inclusive vision. Salvation became basically an affair between God and humanity, and the 
analogia entis – the ladder of ascent from creatures to God – is broken both ontologically and 
epistemologically.114 The retrieval and deepening of Christian cosmological theology has started 
again over the twentieth century. Radford Ruether thinks that the work of theologians such as 
Thomas Berry and Matthew Fox represent the new impulse to rediscover and reinterpret this 
tradition of sacramental theology. She identifies diverse theological efforts inspired by the 
sacramental perspective, from the emphasis on God’s original blessing on creation as the 
intrinsic nature of things that guides the theology of Matthew Fox, to other theological 
endeavors more rooted in scientific discoveries and the new earth story of evolution, such as 
those unfolded by followers of Teilhard de Chardin, and those based on the work of Alfred 
North Whitehead on process thought. Radford Ruether describes the development of an 
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ecofeminist theology and spirituality in the wake of this revival of sacramental cosmology. This 
perspective needs to be built on the notions of the living interdependency of all things, and the 
value of the personal in communion, which underline the kinship among all creatures and the 
idea of an earth community. All creatures share the same origin, are sustained by the same 
source of life, and partake of the same destiny. This sense of equality and communion should 
orient the relationships among human beings and nature. Ecotheology inspired by the 
sacramental tradition points toward this direction.  
c. Willis Jenkins 
 In his book Ecologies of Grace. Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology Willis 
Jenkins provides a typology that unveils three strategies which environmental Christian ethics 
has been exploring in order to relate religious experience to environmental challenges.115 He 
believes that Lynn White’s article has marked much of the subsequent debate within 
ecotheology to the point of establishing as its two major foci the degree of anthropocentrism of 
Christian narratives, and the influence of worldviews on assigning value to nature as well as 
triggering and fostering particular human practices. As a result of this, cosmology seems to be 
the best field to link environmental problems to a religious rationale. Nevertheless, Jenkins 
thinks that ecotheology should move in its reflection beyond both the frame provided by 
White’s thesis, and cosmology as the most suitable arena to tie in the religious vision of reality 
and the emergent environmental problems. If religion is concerned about nature and grace, 
then soteriology must have a part in how ecotheology succeeds in substantiating why 
environmental concern and commitment are inherent to Christian faith. Consequently, Jenkins 
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presents three strategies of Christian environmental ethics nurtured by three different 
understandings of grace, namely, sanctification, redemption, and deification. He thinks that 
these three broad understandings of God’s grace give rise to the theological strategies of 
ecojustice, stewardship, and ecological spirituality respectively. Moreover, these three 
strategies seem to represent in Jenkins’ view three major ecclesial traditions, namely, Roman 
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Eastern Orthodoxy. Therefore, Jenkins shows how the 
theological rationale underlying the understanding of God’s grace shapes different patterns of 
Christian response to environmental problems. He does not opt for any of these theological 
strategies as the most suitable for connecting Christian faith with ecological commitment, but 
rather shows their capacities and challenges, and considers plurality within Christian 
environmental ethics as a necessary fertile ground. 
 Before entering into theological reflection, Jenkins analyzes three ways in which 
environmental ethics has been dealing with ecological challenges. He does so because he thinks 
that the theological strategies somehow correlate and modify these philosophical stances. The 
first one is what is called the nature’s standing strategy which basically draws normative 
obligations from the moral status of the nonhuman world or certain members of it. While some 
authors affirm that nature possesses an intrinsic value, others ascribe value to non-human 
species by recognizing human features in them such as sentience, emotional fellowship, and 
the capacity to work for others. Humanity is bound to respect and protect the somehow 
objective values of the natural world. Therefore, the nature’s moral standing strategy focuses 
on moral obligations whose source is the moral status of nature. The second philosophical 
strategy that tries to make environmental problems intelligible to moral experience organizes 
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around the notion of human agency.  It focuses primarily therefore on human practices that are 
disastrous for nature. The human agency strategy critiques the previous strategy inasmuch as it 
affirms that there is no such thing as objective knowledge of nature. Not only the concepts 
through which we grasp nature, but nature itself indeed is influenced and somehow 
determined by human practices. Nature is mainly socially constructed. Consequently, cultural 
imagination, social structures, technological frameworks, and political power are crucial for 
environmental ethics through the lens of the human agency strategy. Thus, it is exactly these 
powers, practices, and imaginations that must be examined, revised, and reconstructed. The 
third philosophical approach to environmental ethics unfolds from the notion of ecological 
subjectivity. Its starting point is the communion or interconnectedness, and not the division, 
between humanity and nature. It criticizes the human agency strategy insofar as the latter loses 
sight of real organisms, living creatures, concrete relationships, and the impact that nature has 
on the way we conceive not only ourselves, but also society and ethical values. This third 
strategy therefore insists on the importance and influence of nature on human socialization and 
the formation of selfhood. We need to reimagine humanity, starting from its radical 
dependence on and intimate bond with nature. The ecological subjectivity strategy suspects 
that the logics of division between humanity and nature are usually associated with logics of 
domination. The goal is not to collapse the differences, but rather to deconstruct the dynamics 
of speciesism in order to create better ways of relationality. 
Jenkins thinks that these three strategies together provide an outline of practical 
rationality for environmental ethics. The latter therefore “does require at least a minimal 
account of how the natural world makes claims on moral agency, how agential practices 
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condition the natural world, and how human personhood is ecologically shaped.”116 Jenkins 
also uses the image of light, saying that the intelligibility of environmental ethics is illuminated 
by the light of nature, the light of social practices, and the light of human belonging to the 
earth. 
The Christian theological strategies to make environmental problems intelligible to 
religious experience and faith, according to Jenkins, relate to one or more of these practical 
criteria, and transform the philosophical strategies. The first one is the Ecojustice strategy. As 
mentioned above, Jenkins thinks that this strategy is the one preferred by Roman Catholic 
theologians. It organizes itself around the notion of the integrity of creation, and emphasizes 
the direct relationship independent from humanity that God holds with the rest of creatures. 
The value of nature lies in its relation to God, the Creator, and not in its relation to human 
profit or benefit. Thus, this value is both self-possessed and divinely granted. God holds a loving 
regard toward creation for its own sake. 
Ecojustice posits the notion of justice as its overarching moral category, and in this way 
is able to combine the problems of both human exploitation and environmental abuse in a 
noncompetitive manner. Christians are called to respect the caring, compassionate, and 
protective way in which God relates to creation. In other words, Christians should model the 
way they behave toward creation upon the relationship that God maintains with every 
creature. God is reconciling humanity as well as all of creation, and humans need to be in tune 
with God’s own way of relating with creation. In this sense, humanity must take part in natural 
processes and patterns, being faithful to how God relates to them. Consequently, the ecojustice 
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strategy exhibits an understanding of grace as sanctifying. Christians participate in this 
sanctifying grace insofar as they adjust to and connect with the manner in which God relates to 
all of creation. Put differently, they are grasped by sanctifying grace inasmuch they do justice to 
creation.  
Jenkins thinks that there are two unresolved points in the ecojustice strategy. First, it 
does not clarify how being respectful for and faithful to creation’s integrity leads humanity 
toward friendship with God. In other words, theologians who exhibit an ecojustice strategy in 
linking environmental challenges with religious experience, do not clarify how loving and caring 
for creation would be a medium for God’s grace toward humanity. In this sense, they need to 
elaborate further the ways through which nature may carry humanity into intimacy with God. 
Second, theologians working within the frame of ecojustice strategy need to pin down and 
deepen the notion of creation’s integrity. There is no agreement or clarity about which features 
of nature express and epitomize creation’s integrity. In this sense, the question about the 
hallmarks of nature that disclose divine will and providence is legitimate. Moreover, the 
ecojustice strategy exhibits troubles in giving a meaningful account of some features of nature 
such as violence, suffering, and death, which seem to contradict God's loving care for every 
creature and for all creation. Are these characteristics of nature part of its integrity or are they 
just the expression of evil, a distortion of how God would have creation, and therefore they 
represent something that needs to be overcome? If humanity is called not only to respect but 
also follow the manner in which God cares for and relates to creation, the ecojustice strategy 
needs to develop further these questions.  
85 
 
The second theological strategy for showing that caring for creation is an essential part 
of Christian faith that Jenkins identifies is the stewardship strategy. As mentioned above, this 
theological rationale has been developed especially by Protestant theologians. Unlike the first 
one, this strategy organizes itself, as its name suggests, around the notion of stewardship. 
Human beings are God’s stewards within creation, and are called to respect and care for 
creation as God’s representatives on earth. Consequently, this strategy grounds human 
responsibility vis-à-vis other creatures in God’s commands and mandates for respectful and 
loving relationship with creation. This strategy therefore goes back to biblical accounts of how 
God invites and entrusts to humanity the caring and welfare of all creatures. The main focus of 
this strategy is thus faithful human practices to the call for earthkeeping that human beings 
have received from God.  
Jenkins thinks that the stewardship strategy exhibits an understanding of grace as 
redemption. All of creation comes from God as a gift, and human beings must administer it 
faithfully on his behalf. In this sense, this strategy places the importance of environmental 
challenges within the framework of the God-humanity relationship. Human beings are God’s 
representatives and counterparts within the earth, and they are accountable to God for the 
exercise of this role. Consequently, environmentally friendly practices are not performed 
primarily because of nature’s dignity, but rather because of God’s will and divine command 
which humans are asked to respect and comply with. In other words, humanity cares for what 
God has entrusted to it.  
One of the controversial aspects of the stewardship strategy is its understanding of the 
role and position of humanity within creation. It is certainly liable to being accused of 
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promoting an unacceptable anthropocentrism that seems to justify abusive and exploitative 
practices toward nature. This is why the first move of those working within the frame of this 
strategy is to disavow the charge of fostering limitless human dominion over creation. On the 
one hand, they highlight biblical passages other than Genesis 1 which display the type of 
actions God is asking humanity to perform, such as guarding and tending (Genesis 2). On the 
other hand, they rethink and reinterpret the notion of dominion in order to show that the 
biblical text does not substantiate a limitless exploitation of nature. Inasmuch as the task of 
subduing and having dominion over the earth is carried out on behalf of God, it necessarily 
implies limits and obligations that must be respected. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the 
stewardship strategy establishes an ontological differentiation between humanity and the rest 
of creatures. Only the former has been chosen to bear the image of God, and live within the 
earth as representative and delegate of God's rule over creation.  
The stewardship strategy focuses ultimately on Jesus as the one who discloses God’s 
attitudes toward creation. Accordingly, it inscribes the call to be steward within the general call 
to discipleship. In this sense, there cannot be faith in Christ without care for creation. As Jenkins 
explains “environmental stewardship is first and finally Christian discipleship.”117 Christians are 
hence invited to associate themselves with the redemptive work of Christ, who liberates 
creation and humanity, restores the imago Dei in human beings, and leads creation toward 
authentic fulfillment. Christians are rightful stewards inasmuch as they model their own 
behavior upon Jesus’ life and ministry. Therefore, those theologians who subscribe to the 
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stewardship strategy portray the character of true stewardship according to the pattern of 
Christ's rule.  
Jenkins thinks that there are three major unresolved points in this strategy. Firstly, in 
focusing on the figure of Christ for modeling the true nature of stewardship, this strategy 
radicalizes the role of the steward toward something much bigger than mere administration of 
what has been entrusted. Christ not only suffers but also gives his life in ransom for all creation. 
Consequently the question about the scope and implications of faithful stewardship to Jesus´ 
example is a legitimate one. Are Christians called simply to the respectful and diligent 
administration of creation, or are they invited to more extreme acts, which would be more in 
tune with Jesus’ salvific and redemptive work? Secondly, the same question addressed to the 
first strategy arises here again, namely, is nature in need of redemption simply from human 
exploitative practices, or is it itself disfigured and distorted, and therefore in need of salvific 
restoration? In other words, how should Christians interpret those features of nature that seem 
to be in opposition to Christ’s redemptive work, such as violence, predation, suffering, and 
death? How are they supposed to deal with these hallmarks? In this sense, Jenkins thinks that 
this strategy needs to elaborate further what grace makes of nature, in order to clarify how 
stewardship relates to natural features, especially to those that matter for fashioning good 
environmental practices. Finally, the link between faithful stewardship and Christ’s redemptive 
work needs to be clarified and deepened. It is not clear how the fact of administering and 
caring for creation would participate in the work of Christ. Moreover, this seems to reinforce 
the accusation of bad anthropocentrism that this strategy would imply for Christianity. If 
stewardship apparently stands for collaborating with Christ's redemptive work, this means that 
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humanity is portrayed as having not only a delegated role regarding the rest of creatures, but a 
principal one.  
The third strategy that Jenkins identifies among Christian theologians is what he calls 
the creation spirituality strategy. The latter emphasizes the ecological dimensions of fully 
Christian personhood, in order to render environmental commitment essential to religious 
experience. In this sense, it does not start from nature’s dignity or human practices in prior 
isolation, but rather it unfolds from the intimate communion between humanity and the rest of 
creatures. At the heart of human experience lies the fact that they are not only dependent on 
all of creation, but they are in close connection with the rest of creatures. The denial of this fact 
and the sharp division between humanity and nature is indeed the main source of current 
environmental challenges. Human beings therefore discover their role and place within creation 
first of all by acknowledging their interconnectedness and dependence upon all of creation. 
Humanity needs to see itself as a living cosmology, a real manifestation of both the profound 
communion within creation and the solidarity among all creatures.  
Although this strategy encompasses diverse approaches, Jenkins thinks that it is mostly 
represented by the Eastern Orthodox tradition. Those who inscribe their work within the frame 
of the ecological spirituality strategy, hold an understanding of grace as divinizing. God is 
leading creation toward its fulfillment, and human beings take part in this same process. In this 
sense, humanity shares the same origin with the rest of creation, is sustained in the present by 
the same source of life, and is heading toward the same destiny. The creation story and the 
story of Jesus confirm that the whole of creation, human beings included, is animated by the 
power of God and is called to partake of divine life. 
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Consequently, the strategy of ecological spirituality links together anthropology and 
cosmology. There cannot be the former without the latter, and vice versa. The notion of 
creativity is usually the joining point, “because it names a dynamism shared by creation 
generally and humanity peculiarly, and, in the movement of creation toward self-realization, 
the mode of their communion.”118 Humanity hence epitomizes an entire movement of 
autopoiesis which is shared by all of creation. In this sense, human beings are the conscious 
expression of a much bigger cosmic story. The strategy of ecological spirituality therefore 
combines three different kinds of creativity, namely, divine, cosmic, and human. In other 
words, it tightly associates three distinctive but interlocked elements, nature's own agency, 
human participation in divine grace, and God´s action within creation.  
As with the other two strategies, Jenkins believes that there are two unclarified points in 
this third theological endeavor. First, it is not clear which of all nature’s major hallmarks are 
expressions of its creativity and of its journey toward fulfillment, and which of them are to be 
discarded and overlooked. If humanity is asked to concur and be in tune with nature’s unfolding 
creativity, then an array of seemingly conflicting features are displayed for its consideration, 
namely, order, balance, hierarchy, chaos, change, flux, and network. The same can be said 
about those elements of nature that seem to contradict God’s divinizing work, such as 
predation, violence, and suffering. Theology needs hence to elaborate further the criteria to 
identify and enhance those characteristics of nature that apparently are manifestations of 
divine agency through nature´s own creative power. Second, theologians inspired by the 
ecological spirituality strategy need to deepen their depiction of divine agency within creation. 
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While some soteriological metaphors serve to express God’s work within creation, such as 
redeeming, reshaping, recreating, or divinizing, it is not plain how God carries out this work. 
Moreover, it is necessary to clarify not only the way through which God relates to creation and 
divine agency operates within the cosmos, but it is also important to better describe and depict 
the end toward which creation is being led.  
 
d. The State of Ecotheology 
These typologies offered by Haught, Radford Ruether, and Jenkins, give a glimpse of the 
plurality of voices, as well as the diversity of topics, emphases, and strategies within 
ecotheology. There are certainly many other works that aim to map and charter the field of 
ecotheology, such as the handbook of ecotheology authored by Celia Deane-Drummond, in 
order to shed light upon the rationale of this emergent theological reflection, and its own 
challenges and tensions.119 A recent publication edited by Ernst Conradie, Sigurd Bergman, 
Denis Edwards and Celia Deane-Drummond, explores the current paths and new horizons 
within Christian ecotheology.120 This volume is the culmination of a process of ecumenical 
collective theological reflection started in 2007 and entitled: the Christian Faith and the Earth 
project, and gathers the outcome of a conference of the same title held in South Africa in 
August 2012. The aim of this project was to describe and assess the current state of the debate 
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in Christian ecotheology and to offer a sense of direction for the way forward. Therefore, 
although it may sound presumptuous, it is worth asking about the major conclusions we can 
draw from the origin, development and present state of ecotheology. Despite the diversity of 
geographic and social contexts, the variety of confessional traditions and theological stances, 
and the plurality of languages, within which ecotheology is being unfolded, I aim to draw some 
general conclusions about the current state of ecotheology. I believe that these conclusions are 
important both for assessing the nature of ecotheology, and for locating it within the large 
spectrum of theological reflection. 
First of all, ecotheology does not structure itself around an original method or a new 
group of methodologies within theology.  There is no such thing, at least up to now, as specific 
steps or principles which would establish a distinctive way of doing ecotheology. There is not 
yet a recognizable specific method that can be identified from the analysis of the wide array of 
theological works that claim to stand under the notion of ecotheology. Unlike other new 
contemporary methods in theology such as liberation theology and feminist theology, 
ecotheology has not yet articulated its own particular method which would be characteristic of 
its theological stance. The Earth Bible project embodies one of the most systematic attempts to 
offer a distinctive method for ecotheology, in this case when reading the Scriptures. The six 
principles put forward by the Earth Bible team guided by the Australian Lutheran exegete 
Norman Habel, provide a framework for interpreting the sacred texts through an ecological 
lens. Yet, formulated in such a broad language so as to foster apparently a wider 
interdisciplinary dialogue, these principles show no explicit connection with the Bible and the 
Christian tradition itself. While these principles aim to guide a hermeneutic of suspicion and 
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recovery of the Bible from an ecological viewpoint, it is not clear how they emerge from either 
a particular reading of the Scriptures or a legitimate appropriation of Christian tradition. 
Consequently, they lose much of their ability to persuade or provide a convincing reading of the 
Scriptures within this tradition.121 Therefore, it can be said that up to this point of its 
development, ecotheology has not yet exhibited a new method or methodologies for doing 
theology from an ecological perspective.  
Secondly, despite its lack of definite method, ecotheology has grown as an independent 
field within theological reflection, and has unfolded around some methodological tools such as 
the dialogue with scientific accounts of life and cosmology, some specific themes, some general 
strategies, and an overarching sensitivity that tries to take into account the challenge which the 
ecological crisis represents for theology. As has been mentioned above, ecotheology aspires to 
a twofold goal, namely, a Christian critique of the values, beliefs, and practices which underlie 
the ecological crisis, on the one hand, and the ecological reformation of Christianity both in its 
teaching and in its practice, on the other hand. Canadian theologian Heather Eaton summarizes 
the major approaches in ecotheology, apparently evoking the three expected actions for the 
treatment of waste (reuse, reduce, and recycle), through the ideas of retrieval, 
reinterpretation, and reconstruction. Although she speaks of three prevalent methods, I believe 
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that these three actions: retrieval, reinterpretation, and reconstruction, as well as the way they 
have been performed within ecotheology, do not embody a new method in theology, but they 
rather provide specific theological strategies for linking the ecological crisis with the Scriptures 
and Christian tradition. Ecotheology offers therefore a new perspective, emphasis, or 
sensitivity, one to which we were blind before becoming conscious of the current ecological 
crisis, that allows us to retrieve, reinterpret, and reconstruct elements of the Scriptures and 
Tradition. Ecotheology is hence a turning of the head toward theology's historical blind spots, in 
order to retrieve, reinterpret, and reconstruct our beliefs and faith, through an ecologically 
friendly theology. Rooted in a new awareness, this theologically independent field crosses into 
systematics, ethics, history, biblical studies, liturgy, and spirituality, and has “signaled a 
comprehensive reform, as well as a new expression of Christianity.”122 Ecotheology aims to 
relate ecologically friendly practices and beliefs to the deepest convictions and symbols of the 
Christian faith.  
Thirdly, ecotheology is not just another expression of what has been called contextual 
theology.123 It is true that theological reflection is always contextual, in the sense that it is 
rooted in distinctive social, economic, historical, and geographic coordinates. Theology is 
always done from a specific location which inevitably implies presuppositions, biases, 
resources, and blind spots. Although theology is hence always attached to a particular context, 
in denying that ecotheology is just another example of contextual theology I intend to state 
that it is not the mere expression of local challenges. While embodied in local manifestations 
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and challenges, the ecological crisis is undoubtedly a worldwide reality. Therefore, this crisis 
calls for retrievals, reinterpretations and reconstructions of Christian tradition and the Bible, 
which touch the whole of theological reflection. Ecological challenges cannot be alien to any 
dimension of theology, nor to any theological endeavor, no matter its geographical, economic, 
social, and historical location. These challenges should not be dismissed by invoking regional 
differences and pretending that they have a local limited impact upon theological reflection. 
This is why labeling ecotheology as contextual theology can be misleading. Yet, it is undeniable 
that local contexts and regional particularities highly enrich and influence the development of 
ecotheology. As a result of this, ecotheology combines general ecological concerns, cultural and 
geographical particularities, and local strategies, for shaping an ecologically friendly theology 
able to shake up as well as inspire people’s minds in their search for paths to a true and fruitful 
life.  
Fourthly, as can be inferred from the analysis of ecotheology's diverse typologies, the 
twofold goal of a Christian critique of the values and beliefs at the root of the ecological crisis as 
well as the ecological reformation of Christianity, requires more than a mere retrieval of 
elements within the Scriptures and Christian Tradition previously overlooked. Ecotheology must 
not only elicit theological memory, but it also needs to embrace an authentic reformation of 
Christian practices and beliefs which the growing ecological awareness entails. Therefore, while 
the apologetic effort is important in dealing with deficient historical accounts and inaccurate 
biblical interpretations, it needs to be supplemented with other constructive perspectives that 
aim to revise and reinterpret Christian data. Consequently, it is especially important to explore 
the manner and the extent to which this reformation affects the main symbols and doctrines of 
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Christianity. Alongside the necessary urgency of dealing with practical ecological concerns, 
ecotheology needs to re-envision the major doctrines and symbols of Christian faith. Failing to 
do this, it would have the impact of keeping ecological commitment as something extrinsic or 
alien to Christianity. If ecology has to do with how people not only conceive of but also live out 
their existence, then it is crucial that ecotheology undertake an ecological reformation of the 
main symbols and doctrines of Christianity, unveiling some of their assumptions, 
presuppositions, and misunderstandings in their depiction of God, creation, humanity, the 
Church, and so forth, which the ecological crisis has put into question. The rising ecological 
awareness is therefore a catalyst for a new and deeper appropriation of the Scriptures and 
Christian tradition.  
Finally, one of the major aspects which needs to be revisited is theological 
anthropology. Even though Christianity has been accused of holding an anthropocentric 
viewpoint, it is manifest, through the analysis of ecotheology’s different strategies for linking 
Christianity to the ecological crisis, that the way in which humanity is conceived in its relation 
with God and other creatures as well as in its role within creation is a divisive issue. Indeed, 
ecotheology contests what seems to be both the classic theological narrative and default 
position about human beings, namely, that they have been created by God, bear God´s image, 
have a special status within the created order, and have been asked to subdue and rule over 
creation. This understanding of humanity is problematic not merely for what it affirms, but 
rather and especially for what it seems to imply vis-à-vis other creatures. As mentioned above, 
it is worth noting that the questioning that ecotheology implies for this classic narrative about 
humanity has not been widely received. It is still possible and unfortunately not infrequent to 
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encounter theological reflections about human beings that uncritically repeat this standard 
depiction of humanity. Yet, ecotheology has been revising those presuppositions, assumptions, 
and implications of classic theological anthropology that are at odds with what the rising 
ecological awareness requires from believers. By its retrieving, reinterpreting and 
reconstructing Christian doctrines and symbols, ecotheology is in search of re-envisioning what 
it means to be human. It knows that this is crucial to building an alternative ethos.  
2. Three Contentious Spheres: Dignity, Uniqueness, and the Role of Humanity within 
Creation 
Ecotheology has called into question three main assumptions of classic theological 
anthropology: the dignity, uniqueness, and role of humanity within creation. It is not that 
ecotheology a priori denies that humanity is unique in God’s eyes, or that human beings have a 
specific mission vis-à-vis the rest of creation, but rather it demands a clarification about 
whether there are theological bases for these claims or not, and what they actually can and 
cannot mean. Christian anthropology has classically addressed such questions with reference to 
the affirmation that human beings are created “in the image of God” (imago Dei), to the point 
that the interpretation of this notion influences almost every major contribution to theological 
anthropology. Despite the different understandings of the imago Dei, it has typically been 
understood as the theological expression of human uniqueness. Because they are God’s image-
bearers, human beings have been granted a special status and role within the created order. 
From this viewpoint, the imago Dei therefore epitomizes human distinctiveness vis-à-vis other 
creatures. Humanity is special in God’s eyes, and it has not only a special place but also a task 
within creation.  
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The notion of the imago Dei has been increasingly criticized.124 Besides the criticism that 
comes from feminist theology, ecotheology has also called into question this notion, inasmuch 
as it seems untenable in its classic interpretation. First of all, a deeper knowledge of 
cosmological and biological evolution has triggered some discussion about whether a seemingly 
absolute human distinctiveness can be meaningfully affirmed. We are made of stardust and we 
have emerged within the evolutionary history which shows our deep kinship with other 
creatures.125 Secondly, the growing ecological awareness denounces the potential ethical 
ambiguity of affirming a strong sense of human superiority. The notion of imago Dei is indeed 
usually associated with the mandate of subduing and having dominion over the rest of creation 
found in Genesis (1, 26-28). In this sense, the theological recognition of human beings as God’s 
image-bearers has been historically a fertile ground not only to affirm human distinctiveness, 
but also to substantiate exploitative practices that portray other creatures as mere resources to 
be used for human benefit. Many suspect that the dynamic of differentiation between human 
and other creatures, has become a source of domination, where the earth and even the cosmos 
are seen just as the background of the human salvific story. Nevertheless, as James Nash states, 
“the traditional idea that the earth, or even the universe, was created solely for humans is, in 
our scientific age, sinfully arrogant, biologically naïve, cosmologically silly, and therefore 
theologically indefensible.”126 While it is true that other theological positions counteract and 
disavow this understanding of human distinctiveness which conceives of humanity as the crown 
of creation, it is still sufficiently manifest that the place and role of humanity in the created 
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order remain in these perspectives at best ambiguous. Some have sharply pointed out that it is 
a mistake to narrow down theological discussion to the theme of anthropocentrism, as well as 
to sort theological strategies according to their place on an anthropocentric/non-
anthropocentric continuum.127 Doing so would be an abstraction that misunderstands the real 
diversity of theological stances, and simplifies their theological rationale. Yet, it is undeniable 
that ecotheology has brought the notion of imago Dei to the fore, in order to question and 
clarify what it conveys about human dignity, uniqueness, and the role of human beings within 
creation. 
a. Human Dignity 
Human dignity has been a crucial cornerstone in many theological debates. It is 
theologically supported, as David Hollenbach asserts, by the biblical teaching in the book of 
Genesis that human beings are created in the image and likeness of God.128 In this sense, 
persons possess a worth and deserve to be treated with reverence. The notion of human 
dignity is decisive to oppose any kind of domination in the name of gender, race, class and age 
differences. It founds theologically the universal validity of human rights and entails that there 
can be no distinctions or degrees concerning the worth of persons. Human dignity is therefore 
one and indivisible, and its acknowledgment and defense can be considered as one of the most 
important contributions of Christianity to equality among human beings.  
Nevertheless, human dignity becomes problematic when compared to the rest of 
creation. Does it imply that other creatures are less valuable than human beings? Is the claim of 
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human dignity a sign of humanity’s higher value or is it just a sign of an anthropocentric bias 
which fails to recognize the intrinsic and equal value of all creatures? Is there any hierarchy of 
value among creatures? If yes, what would be its source and rationale? Should dignity be 
ascribed only to humans or also to non-human livings beings?  
In May 1992 an amendment to the Swiss Federal Constitution introduced the notion of 
the dignity of non-human creatures. This amendment says that the federal government in its 
regulations of gene technologies shall take into account the dignity of non-human creatures, 
namely, animals, plants and other organisms. This amendment is a sign that people worry 
about moral problems caused by genetic engineering, and it expresses the necessity of setting 
limits to human interference with the life of animals, plants, and other organisms. Yet, what 
does it mean to affirm the dignity of non-human creatures? And, what are the limits to human 
activity that this notion entails? In face of these questions the Swiss authorities appointed two 
committees to clarify the notion of the dignity of non-human creatures and define its 
implications especially for genetic engineering. The reports of these committees gave 
expression to two positions that were prevalent in the discussion. While some proposed that 
the notion of the dignity of non-human creatures should be understood as an extension of the 
notion of human dignity applied to other living organisms, others stated that the notion of the 
dignity of non-human creatures should be seen as corresponding to the notion of the inherent 
value of non-human beings.129 
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This philosophical and legal debate has its expression within theology as well. Facing the 
question of human dignity and its seemingly anthropocentric overtones, some propose to 
extend the meaning of the notion of the imago Dei in order to encompass within it other living 
creatures beyond humanity. Without recognizing other creatures as God´s image-bearers, 
others assert that the intrinsic value of every creature has sufficient theological foundation, and 
it should be therefore affirmed. Theologian David Cunningham, for instance, asserts that the 
tendency to construct a great theological divide between humanity and other creatures is 
usually based on a fairly simplistic reading of the doctrine of the imago Dei. He thinks that even 
if we were able to “agree on both the unique applicability of the imago Dei to human beings 
and the specification of its theological meaning, we would still not be able to agree on how 
much theological distance between human beings and other animals would be specified by 
such claims.”130 Exploring the grammar of the word ‘image’ and analyzing the biblical text, 
Cunningham concludes that the use of the notion of the imago Dei to substantiate the unique 
status of human beings depends on both an argument of silence and a willingness to turn a 
blind eye to the highly contested nature of this notion. In other words, he thinks that 
theologians have classically assumed that human beings are created in the image of God and 
that other creatures are not relying on an argument of silence. While affirming that humanity is 
God’s image-bearer in fact, the Scriptures do not deny the possibility that other creatures can 
image their Creator as well. Furthermore, the interpretation of the imago Dei is a highly 
controversial field, and theologians have typically grounded its meaning relying on 
philosophical or scientific arguments which assume some distinctions between human beings 
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and other creatures. Therefore, Cunningham thinks that the imago Dei “can also describe other 
elements of the created order – and that, in fact, the entire creation bears the ‘mark of the 
Maker’ to at least some degree.”131 He does not propose however a grand levelling of creation, 
in which no species or element would be distinguished from any other element. Acknowledging 
differences among creatures, he rather thinks that these differences “will always be matters of 
degree rather than a simple opposition of inclusion and exclusion from the attribution 'created 
in the image of God'.”132 Cunningham argues for a greater consideration of the term “flesh” as a 
better starting-point for reflection on the relationships among elements of the created order. 
Other authors have taken the same path of extending image-bearing to other creatures. 
Celia Deane-Drummond, for instance, asserts that it is incorrect to exclude the possibility of a 
form of image-bearing that is suited to particular animal species in relation to their own 
kinds.133 Relying on the works of Franz de Waal and Marc Bekoff, she ascribes a form of 
morality to some animals, inasmuch as they are able to make judgements about right and 
wrong within their contexts of specific social life. In this sense, she thinks that “there may be a 
distinct form of image-bearing that is true for that particular species, in so far as it reflects a 
tendency towards the good, as judged according to their own kind.”134 Like humans, therefore, 
animals also can mirror something of the glory of God. The difference between humans and 
non-humans when speaking of the imago Dei seems to be one of degree rather than absolute 
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distinction. As will be shown, Deane-Drummond has since taken her distance from this 
argument.  
Australian theologian Denis Edwards asserts that the notion of imago Dei should not be 
dismissed within ecotheology and that it can be freed from its connections with the language of 
domination. He, too, believes that the notion of image-bearer can be applied to non-human 
creatures. In this sense, the notion of imago Dei can be retrieved for an ecotheology that 
situates human beings in relationship to other creatures, “and that understands each creature 
as in its own way reflecting and imaging God.”135 Edwards states that although the Bible and 
the Christian tradition use the language of the image of God specifically of the human, they also 
see the whole of creation, and the diversity of life on Earth, as the self-expression of God, and, 
in this sense, as imaging God. Relying on a sacramental viewpoint he argues therefore for an 
extension of the notion of imago Dei to other creatures. Nonetheless, this does not imply for 
Edwards denying human uniqueness or weakening the notion of the dignity of the human 
person made in the divine image which remains central to the Christian social justice tradition. 
He thinks that what is “needed is neither the extreme of anthropocentrism that offers no 
respect for the dignity of other creatures, nor the biocentrism that rejects the unique dignity of 
the human person.”136 In a recent article, he develops the same ideas and asserts that there is 
little sense in attempting to minimize the uniqueness of the human.137 Edwards argues 
therefore for a theocentric perspective that, on the one hand, can ground and recognize the 
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intrinsic value of every creature inasmuch as they reflect something of their creator, and, on 
the other hand, that is able to acknowledge the specialness of human beings within the created 
order.  
Many are those therefore who search to counteract the ecological crisis through a wider 
understanding of the imago Dei that encompasses other creatures than humans and recognizes 
their intrinsic value. In doing so, they aim to ground theologically not only the dignity and value 
of every creature as they mirror something of the glory of their Creator, but also the rootedness 
of humanity within the larger earth community. Even though this strategy attempts correctly to 
confront a certain anthropocentrism, which not only overemphasizes human distinctiveness but 
also values other creatures merely for their benefit to human life, I think that there is as yet no 
evidence sufficient to substantiate theologically the understanding of other creatures as God´s 
image-bearers. Furthermore, it seems to me that this strategy of expanding the meaning of the 
imago Dei does not achieve the expected result. First of all, in this strategy other animals begin 
to be absorbed into the human world, and they are less appreciated in what is characteristic 
and proper to them. As this strategy is based on shared capacities or features between human 
and other animals, the special place of other creatures in their relation with God and humanity 
can be jeopardized, inasmuch as greater attention is paid to those creatures that are most like 
human beings. In a recent article, moving away from her previous strategy, Celia Deanne-
Drummond, for instance, advises against conceiving other creatures as God’s image-bearers. 
She thinks that “if other animals are to be thought of as only weakly bearing the image of God, 
it still seems to put other animals on the same hierarchical scale as humans, and they are then 
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found wanting.”138 Those arguing for an expansion of the notion of the imago Dei do not 
obliterate the differences among creatures. They rather underline that the language of God’s 
image-bearers should not be restricted to human beings, and that all creatures reflect in their 
own ways something of their Creator. In this sense, I think that Deane-Drummond’s criticism is 
right when she asserts that ascribing the imago Dei to non-human creatures, ends up by merely 
replacing one hierarchical viewpoint of the created order by another. It is not because theology 
asserts that they are God’s image-bearers that non-human creatures are valued in their 
difference and specialness. Furthermore when put on a unilinear scale of more or less image-
bearing, non-human creatures remain in a disadvantaged position.  
Secondly, classic theological language distinguishes between divine image and divine 
likeness. While the former is reserved only for human beings, the latter is predicated of all 
creatures. It is true that the notion of likeness is spontaneously somehow thought to be less 
than the notion of image, and in this sense it may be insufficient to express the particular 
charism of every creature. Nonetheless, I think that this language is strong enough for founding 
theologically the inherent value of each creature. The problem is not that the notion of imago 
Dei is restricted to human beings, and therefore theology needs to expand its meaning in order 
to encompass other creatures. This notion becomes a threat only when it is interpreted in a 
particular way that disconnects humanity from the rest of creation and affirms a unique and 
oppressive superiority of humans over other creatures. I think that the notion of likeness not 
only adequately conveys the creaturely character of each creature – human beings included – 
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but also offers solid ground to recognize and affirm the inherent value of all creatures and their 
worth. Yet I do agree with Deane-Drummond when she states that “if the language of divine 
likeness is to carry sufficient weight, then it needs to affect how we interpret divine-image-
bearing.”139 The relevant theological move for dealing with anthropocentric tendencies within 
Christian doctrine is not to expand the classic understanding of the imago Dei in order to 
encompass other creatures. Rather, what is necessary is to reinterpret this notion so that it 
carries an ethical component which can illuminate the relation between humanity and other 
creatures, as well as foster among humans an ecological commitment toward the flourishing of 
all kinds of life. 
Finally, the strategy of enlarging the notion of the imago Dei in order to include all 
creatures, may imply a levelling process that undermines not only a crucial aspect of Christian 
social tradition such as the dignity of human beings, but also the ground of moral discernment 
in some ecological issues. I think that it is equally important to confront both the idea of 
limitless dominion where human beings would enjoy all rights over other creatures, and the 
egalitarianism that denies any difference among creatures and affirms that all of them have 
equal value. Inherent or intrinsic value does not mean equal value. Diluting the meaning of the 
imago Dei that theologically founds human dignity within creation is ultimately to weaken a 
powerful source for ecological commitment. As Denis Edwards states “human beings have a 
unique moral responsibility for other creatures. There is a unique moral demand made upon 
them to respond urgently, creatively, and wisely to the ecological crisis they have created.”140 In 
this sense, there is no good theological reason to apply the language of God´s image-bearer to 
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non-human creatures. The intrinsic value of each creature lies in its intimate bond with the 
Creator, and it is ensured by the fact that every creature reflects something of the glory of God. 
The notion of the imago Dei must be reinterpreted so that it safeguards and founds the dignity 
of human beings as well as it entails and promotes the human ethical commitment toward the 
flourishing of other creatures. Christian life has to be equally committed to the integrity of 
creation as well as the dignity of the human person.  
b. Human uniqueness 
Ecotheology has also called into question the notion of human uniqueness, namely the 
idea that human beings are to be set apart from other creatures inasmuch as they are unique. 
This criticism arises from the ambiguous implications that belief in human specialness involves 
for creation. In this sense, ecotheology is characterized by the suspicion that an exclusive focus 
on human uniqueness and interests is at the root of the current ecological challenges. It is 
undeniable that there has been a tendency in Christian theology to over-emphasize the unique 
place and role of humanity within the created order. This human supremacy is typically based 
on the conviction that human beings are fundamentally different from other creatures. The 
theological expression and support of this human distinctiveness has classically been the notion 
of the imago Dei, namely only humans are God’s image-bearers.  
Yet, are we truly unique in God’s eyes? What would be the theological arguments to 
ground human distinctiveness? Contemporary scientific investigation seems to blur the limits 
and the supposed gap between humanity and other creatures. Do claims for human uniqueness 
hence not fall into the trap of anthropocentrism, which assumes that humanity is in possession 
of some particular features which set it in a privileged position within creation?  
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Human uniqueness has been classically related to human dignity. The former sets the 
bases for the dignity of humanity within creation. Nevertheless, contemporary scientific 
investigation calls into question this alleged difference between humans and non-human 
creatures. If such human distinctiveness exists, it can be understood only in terms of an 
ecological and biological continuity with all other forms of life. From a cosmological, biological, 
and behavioral point of view, this continuity seems often endorsed. From a theological 
perspective, it seems that no argument, other than the imago Dei notion, can be invoked in 
order to justify human separatism.141 Nevertheless, other voices express that the seeming 
continuity between humanity and other creatures does not deny the uniqueness of the former.  
South African theologian Ernst Conradie, in an acute work that combines theological 
reflection with scientific data, presents what he believes is already a certain consensus within 
ecotheology on how human uniqueness should be assessed.142 He does so under the form of 
some theses, which he thinks express the double movement of decentering and recentering of 
the place of humanity within the earth of community proposed by Sally McFague.143 Conradie 
asserts, first of all, that the biological and ecological continuity of humanity with the rest of the 
earth community is stressed in virtually all ecological theologies. In this sense, the 
distinctiveness of the human species can be understood only in terms of this ecological and 
biological continuity with all other forms of life. In order to counteract what is seen as the 
customary tendency of Christian theology to underline the specialness and separateness of 
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human beings vis-à-vis the rest of creatures, ecotheology stresses the commonality and 
similarities between humanity and other animals.  
Gregory Peterson shows, for instance, how the distinction between human beings and 
other creatures has classically been built upon cognitive capacities such as reason, language, 
consciousness, and self-consciousness. Relying on contemporary scientific data he notes 
nonetheless that these capabilities can be found in other creatures as well, however in different 
forms and degrees, and therefore “the claim that there is an absolute cognitive divide is no 
longer tenable.”144 Yet, those who contest these similarities and continuity between human and 
animals argue that what is known in cognitive ethology as the “clever Hans” effect is present in 
many of the experiments which ascribe certain capacities such as language and reason to 
animals.145 Others underline that these are far from full-fledged capabilities in animals, and that 
they represent not a beginning of what animals may one day develop, but rather the limit or 
summit of what they are able to achieve.146 Furthermore, such abilities are limited to the 
rarefied elite of the animal world, and we cannot reasonably expect them to develop in other 
animals.147  
Human uniqueness has also been grounded in morality. Yet, as has been shown, some 
animals such as wolves and dogs exhibit the moral capacity to distinguish between what is 
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wrong and good within their specific social habitats.148 Here, it is certainly the definition of 
morality which determines whether or not it can be ascribed to other animals. Others, like J. 
Wentzel van Huyssteen, point to symbolic reasoning and a certain naturalness of religious 
imagination as that which characterizes human distinctiveness, which has historically emerged 
in the interaction of biological and cultural evolution.149 Still others assert that what is 
distinctive about humankind is not a matter of the uniqueness of particular physical or cognitive 
abilities, but that our distinctiveness emerges rather from the dynamic outcome of our 
embodied interactions as we are embedded within social relationships and human culture, and 
within the presence of God.150 In this perspective, unique human characteristics are seen as 
arising from what emerges in the interaction of various distinctly enhanced, but not unique, 
cognitive capacities.  
In any case, the debate about human uniqueness is not caused by discrepancies in 
scientific data, but rather by their interpretation as well as the way in which they are valued 
and combined. What seems clear to me is that we are no longer talking about some kind of 
absolute difference from all other animals. What we need instead is to make careful 
distinctions that recognize both similarity and difference. This allows for a better recognition 
and appraisal of what is specific and proper to each particular species, human beings included.  
Secondly, Conradie affirms that in assessing human distinctiveness, the presence of 
various forms of hierarchy, including hierarchies based on complexity, cannot be denied. In this 
sense, the recognition of similarities between human beings and other creatures does not imply 
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a flat valuation of the created order. Scholars recognize the importance and necessity of a 
diversified understanding of value. Denis Edwards, following other authors, proposes for 
instance the level of consciousness of creatures as a principal criterion of discernment between 
competing interests of different species of living creatures.151 He thinks that this criterion may 
be useful for addressing ecological issues. Nevertheless, it should not be used against human 
beings, in the way some attempt to affirm the relative value of humanity and discriminate 
against those who suffer from disabilities or whose consciousness is not fully developed. 
Indeed, “in the revelation of divine Wisdom in Jesus of Nazareth we are confronted with God’s 
priority for the poor and disabled.”152 Edwards is aware that some may consider his theological 
stance as anthropocentric because of its defense of the uniqueness of humanity. Nevertheless, 
he argues that he confronts the anthropocentrism that envisages human beings as having 
limitless rights over other creatures. This last perspective is faithful with neither the Gospel of 
Jesus nor the loving God that it reveals.  Other theologians, such as John Haught, despite their 
agreement with the ecological critique vis-à-vis the dynamics of dominance and oppression, 
assert that theology should maintain the notion of hierarchy in its assessment of creatures.153 
First of all, because that from a theological and etymological point of view the word “hierarchy” 
helps us hold onto the religious conviction that reality has its origin in the sacred. Secondly, 
because theology needs the term in order to emphasize, against reductionist attempts, that life 
and mind cannot be reduced without remainder to lifeless matter. Finally, Haught affirms that 
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“hierarchal” thinking is now experiencing a revival even within the world of science, especially 
through the notion of information.154  
 It is clear that to a certain extent such a moral hierarchy among creatures is already 
common wisdom. It is true that historical examples of those who have suffered from being on 
the wrong side of a moral hierarchy, such as ethnic minorities, should incline us to be suspicious 
about human uniqueness and any kind of hierarchy. Conradie acknowledges that the role of 
power relationships in any hierarchy cannot be denied. However, he thinks that such a 
hierarchy also implies a form of dependence. In other words, hierarchy does not necessarily 
imply domination and oppression. In fact, from an ethical viewpoint it is even helpful to affirm a 
hierarchy of status and worth among creatures. On the one hand, rightly understood, such a 
hierarchy promotes the ethical treatment of the vulnerable, and in this sense, it enforces 
human ecological commitment. It reinforces human accountability for the wellbeing of other 
creatures. On the other hand, it offers criteria to distinguish between the harm done to 
creatures of more value from the harm done to creatures of less value. As Michael Camosy 
points out “caging a self-aware Gorilla for a medical experiment, for instance, might be quite 
different from caging a mouse for a similar experiment.”155 I do think therefore that human 
uniqueness needs to be thought of in terms of our rootedness and relatedness with other 
creatures. Nonetheless, this commonality between humanity and non-human creatures does 
not preclude the recognition of a hierarchy of status and value among creatures. Rightly 
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understood, such a hierarchy is a source of and not a hindrance to human ecological 
commitment. 
 When it comes to theologically founded and expressed human uniqueness, I think that 
ecotheology needs to both maintain and reinterpret the notion of the imago Dei. It would be 
wrong to consider the worth of other creatures as simply reduced humans, and in this sense, 
the notion of the imago Dei should be reserved to human beings. Non-human creatures share 
in God’s likeness, and they deserve to be valued in their own particularity and specificity. This 
theological expression of human distinctiveness is meant neither to denigrate other creatures 
nor to justify human limitless domination over them. Yet, ecotheology needs to reinterpret the 
imago Dei in order to allow it, along with expressing human uniqueness, to voice human 
responsibility and commitment toward the wellbeing of other creatures. Although crucial and 
important, natural capacities are not sufficient for defining human uniqueness and image-
bearing,156 and therefore the notion of the imago Dei does not refer merely to inherent human 
capacities. It rather connects humanity at once with God and other creatures, and it is 
therefore in this perspective that it should be understood. 
c. The Role of Humanity within Creation 
Human uniqueness is closely related to the question about the role and place of human 
beings vis-à-vis the rest of creation. How should the relationship between humans and other 
species be portrayed?  Does humanity have a particular task and position, not only de facto but 
also de iure, in its interaction with other creatures? What would be the theological arguments 
                                                     
156
 Celia Deane-Drummond, “God’s Image and Likeness in Humans and Other Animals: Performative Soul-Making 
and Graced Nature,” Zygon 47, no. 4 (2012): 934–48.  
113 
 
for grounding this mission? It is well known that a wrong interpretation of the mandate of 
dominion (Gn1:26-28) as domination has historically served as an alibi for exploitative practices. 
What then would be the images and notions that should characterize the way humanity 
interplays with the rest of creation? 
Ecotheology has put into question the notion of the imago Dei for its historical 
association with the motif of dominium terrae. For some, it is precisely by subduing and ruling 
the earth that humanity embodies God’s image. In this sense, the fact that human beings bear 
the image of God is not just an expression of their distinctiveness, but it also implies a special 
task vis-à-vis other creatures, which is characterized by the notions of dominion and subduing. 
On the one hand, ecotheology has been reinterpreting these notions and tempering them with 
other biblical expressions such as “till” and “guard” which voice humanity’s role within creation,  
and on the other hand, it has been searching for other root images that may rightly portray the 
role and task of human beings within the created order. Many are the images and notions that 
have been proposed and explored in this respect, such as caretakers, guardians, priests of 
creation, earthkeepers, co-creators, and stewards. Each of these images has its strengths and 
drawbacks, and they emphasize a particular way of depicting the task of humanity in relation to 
the rest of creatures. 
Jürgen Moltmann, for instance, in his Gifford Lectures published as God in Creation. A 
New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God, focuses among many themes on how human 
beings have to be depicted in their role and presence within creation. He thinks that, first of all, 
human beings have to be conceived in their relationship and fellowship with creation. They are 
imago mundi, and they can exist only in community with all other created beings and can 
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understand themselves only in that community. Secondly, human beings have a priestly calling, 
which means that they stand before God on behalf of creation, and before creation on behalf of 
God.157 Moltmann thinks that human beings, as God’s image-bearers are involved in three 
fundamental relationships, “they rule over other earthly creatures as God’s representatives and 
in his name; they are God’s counterpart on earth, the counterpart to whom he wants to talk, 
and who is intended to respond to him; and they are the appearance of God’s splendor, and his 
glory on earth.”158 Humanity is thus God’s proxy within creation, and human beings stand 
before other creatures on God’s behalf. Yet, Moltmann insists that this special role of humanity 
should not be understood as power and dominion. The notion of imago Dei is a theological 
term before it becomes an anthropological one. It says something about God who freely 
establishes a particular relationship with one of his creatures – the one who happens to be his 
image – and then, only as a consequence of this, it conveys something about human beings and 
their relationship to God and other creatures. It is the particular relationship that God engages 
freely with humanity and becomes constitutive of it. The imago Dei sets human beings apart 
from the rest of creation only secondarily. If the imago Dei is conceived as the way God relates 
to humanity, then that implies for the latter performing a role - counterpart, representative, 
and appearance – and theology should be able to draw ethical guidelines for human behavior. 
The way theology depicts the imago Dei becomes significant when applied to ethics in the 
ecological issues we face today. Although Moltmann’s approach suggests numerous auspicious 
paths with this respect, he does not deepen this perspective, and one can wonder what it 
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means to be God’s counterpart, appearance, and representative within creation. This 
theological stance lacks therefore practical guidelines that may specify the way human beings 
should embody these tasks.  
All the images used to describe the relationship between human beings and other 
creatures disclose a particular understanding of divine agency, the purpose of creation, and the 
relationship between humanity and its Creator. Elizabeth Johnson in her most recent book,159 
for instance, offers the following metaphors for portraying the way God relates to creation: a 
composer of a fugue, a jazz player, a theatrical improviser, a choreographer, a game designer. 
She thinks that it is not enough to recognize the immanence and presence of God within 
Creation, but that it is rather crucial to explore the way in which divine agency acts within the 
created order. In this sense, Johnson characterizes divine agency throughout the book, 
speaking of the Spirit as the one who calls, empowers, accompanies, and is the dynamic 
ground. The Spirit invites but never coerces human response. The Spirit prods, pushes, pulls, 
and lures the heart into loving relationship. If human beings are called to shape their own way 
of relating to other creatures from the way in which God relates to creation, then the 
theological understanding of divine agency is decisive for framing the relationship between 
humanity and non-human creatures. 
As mentioned above, the notion of stewardship is especially important inasmuch as it 
has become the default position among many theologians. Nevertheless, although it has been 
crucial in linking ecological sensitivity with theological reflection, it has drawbacks as well. 
Biblical scholar Richard Bauckham, for instance, disavows the notions of stewardship and 
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priesthood for describing the role of humanity vis-à-vis other creatures. He thinks that the view 
that other creatures are related to God only through human mediation “is surely a relic of some 
of the more grossly anthropocentric views of the creation in Christian history, and has no 
support from the Bible, where other creatures have their own direct relationship with God.”160 
This is why humanity is called to embody what Bauckham terms cosmic humility. Human beings 
join other creatures in their praising of God. This horizontal model of fellow-creatureliness in 
the praise of God exists in counterpoise to the vertical model of human dominion over other 
creatures. Bauckham thinks that theology should not fuse these two models. In their 
interaction they rule out both a sort of deep ecology in which humans abdicate responsibility 
for the distinctive powers they have been given by God, and the model of human priesthood 
which deprives the creatures of their own God-given ways of being themselves to the glory of 
God.161  
All the images which ecotheology has been exploring to theologically voice the 
relationship between humanity and other creatures have their strengths and weaknesses. It is 
therefore clear that there are different ways in which the place and role of humanity within the 
created order may be understood. These images, as Ernst Conradie states, are not innocent, 
but they are open to metaphorical innovation and creative usage.162 In any case, it seems clear 
what features these images need to fulfill in order to be theologically fruitful. On the one hand, 
they should portray humanity at once in its relationship with God and other creatures. On the 
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other hand, they also need to disclose something about divine agency, and the telos toward 
which the whole of creation is led by God.  
In this sense, I believe that the notion of the imago Dei should not be put aside or 
silenced because of its alleged anthropocentric emphasis. It not only helps us in relating 
humanity to God, but it also offers a meaningful portrayal of the relationship between human 
beings and other creatures. In the next chapter I propose that, understood as kenosis, the 
notion of imago Dei provides a sound and timely theological understanding of the human place 
and role within creation. Defined as both making-room or self-limitation and self-giving or self-
emptying love, the notion of kenosis discloses something not only about divine agency, but also 
about crucial aspects of humanity in its interaction with other creatures. In the context of the 
ecological crisis, the notion of imago Dei understood as kenosis, can stimulate us in our 
discernment of pathways to a true and fruitful life. 
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III. Imago Dei as Kenosis: Self-Limitation and Self-Giving Love 
 The previous chapter has established three main points. First, theology has seen the rise 
of a new field of research labeled ecotheology starting from roughly the second part of the last 
century. Although it has not provided an original theological method up to now, it has 
nonetheless organized itself around some distinctive topics, lines of research, and theological 
strategies. It has evolved through the effort of some authors, publications, and theological 
journals. Ecotheology has been instrumental in raising theological awareness of ecological 
challenges which call for a Christian critique of the practices and beliefs underlying the 
ecological crisis as well as for an ecological reformation of Christianity. The notion of ecology 
should not be restricted only to its environmental dimension, but its social and personal 
components have to be acknowledged as well. As a result, ecotheology can collaborate 
meaningfully in dealing with the ecological crisis. Secondly, ecotheology has brought into 
question some of the classic assumptions in systematic theology. As to theological 
anthropology, ecotheology has directed its criticism especially toward the idea of human 
uniqueness, the notion of human dignity in its relation to other creatures, and the role of 
humanity within creation. Thirdly, the notion of imago Dei has been especially criticized 
inasmuch as it appears to endorse an anthropocentric worldview which has proved itself 
detrimental for the life of many species and the flourishing of creation as a whole. Some think 
that this notion should be silenced or discarded since it cannot be detached from its 
anthropocentric emphasis. The first chapter has shown that instead of getting rid of the notion 
of imago Dei, ecotheology needs to reinterpret it in order to retrieve and unfold its ecologically 
friendly overtones.  
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Accordingly, in this chapter I turn to the interpretation of the symbol of imago Dei, 
understood as a theological motif. I will describe, first of all, three main historical lines of 
interpretation: essentialist, functionalist, and relational, which can summarize and group the 
contributions of those who have offered a theological understanding of imago Dei. These lines 
of interpretation will be assessed for their strengths and weaknesses, and it will be affirmed 
that they need to be combined for a thorough understanding of this notion. Then I propose the 
notion of kenosis as one sound, meaningful and timely interpretation of the imago Dei motif in 
the context of the current ecological crisis. Stemming from a Christological understanding of 
imago Dei, this perspective permits a better connection between the themes of creation and 
incarnation-redemption. Defined as both making-room or self-limitation and self-giving or self-
emptying love, the notion of kenosis will be explored from both biblical and systematic points of 
view. I will argue that this notion discloses primarily something crucial about God’s agency 
within creation, and only then can it be considered as an anthropological notion which conveys 
a meaningful and opportune understanding of the imago Dei. In doing so, kenosis not only 
connects the three classic interpretations of imago Dei, but it also serves as a specifier for 
them, inasmuch as it provides concrete content and a precise direction for understanding 
humanity as created in the image of God. Recourse will be made to contemporary exegesis of 
Philippians 2:5-11, and to authors such as Jürgen Moltmann, Denis Edwards, John Haught and 
Sarah Coakley, who have explored the themes of kenosis and divine agency. Finally, I will also 
deal with the main critiques which have been addressed to kenosis as revelatory of humanity, 
especially from feminist theology. The chapter provides an understanding of kenosis which is 
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both a meaningful interpretation of imago Dei and a key ingredient in the process of a 
theological re-imagination of humanity within the context of the current ecological crisis. 
 
A) Three Approaches to Imago Dei: Substantialist, Functionalist, and Relational 
It can be said that the imago Dei has progressively become a theological motif through 
the way it has been interpreted and used within theological reflection. A theological motif can 
be defined as a theological starting point which cannot be refuted – like an axiom – which has 
wide influence in the development and shaping of other theological frameworks and ideas.163 It 
is a cornerstone that stems from revelation and helps in building theological argumentation. In 
presenting the imago Dei as a theological motif, I want to state from the outset that its 
significance should be reduced neither to its presence in Genesis 1 nor to its appearance in 
other biblical contexts.164 Although the biblical roots of this notion are extremely important, I 
do not aim to offer in this chapter an exegetical understanding of the imago Dei in all of its 
occurrences within the Bible. As a theological motif the meaning and function of the imago Dei 
within theological reflection are currently determined not only by its location in the Scriptures, 
but also by the history of its interpretation and its various usages in theological argumentation 
and debates. It plays indeed an important role in different theological domains, sometimes 
quite independently of what can be considered its accurate interpretation in each of its 
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appearances within the sacred texts. It is, for instance, a key factor in numerous ethical debates 
such as abortion and euthanasia, in which it voices and affirms human dignity. In this sense, it 
helps both to oppose any form of domination in the name of differences of gender, race, class 
and age, and to support the universal validity of human rights. It is not the precise meaning of 
the imago Dei in its biblical occurrences that is at stake in these debates, but rather its 
expression of biblical faith in the grounding of the equality among human beings. Feminist 
theology claims along the same lines that the feminine is capable of expressing fully the whole 
of divinity, for women are both equally created in the image of God and called to be the image 
of Christ.165 Thus the fullness of the divine can be expressed through feminine images based on 
women’s experience. In this case, the imago Dei, as a theological motif, becomes one of the 
cornerstones in the task of overcoming the current speech about God which has become 
oppressive and idolatrous inasmuch as it uses male images exclusively, literally, and 
patriarchally in portraying God.  
1. Biblical usage of the Imago Dei 
Although the idea that humanity has been created in the image of God has always been 
considered a central affirmation for theological anthropology, it appears only a few times in the 
Old Testament. Besides Gen 1:26-28, which is the classical source of the doctrine of the imago 
Dei, this idea is found again in Gen 5:1-3 and Gen 9:6. The first biblical account of creation 
presents the creation of humanity in the image and likeness of God. Human beings also receive 
the mandate to act within and upon the created order. These few verses, Gen 1:26-28, are 
                                                     
165
 See, for instance, Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse, 2nd 
ed. (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2002), 8, 15, 62, 69. 
122 
 
certainly the main core of the biblical notion of the imago Dei. The Hebrew words that are used 
in the text are selem (image) and demût (likeness), and the verbs associated with the mandate 
given to humanity of having dominion over the animals and subduing the earth are radâ (to 
rule) and kabas (to subdue). It goes without saying that the interpretation of these words and 
their consequent implications for the understanding of the imago Dei has been difficult and 
controversial among biblical scholars. More will be said later on in this chapter about the 
meaning of these words and their influence upon the understanding of the idea that humanity 
has been created in the image of God.   
The other two texts in Genesis that contain the words image and likeness are related to 
the previous one. While Gen 9:6 connects the fact that humanity has been created in the image 
of God with the reckoning which God will require of human life, Gen 5:1-3 affirms that human 
beings have been made in the likeness of God and states that Adam at the age of one hundred 
and thirty years became the father of Seth who is in his likeness and according to his image. It is 
worth noting that Adam transmits to his progeny the image and likeness he has previously 
received. The biblical text does not tell us anything about a loss or diminishing of image or 
likeness no matter the vicissitudes of history. These three occurrences of selem and demût are 
therefore within what is known as the primeval history.  
The imago Dei appears again in three other texts of the Old Testament: Wisdom 2:23, 
Sirach 17:3, and 2 Esdras 8:44. Wisdom states that God has made humanity in the image of 
God’s eternity, and links the notion of image to the idea of incorruptibility. Sirach 17:3, in the 
context of verses 1-4, relates the imago Dei to the idea that God has entrusted humanity with 
dominion or authority over creation. The text of 2 Esdras asks God for mercy based on the idea 
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that humanity has been created in God’s image. God should spare Israel and have mercy upon 
them, since human beings have been made by God's hands and in God's own image.  
The idea that humanity has been created in the image of God appears twice in the New 
Testament: 1 Corinthians 11:7 and James 3:9. In this latter case, the Greek words used by the 
text are eikon (image) and homoiosis (likeness). 1 Corinthians 11:7 states that men should not 
have their heads veiled in the assembly, for they are the image and reflection of God, while 
women ought to have their heads veiled since they are the reflection of men. Despite the 
misogynist flavor that this text conveys at first sight, it should not be understood as denying 
that women have been equally created in the image of God. This would be a misinterpretation. 
The same text goes on to affirm that in the Lord woman is not independent of man or man 
independent of woman, for just as woman came from man, so man comes through woman. The 
text can be seen therefore as an assertion that in the Lord there is mutuality and reciprocity 
between woman and man. Furthermore, the idea that women have not been created in the 
image of God has little support throughout tradition, and when this text is presented as a proof 
of this alleged difference between man and woman, it is usually based on a misreading of St. 
Paul.166 James 3:9 contains the single use of homoiosis in the New Testament, and asserts that 
human beings should not be cursed by anyone, inasmuch as they have been made in the 
likeness of God.  
The imago Dei is present in other texts of the New Testament but now not as an 
affirmation that humanity has been created in the image God. Two passages state that Jesus 
Christ is the image of God: 2 Corinthians 4:4 and Colossians 1:15. While the former points out 
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that the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers preventing them from 
seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God, the latter links 
Jesus Christ as the image of the invisible God with the origin and reconciliation of all creation. 
Saint Paul seems to make reference in these two texts to something that was well known in the 
teaching of the apostolic communities.167  
Other texts emphasize the renewal of the image of God among those who believe in 
Jesus Christ: 2 Corinthians 3:18, Ephesians 4:22-4, and Colossians 3:10. The text of the second 
letter to the Corinthians indicates that when we turn to the Lord the veil of our sight is 
removed, and with unveiled faces we see that we are being transformed by the Spirit into the 
image of God. Ephesians emphasizes the difference between the way Gentiles live their lives, 
and the way those who believe in Jesus Christ are called to embody their existence. Believers 
are called to put away their former way of life – their old self – and to be renewed in the spirit 
of their minds clothing themselves with the new self, which is created according to the likeness 
of God in true righteousness and holiness. Along the same lines, the passage from Colossians 
invites believers to get rid of things that pertain to their former way of life such as anger, wrath, 
malice, and slander. Abandoning this old self and its practices, believers have clothed 
themselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of 
its creator. This renewal implies that the former differences and inequalities are abolished and 
are no longer valid among believers, since Christ is all and in all.  
Finally, two texts conflate the ideas of Jesus Christ as the image of God and the renewal 
or conformation of the image among believers: Romans 8:29 and 1 Corinthians 15:49. The text 
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from Romans asserts that God predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son those 
whom he foreknew, in order that Jesus Christ might be the firstborn within a large family. 
Humanity is therefore being conformed to the image of the Son. The passage from 1 
Corinthians – inserted in a long reflection about resurrection which includes a parallel between 
Adam and Jesus Christ – affirms that just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we 
will also bear the image of the man of heaven. This will not happen until the general 
resurrection at the eschaton.  
Some general conclusions can be drawn from all the occurrences of the imago Dei in the 
Bible. The first one is that these biblical passages do not know or convey anything about a loss 
or diminishing of the image. There is indeed consensus nowadays among scholars that the idea 
of a loss or deformation of the image of God in humanity is foreign to the Bible.168 Neither the 
Old Testament nor the New Testament explicitly displays this perspective. It is worth noting this 
silence, especially given the importance that the idea of deformation or loss of the image in 
humanity has had in the theological understanding of salvation, grace, human capabilities, and 
the role it has played within the theological debate among Christian denominations. The second 
conclusion is that there are different usages of this notion, and the understanding of these 
different usages should not be forced in order to fit into just one main perspective or narrative. 
In this sense, it cannot be said, for instance, that the meaning and interpretation of the imago 
Dei in Genesis 1 can be equated with the appearance of this notion in Colossians. As previously 
shown, the Bible contains three different types of references to the imago Dei: humanity is 
described as created or made in the image and likeness of God, Jesus Christ is described as the 
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image of God, and Saint Paul also speaks about the renewal in the image of Christ in those who 
believe in him. In his most recent book, David Kelsey states, for instance, that the diversity 
within the biblical usage of the imago Dei does not allow for a unique pattern of interpretation. 
According to him, there are three distinct and intertwined biblical narratives of how God relates 
to all that is not God: God creates, draws all things to their eschatological consummation, and 
reconciles everything to Himself. These three narratives are exemplified and expressed through 
the array of occurrences of the imago Dei within the Scriptures and this is why the different 
biblical usages of this notion cannot be subsumed into one pattern of interpretation.169 
Accordingly, whereas the Old Testament references to the imago Dei point to the idea that 
human beings are made in God´s image and likeness, the New Testament introduces the idea 
that the imago Dei is in some sense given or renewed through Christ – who is the Image of God 
– either in the present or eschatologically. As a result, as Spanish theologian Juan Luis Ruiz de la 
Peña asserts, human destiny is no longer to be God´s image, but rather the image of Christ. Or 
better, the only way through which human beings can be the image of God is by becoming 
themselves the image of Christ, who is the image of God:170 “all of us, with unveiled faces, 
seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into the 
same image from one degree of glory to another” (2 Corinthians 3:18). This Christological 
accent in the interpretation of the imago Dei will be further explored later on in this chapter. 
The final conclusion that can be drawn from the usages of the imago Dei within the Bible is the 
dynamic dimension of the image within human beings which is oriented toward its 
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eschatological fulfillment. On the one hand, it is said that humanity is already created in the 
image of God, which emphasizes the actual and present character of the image. On the other 
hand, Saint Paul underlines the dynamic character of the imago Dei, in which we are being 
renewed or transformed. Therefore, the image of God in man is not something static, given 
once and for all; it is rather a dynamic reality, whose progressive imprinting is taking place in 
the interpersonal relationship of the Christian with Christ.171 It is worth noting that this 
perspective also introduces a moral component within the image, which will be influential in 
the history of its interpretation: “do not lie to one another, seeing that you have stripped off 
the old self with its practices and have clothed yourselves with the new self, which is being 
renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator” (Colossians 3:9-10). 
2. Historical Survey of the Interpretation of the Imago Dei 
Having recalled all the occurrences of the imago Dei within the Bible, their different 
nuances, and having drawn some general conclusions, I turn now to the history of the 
interpretation of the imago Dei throughout Christian tradition. My main purpose is not to give 
an exhaustive account of each one of the interpretations offered by each one of the key 
historical figures, but rather to delineate the main lines of interpretation which can be 
identified within this panoramic view. The focus of this overview is, therefore, not the details of 
specific interpretations, but rather the main constant features and the principal questions 
which have been crucial for advancing and deepening the interpretation of the imago Dei. 
Given that Christian tradition has always considered Genesis 1:26-28 as the locus classicus of 
the notion of the imago Dei, I will focus, henceforth, on the history of the interpretation of 
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these verses insofar as they seemingly offer the meaning of the theological assertion that 
humanity has been made in the image and likeness of God. I will first go through the 
interpretation of this text within the first five centuries of Christian history, inasmuch as it is 
within this time span that some main constant traits of the interpretation of the imago Dei have 
been established, which will remain almost invariable till the end of the 19th century. Then, 
after presenting the interpretation of Saint Thomas and how the theological controversies of 
the 16th century affected the understanding of the imago Dei, I will focus on the last century 
which has been the scenario of acute debates and remarkable studies about the interpretation 
of Genesis 1:26-28 led by Old Testament scholars. 
Many studies nowadays offer a thorough account of the historical interpretation of the 
imago Dei.172 They all agree on the fact that the exegetical options of the Fathers, the 
philosophical influences they have, and the theological controversies of their time, such as 
Gnosticism, Arianism, and Pelagianism, had a great impact on their understanding of the idea of 
human beings created in the image and likeness of God. They all also point to Irenaeus as the 
one who has first developed a more systematic approach to the notions of image and 
likeness.173 His interpretation of these verses of Genesis 1 is directly related to his argument 
with the Gnostics. Irenaeus assumes some lines of interpretation which will be influential for 
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Christian tradition from that point on. First of all, against the background of Gnostic dualism, he 
asserts that the whole human is created in the image and likeness of God. There can be neither 
body without soul, nor soul without body; the two of them appear and disappear together. This 
anthropological stance, which strongly unites the material and non-material components of 
humanity, has a great impact on Irenaeus’s understanding of the imago Dei. The body is the 
essential expression of immaterial reality. In this sense, for Irenaeus, if the image is not related 
to what is visible and can be perceived by the senses, the word loses its meaning, the image 
cannot be disclosed and the Incarnation is no longer conceivable.174 It is the whole of what 
humans are, and not just some parts of them, which has been created in the image and likeness 
of God. Secondly, Irenaeus introduces, especially in the fifth book of his Adversus Haereses, the 
distinction between image and likeness.175 Although it will not be followed by all the writers of 
the first five centuries – St. Augustine, for instance, does not adhere to it – it is undeniable that 
this distinction has greatly influenced the Christian understanding of the imago Dei, especially 
within Catholic tradition. Considered as a significant development of the biblical account of the 
imago Dei,176 there is consensus among scholars today that this distinction is not present in the 
text of Genesis.177 At any rate, by distinguishing between image and likeness, Irenaeus wants to 
describe, on the one hand, that which has been given to humanity through creation and 
belongs to its constitution (the image), and, on the other hand, that which is progressively 
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imprinted in humanity by the Spirit (the likeness). He wants to underline the interdependence 
of what human beings are and what they need to become; the interdependence of what is 
already given to them and what needs to be acquired and will be the fruit of action and 
progress.178 According to Irenaeus human beings have lost the likeness through sin, while the 
image is never lost. By his incarnation, Jesus has revealed the perfect image of God and 
restored the likeness within humanity. The latter is progressively engraved by the work of the 
Spirit, who is the other hand of the Father and shapes humanity on the model of the Son.179 
Finally, according to Irenaeus, liberty is par excellence the expression of God’s image within 
humanity. It can be certainly affected, but never cancelled by human infidelity. As everything 
created, human liberty is under the law of progression, which means that it is in the process of 
becoming, and is able to either grow and develop or become stunted, unfree.180 This is why 
Irenaeus asserts that it has been liberated by Jesus Christ, who has established new conditions 
for stabilizing and enhancing the exercise of human liberty. Against the background of the 
determinism predicated by Gnostics and Stoics, Irenaeus affirms the gift of liberty granted to 
human beings, which is the highest manifestation of God's image within them. Although 
incomplete in its image and likeness, humanity moves, led by the Spirit, toward its completion 
or perfection. 
The Alexandrian Fathers – Clement, Athanasius, Origen, and Cyril – offered an 
understanding of the imago Dei which differs from the one proposed by Irenaeus. The 
distinctive cultural milieu of Alexandria – crossroads between the Hellenic world, Judaism and 
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rising Christianity – and the Christological and Trinitarian controversies of the first centuries 
have a real impact on the emphases and choices they make for interpreting the creation of 
humanity in God´s image and likeness. Three features of this line of interpretation are worth 
highlighting. First, it can be said that the Greek conception of the human being as composed of 
soul and body, even with appropriate modifications, is assumed by the Alexandrian Fathers as 
the starting point of their anthropologies. As a result of this, and influenced by Philo of 
Alexandria, they locate God’s image in the soul (nous) of human beings. Although this does not 
imply that they denigrate or despise the human body, it is undeniable that they see the human 
soul (nous) as the most valuable element within the person.181 The rationale that underlies this 
association between soul and image is that only a spiritual reality can image the transcendent 
nature of a spiritual God. This perspective moves away from the biblical vision which identifies 
the image with the entire human being. Secondly, the Alexandrian Fathers hold that the notion 
of image applies above all to the Word, the Son. As a result, the theme of the image is shifted 
from its former natural location in theological anthropology toward the Trinitarian debate. 
Humanity is now seen, not as the image of God, but rather as created in the image of God or as 
the image of the Image, for only the Word - the Son - is the Image of God.182 Finally, as already 
mentioned, the distinction between likeness and image is not followed by all the writers related 
to the Alexandrian school. While Clement and Origen maintain it, Athanasius and Cyril do not 
make reference to this distinction. However, although they do not concur with this 
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differentiation, they all assert, in their interpretation of the pair image-likeness, that there is 
something which is given to humanity as part of its constitution, and something which needs to 
be progressively received through the work of the Son or the Spirit. Origen, for instance, 
explains this polarity between the "already" and the "not yet" along the same lines as Irenaeus. 
For him human beings have received the dignity of the image by creation, while the perfection 
of the likeness is reserved to the time of consummation.183   
  The historical influence of Augustine’s interpretation of the imago Dei cannot be 
underestimated. With Augustine theological reflection about humanity becomes central for 
Christian tradition. His quarrel with Pelagianism and his theological understanding of the Trinity 
had a great impact on the way he portrays God’s image and likeness within humanity. 
Augustine relates the imago Dei to the knowledge of God. Human beings are ultimately in the 
image of God because they have been given the capacity to know God.184 In this sense and in 
tune with the previous tradition, Augustine locates the imago Dei in the human, rational soul. It 
is especially in the second part of the De Trinitate where the bishop of Hippo thoroughly 
develops his understanding of the image which he does not distinguish or separate from the 
likeness. Indeed, both of them – image and likeness – develop or deteriorate together.185 
Moreover, since the capacity to know God never disappears in human beings, no matter their 
historical circumstances, the image can certainly be distorted or darkened, but it cannot be 
destroyed or dissolved. Far away enough from the Christological debates, Augustine does not 
build his theology of the image upon the Word, the Son. According to him, human beings are 
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the image of a God who is Trinity. As a result, he aims to identify ultimately in the human soul 
the presence of a trinity, which is the expression within human beings of the fact that they have 
been created in the image and likeness of a triune God. Augustine finds this trinity especially in 
the triad of memoria, intelligentia and voluntas, which are equals and intimately connected 
among themselves.186 Human beings are created in the image of God inasmuch as they have 
been granted the capacity to remember, understand, and love their Creator. Augustine is 
therefore the first thinker to define the image as a power.187 This capacity has been distorted or 
darkened by sin, and it has been restored by Christ. The renovation of the image within each 
person is therefore the work of God’s grace, and is accomplished through baptism and a 
spiritual growth achieved by daily work. Augustine manages to combine both the ontological 
and the dynamic or historical character of the image within humanity. This image will be perfect 
in human beings only when they will be granted an incorruptible body through their 
resurrection and will perfectly contemplate God.  
Saint Thomas takes up the Augustinian understanding of the imago Dei, adding some 
nuances. According to him, all that has been created reflects the image of the Creator to a 
certain degree. In this sense, Saint Thomas affirms that all creatures are like God inasmuch as 
they exist and live, however the image of God is to be found only in human beings who are 
intellectual creatures.188 He distinguishes accordingly between what he calls likeness by way of 
a trace, which is present in all creatures, and likeness of image which is present only in rational 
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beings.189 Consequently, although Saint Thomas constantly insists on affirming the unity of soul 
and body – the former is the substantial form of the latter – he thinks that human beings are in 
the image of God only with respect to their rational soul. As we have already seen in Augustine 
and the Alexandrian tradition, Saint Thomas also accords primacy to the soul over the body as 
the manifestation of God´s image in humanity. It is because they are rational beings that 
humans are in the image of God. Therefore, following Augustine, Saint Thomas relates the 
imago Dei to the power granted to humanity of knowing and loving God. He asserts that the 
image of God is in humanity in three different ways.190 First, inasmuch as human beings possess 
a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God. Secondly, inasmuch as human beings 
actually or habitually know and love God, though imperfectly. Thirdly, inasmuch as human 
beings know and love God perfectly. In Saint Thomas, therefore, the imago Dei possesses an 
historical and progressive character since it goes through three stages, namely, the imago 
creationis (naturae), the imago recreationis (gratiae), and the imago similitudinis (gloriae).191 As 
he states, the first image is present in all humans, the second only in the just, and the third only 
in the blessed. Some think that while the first image is Aquinas’s account of the Old Testament 
image, the second describes the New Testament image in process of formation, and the third 
describes it in full and perfect activity.192 It is worth noticing the dynamic character of the image 
in this understanding, and the distinction that Saint Thomas makes between a general power or 
endowment present in all human beings (imago creationis), and the actual exercise of this 
power assisted and perfected by God’s grace (imago re-creationis and similitudinis). It is worth 
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noticing as well that the Christological definition of the imago Dei, which was important in 
other times, has almost disappeared by the time of Saint Thomas. This forgetfulness is perhaps 
due to the effort at that time to understand human nature in itself.193 
The theological controversies of the 16th century broke what was a seemingly peaceful 
consensus, though with some differences and particular emphases, in the interpretation of the 
imago Dei. Luther and Calvin parted company with all those who had previously interpreted the 
image as some inherent human quality granted by God. Reformers believed that it was 
mistaken to identify the image with the human power of knowledge and will, and that this 
association both jeopardized their own deep belief that salvation comes through faith and 
grace alone, and misconstrues the biblical account of the imago Dei.194 According to the 
International Theological Commission, the Reformers “accused the Catholics of reducing the 
image of God to an ‘imago naturae’ which presented a static conception of human nature and 
encouraged the sinner to constitute himself before God.”195 Unlike the previous tradition, 
Luther and Calvin proposed an understanding of the imago Dei that stresses its relational 
character. In this sense, as Douglas Hall asserts, they basically conceive the “imago as an 
inclination or proclivity occurring within the relationship” between the Creator and the 
creature.196 Human beings are not said to be in the image of God because they possess some 
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distinctive capacities, but rather they image God inasmuch as they remain faithful to the loving 
relationship which God has engaged with them. Only in this way are they able to mirror God's 
image in themselves. This is the main reason why the Reformers, dismissing the distinction of 
image and likeness, speak of a loss of the image after the fall. In asserting the loss of the image, 
Luther and Calvin, therefore, do not intend to claim that human sin has implied the loss of any 
human capacity such as reason or will, although they have been certainly affected. They rather 
point to the breakdown or violation of the relationship between humanity and its Creator. 
Because the relationship is broken, human beings are unable to image God. According to them, 
we no longer image God, “not because we have lost some inherent quality of our creaturehood 
but because we are literally disoriented.”197 As can be expected, Catholics accused the 
Reformers, therefore, of denying the ontological reality of the image of God and reducing it to a 
pure relation.198 The imago Dei is restored only by the Word of God and the work of the Spirit, 
and this process of restoration, which is progressive, requires from humanity only faith and 
obedience.  
It is worth noting that with the Reformers a new line of interpretation of the imago Dei 
takes shape. Before them, as already shown, tradition has classically understood that human 
beings are created in the image of God inasmuch as they have been granted some capacities – 
especially related to their rational soul – which distinguish them from the rest of creatures and 
enable them, through the help of God’s grace, to know and love God. These two distinctive 
approaches to the meaning of humanity created in the image and likeness of God would remain 
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virtually untouched till the end of the 19th century when Old Testament scholars, using new 
exegetical tools, will turn their attention to the interpretation of the imago Dei. 
The renewal of OT studies over the last century has greatly influenced the interpretation 
of the imago Dei.199 It can be said that the different approaches to Gen 1:26-8 are related to 
three main aspects: a) linguistic study of words (the Hebrew words for image and likeness, and 
the Hebrew verbs usually translated as “have dominion” and “subdue”), b) the theology of P, 
who is unanimously considered the writer of Genesis 1, and the dating of the text within the 
formation span of the OT; c) the linking of the OT with other writings, cultures, and 
contemporary religions – especially Ancient Near Eastern ones – which may have directly or 
indirectly influenced its theology and writing. The combination of these three elements as well 
as the importance and priority given to each one of them by each scholar have produced the 
large array of understandings of the imago Dei which has appeared in the 20th century.  
Despite the diversity of interpretations, it can be asserted that a wide consensus has 
been reached among OT scholars in the last forty years about the understanding of the imago 
Dei.200 This consensus holds that this notion should be interpreted in a functionalist way, 
namely, human beings have been created as the image of God within creation. They are God’s 
representatives on earth, and hence participate in God’s dominion over the rest of creatures.201 
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This interpretation takes especially into account the ancient Near Eastern background of the 
notion of imago Dei. In this sense, it recognizes the influence that the usage of this notion in 
other cultures and contemporary religions, in which the royal authorities are said to be in God’s 
image, may have had in the Genesis account of the creation of humanity. As a result, the 
Genesis use of the imago Dei is inspired by the use of the royal imagery in ancient Near Eastern 
cultures, and it means that humanity represents God within creation and participates in God’s 
dominion over other creatures. 
This consensus is also based on other points of agreement in the study of Genesis 1:26-
8. First, the imago Dei cannot be restricted only to spiritual human capacities or to the physical 
form of human beings. This text does not support any distinction or separation between 
spiritual and material components in the creation of humanity. The imago Dei refers therefore 
to the whole person, not just to its corporeal or spiritual side.202 Clearly this has not always 
been recognized and affirmed. Greek understandings of humanity have greatly influenced the 
historical interpretation of the imago Dei with its consequent prioritization of the human 
rational soul as the expression of the image in human beings. Secondly, the philological study of 
the Hebrew words for image and likeness is not enough for defining the meaning of the text. 
There is consensus that neither selem nor demût are univocal. Moreover, the idea that they 
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refer to two different realities, and so therefore a distinction can be made between the image 
and the likeness is not clearly supported by the biblical text.203 The usual understanding is that 
the word demût qualifies selem in order to define and limit its meaning.204 Finally, although the 
verbs used by Genesis to express the divine mandate of having dominion or ruling (rada) over 
living creatures and subduing (kabas) the earth have an undeniably harsh connotation they 
cannot be understood as a license for limitless exploitation and domination over other 
creatures. While kabas usually refers to the defeat or conquest of enemies and their 
enslavement, rada is frequently associated with the political power that either kings exercise 
upon their peoples or one nation upon another one. Despite the harshness that these verbs 
may convey, biblical scholars agree on asserting that they should not be understood as granting 
humanity unlimited power over other creatures or as promoting destructive practices toward 
the earth.205 The rationale is that the mandate of having dominion over living creatures and 
subduing the earth should not be separated from the notion of the imago Dei. As the 
International Theological Commission asserts, in tune with the standard interpretation of these 
verses, human beings exercise this sovereignty over visible creation only in virtue of the 
privilege conferred upon them by God. They imitate the divine rule, but they cannot displace 
it.206 As created in the image of God, humanity participates in the divine rule over creation, 
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which is not only the source of its own agency but also its inspiration and model. In this sense, 
some have explored other biblical narratives and images which stress the sense of community, 
solidarity, and care that humanity must have vis-à-vis the rest of creatures.207 It is undeniable 
that Gen 1:26-8 conveys a hierarchical view of creatures locating humanity in a distinctive 
position. Nevertheless, it does so within a primal message of solidarity and community among 
all creatures, epitomized especially in the sharing of vegetarian food.208 Consequently, having 
dominion and subduing must be understood in the direction of care, respect, and responsibility 
that humanity needs to exercise toward other creatures.209 
3. Three lines of interpretation: substantialist, relational, and functionalist 
Having completed this brief overview of the historical interpretation of Gen 1:26-8, as 
the locus classicus of the imago Dei, it can be established therefore that the contributions to its 
interpretation can be grouped into three main perspectives: substantialist/essentialist, 
functionalist, and relational.210 This is not to say that these distinctive lines of understanding 
should be seen as watertight compartments. In fact, elements of the three can be found in 
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many of the authors of this historical survey. I aim simply to identify the particular emphasis 
and theological rationale of each approach. They also have specific advantages and drawbacks.  
A substantialist or essentialist view of the imago Dei is one in which some permanent 
aspect, quality or attribute of humanity is considered to be that which makes the human 
species unique and special in God's eyes. This can be rationality, freedom, self-consciousness, 
language, or any other characteristic of the human condition that is seen to distinguish 
absolutely human beings from the rest of creatures, and seen as the expression of the image 
within humanity. As mentioned, most of the church Fathers proposed a substantialist 
understanding of the imago Dei inasmuch as they asserted the primacy of the rational soul over 
the body, and the location of the image in the spiritual capacities of human beings. Saint 
Thomas also belongs to this line of interpretation as he asserts that the imago Dei refers to the 
human capacity to know and love God. Usually, the special characteristics of humanity said to 
be the manifestation of the image of God in human beings are qualities that were highly valued 
in the societies to which the writers making those claims belonged.211 
As expected, many critiques have been raised against the substantialist or essentialist 
interpretation of the imago Dei. On theological grounds, it is clear that this interpretation does 
not comport well with the biblical vision of humanity, which does not separate the spiritual 
from the corporeal, or prioritize the former at the expense of the latter. Dualism and hierarchy 
between the spiritual and the corporeal is foreign to the OT. As history has shown, this 
reductionism affects not only the theological appraisal of the body but it also implies an 
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overestimation of some human capacities. As a result, some human beings – those who excel in 
these capacities – may be regarded as being better representatives of the divine image within 
humanity, and others – either with impaired capacities or without some of these capacities - 
may be regarded as being not fully in God's image. It is well known that eugenic practices, 
historical mass killings, and many more subtle ways of discrimination stem from distinctive 
forms of negating or failing to recognize full humanity in others.  
A relational interpretation of imago Dei is one in which the image is understood in terms 
of the relationship between humanity and God. In this sense, the image of God does not reside 
in a particular human attribute, capacity, or human quality, but is a manifestation of a particular 
relationship between God and humanity.212 The imago Dei is something that occurs in humanity 
as a result of this relationship. Douglas Hall asserts that humanity “images (used as verb) its 
Creator because and insofar as it is ‘turned toward’ God. To be imago Dei does not mean to 
have something but to be and do something: to image God.”213 As mentioned, the relational 
interpretation finds its best exponents in Luther and Calvin who emphasized this new approach 
to the imago Dei throughout the 16th century. Two recent important advocates of a relational 
interpretation, each with distinctive nuances, are Karl Barth and Claus Westermann from a 
systematic and a biblical perspective, respectively. Within a relational interpretation, it can be 
asserted that the imago Dei is a theological term before it becomes an anthropological one. It 
says something about God who freely establishes a particular relationship with one of his 
creatures – the one who actually happens to be in God’s image – and then, only as a 
consequence of this, it conveys something about human beings and their relationship to God 
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and other creatures.214 A relational understanding of imago Dei may be developed further in a 
number of ways. The most common has been to explore the intra-Trinitarian mode of 
relationship as the paradigm of humanity. If God is to be understood as persons-in-mutual-
relationship, then human beings, made in the image of the triune God, are to be understood as 
persons-in-mutual-relationship. Therefore, communion rather than substance is the basic 
structure of reality.215 Nevertheless, while some remain skeptical about the idea of grounding 
theological anthropology in a distinctive understanding of the intra-trinitarian relationships, 
others highlight that the emphasis on relatedness does not qualify in any sense the nature of 
relationship. Reflection about the intra-trinitarian relationships supposes that we have some 
direct access to this knowledge, and that it can be used to model human relationships. It 
certainly seems more adequate to be cautious in speculation about intra-trinitarian life. 
Moreover, it is true that relational interpretation of the imago Dei requires a specification of 
the nature of the relationship between humanity and God. Relations can span a large array of 
types, and they can even be oppressive. 
Finally, a functionalist view of imago Dei bases its interpretation on the close connection 
of the themes of “being created in the image of God” and “have dominion and subdue the 
earth” in Genesis 1. In this sense, this approach emphasizes the special task and role of human 
beings vis-à-vis the rest of creatures. Humanity acts as a representative of God on the earth 
inasmuch as it is invited to be part of God’s power and rule over the earth. This interpretation 
of Genesis 1, which is also called the royal interpretation, as mentioned, is the one that OT 
                                                     
214
 See, for instance, Moltmann, God in Creation, chapter IX.  
215
 See, among others, Denis Edwards, Breath of Life: A Theology of the Creator Spirit (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
2004), and Ecology at the Heart of Faith. 
144 
 
biblical scholars tend to support. Human beings rule over other earthly creatures as God’s 
representatives and in God’s name. In this sense, the imago Dei implies for humanity a 
particular vocation and commission. Ernst Conradie, for example, holds that “the resemblance 
between God and humanity is not primarily one of character or substance, but one of function 
and position.”216 As mentioned, this participation in God’s rule over creation does not imply a 
limitless dominion. One of the risks of this approach is to reduce the image in humanity to a 
mere task or vocation, emptying it of its ontological reality.217 
4. Conclusions 
It is important to note that these three lines of interpretation of the imago Dei: 
substantialist, relational, and functionalist, are far from being mutually exclusive as someone 
might expect. On the contrary, they complement each other, enabling theology to spell out 
three distinctive aspects of what this theological motif connotes. Thus, it would be a mistake to 
believe that the survey of the history of the interpretation of this notion implies that just one of 
these three understandings is correct and the other two are wrong, and that we need to decide 
which one is which. What I hope the survey has shown is that cultural and theological contexts 
have elicited new understandings of the imago Dei throughout history, which have been 
instrumental in deepening our understanding of what being created in the image of God means 
for humanity. The complementary character of these three interpretations of the imago Dei is 
also asserted in the document of the International Theological Commission already mentioned. 
                                                     
216
 Conradie, An Ecological Christian Anthropology, 88. 
217
 The International Theological Commission is especially emphatic in pointing to this risk of reductionism (n. 9) 
and affirming the ontological character of the image (n. 3). Nevertheless, it does affirm that one of the 
manifestations of the imago Dei within humanity is the specific call it has received from God to responsible 
stewardship of the created world (n. 4, 26, 57-61, 95). International Theological Commission, “Communion and 
Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God.” 
145 
 
Beginning with its title – Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of 
God – this document not only explores and affirms what is valuable in each one of these 
interpretations but also connects them tightly. It also shows their risks and weaknesses. 
Accordingly, a substantialist approach highlights the ontological force of the symbol 
imago Dei. In this sense, the fact that human beings are created in the image of God refers to 
something which is not extrinsic or accessory, but essential. It is indeed what constitutes them 
as what they are. The search for what differentiates humans from other creatures, making 
them unique within creation, and therefore the identification of the imago Dei with some 
human attribute, capacity, or quality, such as reason or will, has historically been an attempt to 
assert the ontological implications of the image, though with the risk of highlighting merely 
some human traits at the expense of others. Nevertheless, as the International Theological 
Commission states, there is consensus nowadays on affirming both the ontological character of 
the image, as well as the integral character of the latter, namely, that the “human person as a 
whole is the bearer of the divine image in a spiritual as well as a bodily dimension.”218  
A relational interpretation underlines that God has created humans in God’s image in 
order to share with them the communion of trinitarian life. This is why the image is “essentially 
dialogical or relational in its ontological structure.”219 Being created in the image of God is 
indeed what enables humanity to partake of divine communion. It is also what drives human 
beings toward communion with one another. As a result, humanity is oriented by its 
constitution as image of God toward interpersonal communion. It is worth noting that while 
asserting the relational character of the imago Dei, the document of the International 
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Theological Commission is also emphatic in stating its ontological implications. This is ultimately 
why the image, although impaired by sin, can never be totally destroyed, “since it defines the 
whole structure of human nature.”220 Salvation in Christ reconfigures the imago Dei in its 
proper orientation toward participation in divine communion.  
Finally, a functionalist interpretation underscores both the dynamic character of the 
image and its implications for the relationship between humanity and other creatures. 
Humanity is established as the image of God within creation, inasmuch as it partakes in the 
divine rule over creation. Therefore, God allows “the creature made in his image to participate 
in his work, in his project of love and salvation, indeed in his own lordship over the universe.”221 
As mentioned, this is not to say that humanity has the right of a limitless dominion over other 
creatures. Human beings participate in the divine governance, but they can never displace it. 
They exert a delegated authority which must imitate its source in the way it is exercised. 
Moreover, the International Theological Commission draws on the notion of natural law222 to 
assert both the ontological character of the human participation in the divine rule over 
creation, and the limits that humanity should respect in this collaboration, which is ultimately 
oriented toward the transformation of the whole of creation which is called to participate in 
the divine life. Accordingly, the notion that the commission uses to refer to the role of 
humanity within creation is stewardship. 
To sum up, these three understanding of the imago Dei provide all together a 
complementary approach to this theological motif, which combines the distinctive nuances of 
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all its biblical occurrences. This complementary approach hence allows theology to state the 
ontological character of the image, on the one hand, and its dialogical dimension, on the other. 
Human beings are in the image of God inasmuch as they are created to partake of divine 
communion. This relational nature of the image evinces both its dynamic and performative 
character. Thus, the image is not only susceptible of being renewed – this is what the Christ 
event accomplished – but it also entails consequences for humanity in its relationship with 
other creatures. Human beings are the image of God on the earth insofar as they are called to 
share in God’s governance and care for creation.223 
The interplay of these three interpretations therefore not only sheds light on the place 
and role of human beings on earth, but also helps theology to re-imagine its understanding of 
humanity within the context of the current ecological crisis. As mentioned, the imago Dei as 
theological motif should not be silenced or discarded for its allegedly anthropocentric depiction 
of humanity. On the contrary, it rather enables theology to provide an ecologically friendly 
representation of human beings, at the same time challenging for us, inasmuch as it aims to 
orient and inspire them in their relationship with the rest of creatures. Moreover, I believe that 
when it is understood in terms of kenosis, the imago Dei exhibits all its ecological strength, and 
it shows itself as a timely, meaningful, and sound understanding of humanity for our time. The 
notion of kenosis indeed not only effectively intertwines the substantialist, relational, and 
functionalist interpretations of the imago Dei, but also serves as a specifier for them, insofar as 
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it gives them concrete content and practical orientation for understanding humanity as created 
in the image of God. Reading the imago Dei theological motif through the lens of the notion of 
kenosis enables theology to display the ontological implications of the image, its relational 
character, as well as its performative dimension, inasmuch as it should control the way in which 
human beings relate to other creatures. This perspective also assumes the Christological 
understanding of the imago Dei, which has been progressively emphasized in the wake of the 
Second Vatican Council. It is ultimately only in the mystery of the incarnate Word that the 
mystery of humanity takes on light (GS 22). It is time therefore to explore how the notion of 
kenosis specifies the imago Dei and provides a meaningful and inspiring understanding of it. 
 
B) Imago Dei as Kenosis: Biblical and Systematic Perspectives 
One may legitimately ask why the notion of kenosis should play a role in the 
interpretation of the imago Dei theological motif; why this term, which is primarily a 
Christological notion, should come to the fore when theology seeks to unfold what being 
created in the image of God could mean for humanity? For some it may appear to be an 
unwarranted association or an arbitrary movement. Nevertheless, I think that reading the 
imago Dei through the lens of the notion of kenosis is not only reasonable, but it is also a 
theological requirement if one wants to be faithful to the biblical data and to the intimate 
connection between Christology and anthropology. Affirming that human beings have been 
created in the image of God is first of all a theological statement, which primarily says 
something about God, and only then something about humanity. Our attention is immediately 
and rightly drawn to the God in whose image human beings are said to have been created. 
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Accordingly, we look at God in order to get any hint which may give a definite meaning to this 
theological statement. We look at God asking about God’s main features and about what 
characterizes God as God. In other words, if we want to provide precise and concrete meaning 
to the imago Dei, the first and most important theological question is: who is this God who has 
created creatures in God’s own image? Therefore, anything that shows and reveals who God is 
and what God does is potentially crucial for pinning down the meaning and content of the 
theological understanding of the imago Dei. In this sense, the New Testament is not only 
emphatic in pointing to Christ as the true image of God (2 Cor 4:4 and Col 1:15), but it also 
emphasizes that whoever has seen Jesus, has seen the Father (John 14:9), and that Jesus is the 
one who reveals the Father (Mt 11:27).  A Christocentric vision of the imago Dei therefore – to 
focus on the only image we have been given: Jesus – is not only warranted but a theological 
requirement. It is in this respect that I believe that the notion of kenosis – inasmuch as it unveils 
something about who God is and what God does – is vital for providing a timely and meaningful 
understanding of imago Dei in the context of the current ecological crisis. 
1. The locus classicus of kenosis: Philippians 2:5-11 
The theological notion of kenosis is rooted in the Pauline letter to the Philippians. There, 
the Greek word  conveys a deliberate action by Jesus Christ: he emptied himself (Phil 
2:7), which epitomizes what Jesus Christ’s mindset or attitude was, and which Paul asks 
Philippians to take into account. Much has been written about this letter and specifically about 
the passage where this notion is found: Phil 2:5-11. I intend neither to examine all the 
exegetical controversies and theories which have been advanced for this specific passage 
through history, nor to solve all the dilemmas that this text implies for exegesis. This would 
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certainly bring us out of the purpose and scope of this analysis.224 What I intend, rather, is to 
highlight some significant insights from the interpretation of this passage which are valuable for 
the theological understanding of the imago Dei. I will therefore focus on those aspects of the 
text that shed light on what kenosis actually means for Jesus Christ, and that consequently 
inspire and specify what being created in the image of God entails for humanity. There is 
definitely much disagreement in the interpretation of this passage, and its study has certainly 
become a battle field of technical details. Nonetheless I believe that these differences do not 
affect the core message of this text and the elements that this analysis wants to highlight.  
Before entering into the details of the exegesis, it is important to summarize some of 
the main features of Philippians. It is widely held by current scholarship that Philippians has 
been written while Paul was in prison. Nevertheless, there is no consensus about the date of 
the letter. Depending on the city where the letter was allegedly written – Ephesus, Rome, 
Caesarea, or Corinth – its date ranges from 50 C.E to early 60 C.E.225 However, neither its place 
of origin nor its writing date affect significantly its interpretation. It is usually considered as one 
letter, though some scholars suggest that the letter we have was originally more than one, and 
that it is the result of the joining of at least two letters.226 Nonetheless again, the disagreement 
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about the integrity of the letter does not imply any important consequence for the 
interpretation of the passage we are concerned with.  As to the form and the structure of the 
letter, it has been studied against the background of the rhetorical patterns and forms of 
Greco-Roman letters. As a result, for instance, while some suggest that Paul follows in 
Philippians the conventions of a letter of friendship, others think that Paul writes this text as a 
letter of consolation to encourage Philippians in their distress because of his imprisonment, or 
that Paul structures the letter according to the pattern of a family letter.227 The pattern and 
form of Greco-Roman letters with which Philippians is equated, certainly affects how the 
structure of Paul’s letter is established, how its different components are valued, and what role 
these components are said to be playing within the letter. At any rate, as shown by the most 
noteworthy commentaries and multiple specific works, this does not have significant impact on 
the interpretation of what is considered to be one of the most important passages of 
Philippians, namely, 2:5-11. As a result, it can be said that the current disagreements about the 
writing date of Philippians, its place of origin, its original integrity, and its form and structure, 
do not prevent exegetes from examining the letter and arriving at some consensus in its 
interpretation, which are valuable for understanding the notion of kenosis, and therefore, for 
specifying what the imago Dei means for humanity. Hence, I turn now to some key insights of 
this passage, which are both enlightening and promising for the theological view on human 
beings.  
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a. Background and form of the passage 
There is consensus among scholars in stating that these verses, 2:5-11, form a unity in 
themselves, which can be examined in its structure, grammatical particularities, and meaning. 
However, despite the general agreement on attributing Philippians to Paul, scholars debate 
about the origin of this particular text. Some believe that Paul is using an earlier liturgical hymn, 
which he inserts and modifies within the letter.228 Others, taking distance from this perspective, 
not only deny the hymn-genre of this passage, but also affirm that it has been written by 
Paul.229 It is noteworthy that, despite the particular vocabulary and style that the passage 
exhibits, as well as its internal parallelism and symmetry, there are not apodictic reasons to 
affirm that Paul is actually using and editing an existing hymn.230 Anyway, even if Paul is 
drawing on pre-existing material, this should not lead anyone to the conclusion that the text 
can be interpreted independently of its current context and the function that it plays within the 
entire letter. Its meaning therefore must be unfolded against the background of the whole of 
Philippians. 
Along the same lines, the debate around Pauline authorship of this passage is crucial 
only because of the consequences that it may entail for the understanding of the text. In this 
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sense, it would be flawed to think, for those who uphold the primitive origin of these verses, 
that the text does not fit Pauline theology and that it is not representative of his thinking. 
Australian biblical scholar Peter O’Brien states clearly that the passage not only belongs in its 
present context and forms a highly significant section of the overall argument of 1:27--2:18, but 
also its vocabulary evokes that of the verses immediately preceding (2:1-4). The text prefigures 
as well themes that appear later in the letter (e.g. 3:20-21).231 Even though the vocabulary of 
the text – which contains a few hapax legomena – and some of its theological emphases do not 
exactly match what is seen as classic Pauline style, the passage should not be considered 
foreign to his thinking or theological stance. The fact that Paul may have been possibly using 
existing material does not imply that the text has to be regarded as non-Pauline. Phil 2:5-11 is 
currently indeed in a wider context, which is determinant for both unfolding its meaning and 
establishing its function. The idea that Paul has edited a former text – inserting or adding some 
phrases – and the consequent searching for these interpolations have proved to be extremely 
hypothetical and highly dependent on what is considered to be the text’s original background: 
Gnostic, Hellenistic mythology, Jewish, and its original language: Greek or Semitic.232  
Without reviewing all hypotheses and theories about authorship, original background, 
form, and language of this passage, I think that the following are the conclusions which are 
central for this analysis of the text. First, the passage perfectly fits its current context, and 
therefore it has to be interpreted against the background of the entire letter to the Philippians. 
                                                     
231
 O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians, 202. N.T. Wright is also inclined to Pauline authorship of the text: “if 
someone were to take it upon themselves to argue, on the basis of my conclusions, that the ‘hymn’ was originally 
written by Paul himself precisely in order to give Christological and above all theological underpinning to the rest 
of Philippians, especially chs. 2 and 3, I for one should find it hard to produce convincing counterarguments.” 
Wright, The Climax of the Covenant, 98. 
232
 Aletti, Saint Paul, Epître Aux Philippiens, 140. 
154 
 
The idea that the text’s allegedly original meaning and intention can be established 
independently of its current context – and therefore that the Pauline use of the text should be 
understood in parallel to this primeval form – should be discarded. Inasmuch as there is no 
material evidence of a former text, we will never have sure answers about the text's supposed 
original form and theological emphasis, nor about its use by the early Christian community.233 
Therefore, it is both its current context and Paul’s intent – not any supposed primitive form and 
use – that is essential for the interpretation of this passage.234 Secondly, what Paul may 
allegedly have added to an existing text – e.g. death on a cross – is of little interest, for given its 
current context, the whole text, and not just some of its parts, accounts for Pauline theology. 
By no means can it be stated that only the elements supposedly introduced by Paul would 
reflect his own theology. The text in its entirety has to be assumed as Pauline thinking. Thirdly, 
among all the possible original backgrounds which have been proposed to this passage, it is 
important to note that while the larger Graeco-Roman context must not be ignored, the 
immediate early Christian context of language and ethos is most significant.235 This is another 
way to state that the hypothetical original background of the text should not be determinative 
in its interpretation, and that its actual Christian context – literary and vital – is certainly crucial. 
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Finally, deciding whether or not the passage is a pre-Pauline hymn is not as important as the 
exegetical consequences that one may eventually draw from this dilemma. Though some have 
convincingly argued against considering Phil 2:5-11 as a hymn,236 it is not the notion of hymn 
that may be problematic, but rather the idea that because it would be a pre-Pauline hymn, the 
text could be interpreted independently of its current context and function, and regardless of 
Paul's intent in using it. Defining this passage as a hymn may have an impact on the definition 
of its structure, but not necessarily on its interpretation. Therefore, Philippians 2:5-11 
undoubtedly expresses Pauline theology, and both its meaning and function must be 
established in relation with the rest of the letter. 
b. Some key expressions: , , and  
 It can be said that the interpretation of this passage, which is certainly thorny, revolves 
around some key expressions. Indeed, the analysis and clarification of the meaning of some 
crucial notions of this text have proved determinant for establishing Paul’s intent with these 
verses, and the message addressed to the Philippians through them. In the following pages, I do 
not aim at an exhaustive exegesis of this passage, which would go well beyond the limits and 
scope of this project, but rather I intend to focus on the interpretation of some key terms, 
namely, , , and  in contemporary scholarly exegesis. They are 
pivotal for understanding what Jesus’ kenosis may mean theologically and therefore for 
shedding light on the implications of the imago Dei for humanity.  
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 It is almost unanimously agreed that the text is divided in two parts vv 6-8 and 9-11, and 
v 5 is considered to be an introduction to the subsequent verses, in which Paul invites the 
Philippians to have in themselves what Jesus Christ’s mind or attitude was. It is important to 
state from the outset that Paul is not simply proposing an exemplary role model which would 
be extrinsic to Philippians – and by extension to all believers – but he is rather pointing to the 
interior transformation or conformation to Christ’s likeness, which occurs in those who follow 
Jesus Christ.237 French exegete Jean-Noël Aletti also shows that the verb  can be 
understood to refer to a change of the opinion one has about oneself and others, which should 
be totally different from the one proposed by the mundane values of selfishness and conceit, to 
which Paul alludes in the preceding verses. In this sense, the center of gravity of this verb is not 
just the materiality of Jesus Christ’s action, but rather a way of being, a manner of considering 
oneself and others, according to the spirit of humility and self-emptying love which will be 
presented in the following verses.238  
The Greek words of verse 9 – which are translated as and therefore – divide the 
passage in two parts. While the first part shows a series of deliberate choices made by Jesus 
Christ: he emptied himself, took the form of a slave, humbled himself, and was obedient to the 
point of death on a cross, the second part shifts the focus to God the Father, who reacts to 
Jesus Christ’s actions, exalting him and giving him the name which is above all other names: 
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Lord, aiming toward universal proclamation and adoration. The first part hence emphasizes the 
intentional character of Jesus’ behavior, who is the subject of all the verbs of this part. Although 
some important insights of the second part will be provided below, in order to draw out the 
meaning and scope of Jesus Christ’s kenosis, I will concentrate on the first part of this passage, 
namely vv 6-8. As mentioned, there are some key expressions or notions in this part, which are 
crucial for an accurate understanding of both the kenosis of Jesus Christ, and Paul’s intent with 
this text. 
Form of God:  
 The first of these notions is , which appears twice – the only two occurrences in 
the NT – and is associated with both God and slave. Although the first occurrence is related to 
God –  – the meaning of this subject, as scholars affirm, must be necessarily 
clarified by its second occurrence, when it is linked with the imagery of slavery 
(), and it is said that Jesus Christ has taken the form of a slave. Scholars agree in 
considering that Paul is looking for a word suitable for this dual usage, able to characterize 
Jesus Christ both in the form of God and in the form of a slave. Therefore, they believe that 
 in this context needs to be understood as “form” or “shape,” though not only in the 
sense of exterior appearance – face, body, flesh – but also and especially in terms of those 
characteristics and qualities which are essential to it. As Fee states,  therefore means 
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“that which truly characterizes a given reality.”239 It denotes hence the visible manifestation of 
a given real condition,240 or the true expression of the inner self.241 
 For some scholars v 6 refers to the pre-existent Christ, who would be the subject of the 
action described in that verse. It would be indeed a statement about the pre-existence of 
Christ, and in this sense, it would be a strong Christological affirmation, and one of the clearest 
NT testimonies about this. As a result, in using Paul would be intentionally 
asserting Christ’s pre-existence. Those who uphold this view therefore believe that the first part 
of this passage (vv 6-8), refers first to the pre-existent Christ (v 6) and only then to his earthly 
life (vv 7-8), when he took the form of a slave, humbled himself, and was obedient to the point 
of a death on a cross.242 Consequently, Jesus Christ’s kenosis would be first of all related to his 
incarnation.  
 Others think that vv 6-8 refer only to the earthly life of Jesus Christ, and that v 6 should 
not be understood as stating his pre-existence. It is not that this passage denies Christ’s pre-
existent life, but rather that this is not its main focus or intent. Therefore, Paul does not aim to 
make a strong Christological assertion in this passage, but rather he is offering Jesus Christ as an 
example to Philippians. I think that, among others, French biblical scholar Jean-Noël Aletti 
argues convincingly to show that these verses have to do with the divine Christ in his 
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incarnation, and not to his pre-existence.243 The first argument he provides is an historical one. 
He underlines that the early interpretation of this text made by the Latin and Greek Fathers 
until St. Ambrose, has mostly understood vv 6-7 as referring to the incarnate Christ. He thinks 
that the Arian controversy has greatly influenced the reading of this text, and as result, it is only 
after St. Ambrose and the Ambrosiaster that the Latin Fathers customarily begin interpreting it 
as an assertion of Christ’s pre-existence. This interpretation hence will be rooted in and 
reinforced by the technical distinction between the pre-existent Logos and the incarnate Logos 
which is set up in the wake of Nicaea I.244 The Arian polemic would have inclined the Fathers 
toward one interpretation of the text – the one that secures Christ's pre-existence and 
therefore Christ's divine character – resulting unfortunately in the forgetting of other 
interpretations, which associate the text with the incarnate Christ, and are less concerned with 
the Christological controversies. The second argument provided by Aletti is a contextual one. 
He says that when Paul in his letters introduces Christ as an example, he alludes to Jesus’ 
earthly life and his feelings vis-à-vis humanity, and not to the pre-existent Logos. Paul, for 
instance, presents Jesus as an example of generosity (2 Cor 8:9), welcome (Rom 15:7), 
forgiveness (Col 3:13), and charity (Eph 5:2).245 Providing supplementary references (namely, 
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Rom 15:3, 8; 1 Cor 10:31--11:1; 2 Cor 4:8-11; 5:14; and 1 Thess 1:6) L. W. Hurtado asserts that 
these verses are clear evidence that the earthly Jesus in his self-sacrifice is cited by Paul as a 
pattern for behavior.246 Therefore, in the context of the entire Pauline corpus it is reasonable 
and consistent to think that the one whom Paul presents as an example in Phil 2:6 is the 
incarnate Christ and not the pre-existent Logos.  Along the same lines, Aletti wonders if the 
invitation to imitate Christ would be still suitable if Paul was proposing to Philippians to take 
into account the deliberate action of the preexistent Logos, which would certainly be 
something difficult to identify with, and embody.247 
 The remaining arguments that Aletti offers to substantiate his position stem from a 
close reading of the text. First of all, he asserts that given that  denotes corporality and 
visibility, and that the participle which accompanies it –  - is never used by Paul in 
statements about God, it is then warranted to think that v 6: refers 
to the divine condition of the incarnate Christ, and not to the pre-existent Logos.248 Secondly, 
those who dismiss the reference to Christ´s preexistence in v 6, have to provide an 
understanding of the subsequent verses in which Jesus Christ's incarnation therefore does not 
play any role. In fact, when v 6 is said to allude to the pre-existent Logos, v 7 is read as asserting 
that Jesus Christ emptied himself, took the form of a slave, and was born in human likeness 
(incarnation). Aletti therefore affirms that it is important to remember that the contrast Paul 
makes is between  and  and not with , even if 
some want to equate  with . In this sense, the passage does not say simply 
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that Christ who was God became man, but rather that Jesus Christ who was in the form of God 
took the form of a slave.249 As a result,  should neither be 
considered as a pinning down of the previous affirmation –   – nor be 
linked to it. On the contrary, Aletti believes that is the 
beginning of a new phrase which is closely connected with . 
He thinks hence that in this situation has to be translated as being – so related to 
the verb  – and not as becoming and then related to the verb .250 Accordingly, the 
text has to be read as asserting that Christ being like human beings, and being recognized as a 
human being, he humbled himself. Therefore, there is no temporal sequence between the two 
affirmations, as if the text was saying that first Christ became in the likeness of human beings, 
and then he was recognized as a human being, but rather it is a cumulative dual assertion of the 
same reality, first from the viewpoint of what it is, and then from the viewpoint of viewers. 
Aletti states hence that “the text goes from a statement about being, to a statement about 
recognition: Christ appeared and was recognized for what he wanted to be and the way he 
wanted to be.”251  The text is not redundant, but rather it emphasizes Jesus Christ's human 
condition from two different perspectives. Thereby, vv 6-8 do not describe an itinerary that 
begins with Christ’s pre-existence, and follows with his incarnation, humiliation and obedience, 
but rather it refers all the time to the incarnate Christ, who is the subject of all the actions 
depicted in these verses.  
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Although the decision between whether the text alludes to Christ's pre-existent life or 
not is not essential for showing how the notion of kenosis elucidates the theological 
understanding of the imago Dei, as will be shown below, I believe that, when the text is 
assumed to refer only to the incarnate Christ, the idea of self-emptying oneself acquires a 
higher, inspiring and meaningful significance. Therefore, contrary to what Fee asserts, I believe 
that, if the text does not point to the pre-existent Logos, the notion of kenosis is neither 
emptied of its content nor is the narrative of the text divested of its essential power,252 but 
rather in this case the notion of kenosis denotes and evokes other ideas which are not clearly 
present when it is almost equated to the idea of incarnation.  
He does not use it for his own advantage:  
 The second key notion of vv 6-8, in order to obtain an accurate understanding of their 
meaning, is It is a hapax legomenon which does not have parallels in the LXX and it 
is rare in extra-biblical materials.253 This notion is directly related in the text to 
which is usually understood as a complementary phrase of  and 
translated as expressing equality with God; therefore, the text states that Jesus Christ possesses 
equality with God the Father.254 Nevertheless, the center of gravity of this phrase is not the 
assertion of this equality, but rather that Jesus Christ did not consider it as What 
therefore does this uncommon expression mean? 
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 N.T. Wright offers, in a thorough and widely cited article, the most satisfactory and 
exhaustive examination of this notion.255 In his interpretation of  he combines the 
work of two other scholars – Roy Hoover and C.F.D Moule – and shows that they are 
complementary approaches, which enable theology to disclose the meaning of this term. In the 
wake of Hoover’s work, Wright states that  has to be interpreted both in relation to 
 and as being part of an idiomatic expression meaning “something to take advantage 
of” or “something to be used for one’s own advantage’.256 Accordingly, the text asserts that 
Jesus Christ did not consider his equality with God as something to take advantage of or to be 
used for his own benefit. Paul is using therefore an idiomatic expression in order to state that 
Jesus Christ did not see the equality with God he possesses, as something to be used for his 
own advantage or as a condition to be exploited for his own gain. Wright believes that despite 
the fact that Hoover’s interpretation of  renders untenable other understandings of 
this notion, it is nevertheless capable of including many of their strong points within itself as 
well as of making excellent theological sense.257 According to this perspective – and contrary to 
some interpretations – the text asserts that equality with God is something that Jesus Christ 
already has. In fact, after a careful study of its extra biblical usage, Hoover states that this 
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idiomatic expression always refers to something already present and at one’s disposal. The 
question in such instances is indeed “not whether or not one possesses something, but 
whether or not one chooses to exploit something.”258  
 Wright combines the result of Hoover’s study, with the interpretation of  
that C.F.D. Moule offers. The latter thinks that this notion has to be understood in its active and 
abstract sense and therefore meaning: raptus. Hence, the text would be asserting that Jesus 
Christ did not regard equality with God as consisting in “snatching” or “grasping.” In this 
perspective, and contrary to the standard picture of oriental despots, divine equality did not 
mean for Jesus Christ “getting,” but rather “giving,” which is properly expressed in self-giving 
love.259  
It is worth noting that the participial phrase  can be 
grammatically understood not only as concessive, but also as causative. While in the former 
sense the phrase would be asserting that though he was in the form of God, Jesus Christ 
nevertheless did not consider his equality with God as something to use for his own benefit, the 
latter sense would be affirming that precisely because he was in the form of God, Jesus Christ 
did not consider his equality with God as something to take advantage of for his own gain. The 
causative interpretation therefore underlines that Jesus Christ’s condition is precisely what 
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motivates him not to use it for his own advantage, whereas the concessive understanding 
highlights that Jesus Christ renounces what he had a right to because of his condition. Wright 
states that the causative sense is the one which Moule prefers, as well as the one that an 
accurate interpretation of the text requires.260 In either case, the emphasis of the text is on 
Jesus Christ's deliberate decision not to take advantage of his position or not to use it for his 
own benefit. Therefore, as Wright puts it, combining the works of Hoover and Moule, Paul’s use 
of  implies that “Christ might have regarded his equality with God as meaning 
snatching (or, as something to take advantage of), but on the contrary he chose (to regard it as 
meaning) the way of self-giving, and, further, to act on that understanding.”261 Accordingly, 
Jesus Christ makes clear that what really embodies and reveals God is not the way of "getting" 
or "grabbing," or the attitude of taking advantage of one’s own condition for one’s own benefit, 
but rather what ultimately defines and makes manifest God is self-giving love. Given that Jesus 
understood his equality with God in this sense, we therefore already have a glimpse of what the 
imago Dei may imply for humanity. 
He emptied himself:  
Finally, the third key notion of the first part of the text is . It is the only 
occurrence of this verb in the Bible where it is used with a reflexive pronoun, namely, Jesus 
Christ  himself. It is worth noting that the Greek adversative  - which initiates 
the phrase – establishes a sharp contrast between what Jesus Christ could have chosen and 
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what he really did. In this sense, the meaning of kenosis is directly related – indeed as its 
opposite – to what has been said about the understanding of . Jesus Christ did not 
consider his equality with God as 'grabbing' or as a something to take advantage of for his own 
gain, but rather - and in great contrast - he  himself. This verb is usually translated as 
“he emptied himself,” and scholars agree on its metaphorical sense. Jesus Christ does not 
empty himself as one can empty a barrel or a bottle,262 nor does the verb require a genitive 
qualifier that he must have ‘emptied himself’ of something.263 Therefore, Jesus Christ did not 
empty himself of anything, he emptied himself; and he poured himself out.264 
Some elements of the text need to be emphasized in order to get an accurate 
understanding of Jesus Christ’s kenosis. First of all, the passage refers to a deliberate and 
voluntary act of Jesus. It is not imposed on him, and nothing makes it necessary, unless perhaps 
only – as the text underlines – the way Jesus conceives of his divine equality with God, and the 
implications that therefore this entails for him. Jesus Christ’s kenosis is therefore the outcome 
of an intentional and mysterious decision, namely, he has chosen to appear and be recognized 
not as  but rather as  with all the human and social consequences related to this 
condition.265  Secondly, the inquiry about what Jesus Christ has emptied himself of or what he 
has he given up of himself, is a wrong path. Paul’s use of kenosis in this text does not require 
nor imply that Jesus has renounced something which was essential to him such as divine 
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properties or attributes.266 For, “God cannot stop being God. What Jesus relinquished was 
privilege, not essence.”267 Jesus does not renounce his equality with God, but he does not take 
advantage of this for his own benefit. Therefore, and thirdly, this is what is meant by affirming 
the metaphorical sense of Jesus Christ’s kenosis. It does not mean indeed that the latter is not 
real or that it did not happen, but rather that it does not require a direct object, namely, 
something Jesus would have divested himself of. Jesus does not give up anything of his divine 
condition, but he pours himself out through self-giving love. Finally, the contrast that Paul 
establishes is between  and , which is the one that Jesus has freely 
chosen. This is why Paul’s intent in using the language and imagery of slavery is central for 
understanding the scope and deep meaning of Jesus’ kenosis. Taking into account that Paul is 
writing to Christian readers with a pagan past – the Philippians – O’Brien thinks that the best 
way of understanding the image of slavery is against the background of slavery in contemporary 
society. Therefore, slavery points to deprivation of one’s rights, even those related to one’s 
own life and person.268 In this sense, he thinks that the contrast between  and 
                                                     
266
 This is contrary to kenotic Christology which was developed over the 19
th
 century by German (Lutherans) and 
English (Anglicans) scholars, and it is still supported by some theologians. The overarching thesis of this approach is 
that at the incarnation Christ divested himself of some non-essential or relative divine attributes or properties, 
namely, omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence, while retaining other essential attributes such as holiness, 
righteousness, and love. It is worth noting that – as contemporary exegesis has shown – Philippians does not offer 
any basis for such speculations. For a good presentation of the 19
th
-century kenotic Christology, see Thomas R. 
Thompson, “Nineteenth-Century Kenotic Christology: The Waxing, Waning, and Weighing of a Quest for a 
Coherent Orthodoxy,” in Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. Stephen Evans (Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 74–111, and David R. Law, “Le Kénotisme Luthérien et Anglican: Les 
Christologies de Gottfried Thomasius et Frank Weston,” Etudes Théologiques et Religieuses 89, no. 3 (2014): 313–
40. For a contemporary defense of kenotic Christology see Stephen Davis, “Is Kenosis Orthodox?,” in Exploring 
Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. Stephen Evans (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 112–38, and for a critical approach see Sarah Coakley, “Does Kenosis Rest on a Mistake? Three Kenotic 
Models in Patristic Exegesis,” in Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. Stephen Evans 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 246–64. 
267
 Thurston and Ryan, Sacra Pagina, 83. 
268
 See O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians, 223, and Moule, “Further Reflections on Philippians 2:5-11,” 268. 
168 
 
implies that Jesus “displayed the nature or form of God in the nature or form 
of a slave, thereby showing clearly not only what his character was like, but also what it meant 
to be God.”269 Paul is using language that has positive overtones for his readers, and that can be 
also associated, in the way the apostle uses it in his letters, with the word group of . 
Accordingly, Hurtado believes that the primary Pauline association with the term is 
servitude to God and to others.270 Hence, Jesus Christ's kenosis and his taking the form of a 
slave refers, on the one hand, to the voluntary deprivation of rights and its necessary 
consequences – paradoxically Jesus freely chooses a condition that no one wants –271 and, on 
the other hand, to service and love for others – Jesus shows by his life that divine equality 
ultimately means sacrificial self-giving.272 
The way of kenosis is therefore for Jesus the path between the  and 
, which is a sharp contrast between the highest form of being (God), and the 
lowest form of being (slave).273 It has already been established that this passage of Philippians 
likely refers to the incarnate Christ, and not to the pre-existent Logos. For those who uphold 
the latter, the notion of kenosis is intimately and directly related to the incarnation of Christ, 
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though the two terms and actions cannot simply be equated.274 Indeed, it is evident that the 
notion kenosis cannot be reduced to Christ’s incarnation, inasmuch as it is explicated in the text 
through the notion of . In addition to the reasons already given to dismiss the 
reference to the pre-existent Logos, I also believe that the notion of kenosis acquires all its 
evocative and inspiring power when, instead of being connected with the notion of incarnation, 
it is rather seen as a deliberate act of Jesus’ earthly life. It is then that it displays all its potential 
impact and influence upon theological anthropology. 
The notion of kenosis is related in the text not only to Jesus’ act of taking the form of a 
slave, but also to his acts of self-humbling and obedience. In fact, the expression  
(he humbled himself) clearly echoes “emptied himself,” and given that “humility” was a 
slave virtue, the verb aptly describes the “emptied condition” of Jesus which resulted from his 
kenosis.275 Accordingly, Jesus’ self-humbling expresses the final, climactic part of his consistent 
action of abasement.276 It is also worth noting that the verb  clearly echoes the 
expression  which Paul uses for encouraging everyone within the Philippian 
community to do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit, but in humility regard others as 
better than oneself (v 3).  
The notion of obedience –  – in turn specifies what self-humility has ultimately 
meant for Jesus. In this sense, Jesus’ self-humbling is expressed through his obedience to the 
point of death, and death on a cross. Even though the text does not clearly declare to whom 
Jesus is obedient, it can be rightly asserted – being faithful to the Pauline usage of the word 
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group related to obedience – that Jesus is obedient first and primarily to the Father, and that 
this obedience is also embodied through Jesus’ service vis-à-vis others. Aletti thinks that the 
fact that the text does not assert the recipient of Jesus’ obedience highlights the act of 
obedience in itself, its duration, and its constancy, namely, a whole life right up to the end. 
Moreover, this fact emphasizes as well the imagery of slavery, inasmuch as slaves are defined 
by their dependency and obedience.277 Nonetheless, in the Pauline corpus, obedience does not 
first consist of the recognition of someone's superiority to whom one would be subjected – in 
fact it should not  be merely equated to submission – but it rather expresses the willingness to 
do the will, to be attentive and docile to the words of the one to whom one is obedient. It is 
important to keep in mind that vv 6-8 emphasize the deliberate and voluntary character of 
Jesus’ acts: he did not consider his equality with God as something to take advantage of for his 
own benefit, but rather he purposely self-emptied and self-humbled himself. Along the same 
lines, Jesus’ obedience has to be understood as an intentional act. He freely chose the path of 
self-abasement and obedience which led him to death on a cross. In this sense, his crucifixion 
can be seen, as it were, as a dramatic and forceful climax of Jesus' kenotic way.278 O’Brien 
underlines indeed that the central concern of this passage is to show what obedience meant for 
Jesus, not for us, that is, “it meant condescension, humiliation, death, and finally exaltation.”279 
Therefore, Jesus – the one who is equal with God – shows that God is love and that this love is 
fully and primarily revealed through self-emptying and self-sacrificial love. 
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These three key expressions – , , and  
– along with the general theological standpoint of the text, have led many scholars to inquire 
about the biblical background and the parallels of Philippians 2:5-11 with other Old Testament 
passages. Accordingly, it has been said that Paul is intentionally connecting the letter with 
either the figure of the Servant of YHWH (Is 52:13--53:12),280 or the figure of the righteous 
sufferer of wisdom literature,281 or that he is establishing a parallel – as he does in other 
passages such as Rom 5 and 1 Cor 15 – between Adam and Christ. As to the reference to the 
figure of the righteous sufferer – namely, those who having suffered human violence because 
of their obedience to God, are eventually exalted by God – it is said that Phil 2:6-11 presents 
Jesus as the full realisation of the figure of the persecuted just person. Nonetheless, most 
scholars think that while the thematic linkage between Philippians 2 and the righteous sufferer 
of wisdom literature can be rightly asserted, it is merely a generic link with no strong literary 
and linguistic foundation. As to the alleged parallel with the servant of YHWH (Is 52:13—53:12), 
it is widely accepted that this passage exhibits the same biblical theme of abasement/exaltation 
– though some dismiss  the direct linguistic and literary connection – and therefore provides a 
suitable background to interpret Phil 2: 5-11 and Paul’s intent with it. This association with 
Deutero-Isaiah is strenghtened by the second part of Philippians (vv 9-11) when it is said, in 
direct relation to Is 45:23, that Jesus is granted the name above all names, and that every knee 
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shall bend at the name Jesus has received, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is 
the Lord.282 Richard Bauckhman indeed thinks that the allusions to Isaiah 52--53 and to Isaiah 
45 within Philippians cohere. He believes that Phil 2:6-11 reads Deutero-Isaiah “to mean that 
the career of the servant of the Lord, his suffering, humiliation, death, and exaltation, is the 
way in which the sovereignty of the one true God comes to be acknowledged by all.”283 Finally, 
the association of Philippians 2 with the Pauline Adam/Christ parallelism is again widely 
accepted as a general background that helps in the understanding of the theological meaning of 
Paul´s text, though some dismiss any direct linguistic and literary relationship between 
Philippians and Genesis. I will later explore this parallelism inasmuch as it is the most promising 
and suitable for shedding light on the theological understanding of the imago Dei through the 
lens of Jesus’ kenosis. To sum up, Philippians 2:5-11 evokes several Old Testament passages and 
themes, with which it is closely related  and in some cases directly influenced by. These 
passages and themes help in understanding not only the biblical background of Phil 2, but also 
its theological scope and meaning. 
The second part of the text 
Before exploring further the Adam/Christ typology in Philippians 2, it is important to 
underline some key elements of the second part of the text (vv 9-11) as a way of concluding my 
analysis. Once again, I do not aim to present an exhaustive exegesis of these verses, but rather 
to highlight only those elements which are relevant to this project and provide some insights 
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for deepening  our interpretation of Jesus’ kenosis, and therefore for a suitable understanding 
of the imago Dei. 
First, the beginning of v 9 sets a direct correlation between what has happened and 
what it is about to occur. The Greek expression is indeed translated as therefore or that 
is why, and introduces the reaction of God the Father vis-à-vis Jesus’ steady self-abasement to 
the extent of his death on a cross. This implies that what vv 9-11 tell about God the Father is 
directly related to the path of self-abasement followed by Jesus, especially since this path has 
included voluntary obedience. As Aletti points out, it is not that Jesus has chosen abasement in 
order to be exalted – it is not a utilitarian or interested choice – but it is rather because he has 
emptied himself, taken the form of a slave, and been obedient unto his death on a cross, that 
God the Father has exalted him.284 Therefore, while the first part of the text has Jesus as the 
subject of all the actions described in these verses (vv 6-8), the second part (vv 9-11) introduces 
God the Father as the subject of all the actions, and Jesus becomes the recipient of them; he 
receives the name above all names, and every knee and every tongue proclaim that he is the 
Lord to the glory of God. The same way that the text emphasizes the deliberate character of 
Jesus’ acts, his exaltation has to be seen as a free act of God the Father. The Father indeed is 
not bound to any specific response regarding Jesus’ self-humbling life and death. God does not 
act therefore out of obligation, but rather out of love and faithfulness to the promise, that the 
one who humbles oneself shall be exalted. Accordingly, the exaltation of Jesus is widely 
understood as a “response of vindication and approval.”285 Jesus’ exaltation is the affirmation, 
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by God the Father, that Jesus’ self-emptying and self-humbling path is really “the revelation of 
the divine love in action.”286 The Father acknowledges that Jesus’ kenosis is the true 
understanding and expression of divine equality. Precisely because Jesus did not understand 
equality with God as either ‘snatching’ or ‘grabbing,’ or consider this equality as something to 
take advantage of for his own benefit, but rather emptied himself to the extent of death on a 
cross, the Father has exalted him. Scholars widely agree on considering the Greek verb 
 (to highly exalt) to refer to something superlative – and not merely comparative 
in regard to Jesus previous condition – which is in direct contrast to the supreme humiliation of 
Jesus’ crucifixion, and implies that “nothing is higher than Christ Jesus, who is placed over all 
things and is given the name above every name.”287 
Secondly, the name that Jesus has been granted is the name of  which is the 
Greek designation used in the LXX to represent the personal name of the God of Israel, that is, 
Yahweh.288 Once again, the text resonates and evokes Deutero-Isaiah where God states that "I 
am the lord, that is my name; my glory I give to no other" (42:8). Accordingly, the sharing of the 
name implies that in his exalted state Jesus exercises universal lordship. Nonetheless, as the 
text asserts, the universal recognition of Jesus’ lordship is for the glory of God the Father, for 
“Christ’s lordship does not compete with God’s sovereignty.”289 Jesus, who has never lost or 
divested himself from his divine condition, receives now from God the Father the highest glory. 
This is the great paradox of the text, as Alleti notes, that Jesus Christ, who by renouncing use of 
his equality with God for his own benefit, has emptied himself, has taken the form of a slave, 
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humbling himself and being obedient to death on a cross, now is to be acknowledged and 
proclaimed as Lord by everyone.290  
Finally, the second part of the text declares that at the name of Jesus every knee should 
bend and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is the Lord. As mentioned, in clear 
parallel with Isaiah 45:23, Paul announces universal acknowledgment and proclamation of 
Jesus’ lordship over all creation. The bending of the knee implies homage and recognition of 
authority. Martin shows, for instance, that “the universal homage marks the subjection of those 
who so kneel to the lordship of Christ.”291 In this sense, through his exaltation God the Father 
“has transferred this right to obeisance to the Son.”292 As to the universal proclamation of 
Jesus’ lordship, it should not be understood as a fully religious conversion, meaning universal 
faith and adherence to Jesus; rather, as O’Brien shows, it signifies that every tongue “will 
openly declare that Jesus alone has the right to rule.”293 The expression “in heaven and on 
earth and under the earth” of these verses has to be understood as pointing to everything. Paul 
is using an expression capable of encompassing every creature, in order to affirm that “nothing 
in creation is outside of the realm of Jesus’ lordship.”294  
To sum up, God the Father has freely exalted Jesus Christ, not as a mere reward for his 
deeds, but as a vindication and approval of his understanding of divine equality, as well as of his 
constant “downward mobility” – not taking advantage of this equality for his own gain – which 
has been expressed in his kenosis, choosing the form of slave, humbling himself and being 
obedient to the point of death on a cross. This is why the Father has given him the name above 
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all names: Lord, before which every knee shall bow, and every tongue shall proclaim that Jesus 
is Lord of all creation.  
c. The Adam-Christ parallelism 
After highlighting some key elements of the second part of Phil 2:5-11, I turn now – as a 
way of concluding the exegesis of the text – to the idea that in this passage Paul is contrasting 
Jesus Christ with Adam. Despite the fact that this alleged parallel has been dismissed on 
linguistic basis by some exegetes, it is nevertheless widely accepted by other scholars who 
clearly see the Adam/Christ contrast as a background of Phil 2.295  
The Adam/Christ parallel has been interpreted in many different ways ranging from the 
assertion of a close linguistic and literary parallelism between Philippians 2 and Genesis to a 
more general and merely thematic connection between these two texts. Nonetheless, for the 
sake of this project, it is sufficient enough to conceive of the Adam/Christ theme in Philippians 
2 in terms of an “allusion”296 or an “example of the phenomenon of multiple ‘intertextual 
echo.’”297 I agree with N.T. Wright that the undoubted presence of Adam Christology in 
Philippians 2 does not mean that Adam and Christ must be parallel in every way, and that this 
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association does not exhaust the whole meaning and scope of this passage.298 Therefore, 
drawing especially upon the work of Belgian exegete André Wénin, I intend to show how this 
Adam/Christology sheds light on the theological understanding of Jesus’ kenosis, and 
consequently on what the imago Dei means for humanity.299  
The starting point is the dynamic character of the imago Dei asserted by Genesis 1. 
According to Wénin the text presents humanity as an unfinished creation, which ultimately 
requires human commitment and cooperation to be fully achieved. The absence of the 
expression “God saw that it was good” after the creation of human beings – which is the 
literary mark of completeness – and the plural form of v 26 – let us make humankind in our 
image – are signs both of the incomplete character of humanity, and the calling that human 
beings receive from God to participate in their fulfillment. Therefore, the imago Dei in humanity 
is not something static, given once and for all, but it is rather a dynamic reality, whose 
progressive imprinting is taking place in the interpersonal relationship of human beings with 
God, as well as with the rest of creation. Having been created in the image of God, humanity is 
invited to progressively become in God's likeness. 
Wénin asserts that, according to Genesis 1, human beings are called to fulfill the image 
of the Creator in the way they exercise their power vis-à-vis the rest of creation. In this sense, 
their dominion over other creatures must be necessarily oriented toward the life and 
flourishing of the latter. Not only because the mandate of having dominion is preceded by a 
blessing which aims at the flourishing of life, but also because humanity is called to control its 
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power, inasmuch as it is invited to exercise the latter as God does, who also sets a limit to God’s 
power, for instance, when resting on the seventh day.300 The limit of human power is 
symbolically represented by the vegetable diet that God assigns to human beings. This suggests 
that humanity may perform the task of subduing and having dominion over animals without 
producing any harm to them, in fact, like God who has organized the universe and made life 
appear with the non-violent power of God's performative word, and without destroying 
anything. What is at stake therefore is the human capacity to be faithful to a distinctive way of 
exercising power, which both acknowledges some limits and is able to respect life and the place 
of animals within creation. Humanity is invited to acknowledge and make room for otherness as 
God does in creating. Wénin thinks that Genesis 1 hence raises the question of how human 
beings are going to respond to this invitation, which directly affects not only their own future – 
their becoming in the likeness of God – but also the future of animals.  
Genesis 2--3 tells how the story follows and how human beings have responded to 
God’s invitation. Genesis 2 introduces another dietary limit to humanity (vv 16-17), which is 
necessary for life’s flourishing, and shows that life is not about avid and jealous possession.301 
This new limit places human beings before a choice: they either can trust God's word and 
believe that God cares for and desires the fulfillment of humanity, or they can disobey God's 
invitation and transgress the limit in order, as the serpent asserts,  to become like God. The text 
shows that instead of having dominion over the animals, human beings decide to follow the 
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serpent´s advice, which will be in the end a source of misfortune and not of life. The serpent 
distorts the truth in two ways. It attracts the attention of human beings only toward the limit 
set by God and not toward the bountiful gift they have received – you may freely eat of every 
tree of the garden v 16. And it also interprets the limit as a sign that God wants to keep 
humanity in subjection preventing them from becoming equal to God. As a result, God becomes 
the rival of humanity, the one who ultimately threatens with death in order to keep what is 
seen as divine privilege. In this sense, Wénin thinks that it is not surprising that the 
transgression described by Genesis is an act of taking and eating, which is ultimately an act of 
grabbing something in order to use it for one’s own exclusive benefit.302 However, snatching 
the fruit like booty, wanting to become like God, does not lead humanity to real life. It is a sign 
that humanity has succumbed to the serpent’s temptation, seeing equality with God as 
something to be snatched or grabbed, rather than to be received from God. Beneath this 
transgression, the “logic of greed”303 is at work. 
It is at this point that the parallel between Adam and Jesus becomes manifest. 
Philippians asserts that Jesus Christ does not fall into the trap of considering God as a rival, but 
rather being faithful to his understanding of equality with God, and without using this equality 
for his own benefit, he emptied himself and took the form of a slave. He might have regarded 
his equality with God as “snatching” or “grabbing,” or as something to take advantage of for his 
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own gain, but instead he understood it as meaning the way of self-giving, and so acted 
accordingly. Therefore, Jesus Christ reveals and embodies the true image of God, and we can 
recognize in him what most properly and truly characterizes God: the gift. In fact, the first 
chapters of Genesis do not depict God as someone who grabs and jealously keeps things, but 
on the contrary, God is at the service of the living because they are God’s beloved creatures, 
and bestows on humanity part of God’s power and authority within creation. In line with his 
kenosis and taking on the form of a slave, Jesus Christ further humbled himself, and was 
obedient to death on a cross.304 He also differs in this respect from Adam, who distrusts both 
God’s word and caring love, and disobeys looking to become like God. In this sense, following 
James D.G. Dunn, N.T. Wright asserts that Jesus Christ faces the same archetypal choice that 
confronted Adam.305  
The second part of Philippians 2:5-11 confirms the parallel between Jesus Christ and 
Adam. Because the former does not conceive of his equality with God as “grabbing” or as 
something to take advantage of for his own benefit, God the Father has exalted him, and has 
granted him the name above all names. What Adam tries to grasp by an act of selfish 
possession, Jesus receives gratuitously for his understanding and embodiment of God’s true 
image. Thus, if the vocation of human beings is to become like God, namely, to fulfill in 
themselves the image of God, then what is said about Jesus in Philippians 2 – and not Adam’s 
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behavior – shows the way to their authentic fulfillment.306 The universal recognition of Jesus’ 
lordship announced by the text – every knee shall bow and every tongue shall proclaim – is a 
sign that the exaltation of Jesus entails the renewal and fulfillment of the whole of creation. 
This is once again in sharp contrast with Adam, whose transgression has led all creatures to 
misfortune (Gen 3:14-19). Precisely because Jesus neither distrusts nor competes with God – 
nor takes advantage of his equality with God – but rather empties himself and is obedient to 
the point of death on a cross, he allows God to recognize in him God's true image, and 
therefore allows God to do what fathers do with their sons, namely, to give him God's own 
name: Lord.307 Wénin thinks indeed that this is exactly the meaning of the last phrase of the 
text: to the glory of God the Father. Paternity is what truly conveys who God is, and Jesus has 
allowed God to be known as Father. This is God's glory.308 
In summary, through his downward movement – kenosis,  , humility and 
obedience – Jesus displays the true image of God.309 Now exalted he exhibits the actual dignity 
of the one who chose the form of slave; the one who conversely to Adam, did not conceive of 
his equality with God as meaning “grabbing” nor as something to take advantage of for his own 
benefit. As a result, the whole of creation - every knee and every tongue - pays homage to him, 
since he has enabled God to be known as what God truly is, namely Father, and therefore he 
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has received the name above all names: Lord, because God has recognized in him God’s image 
fully accomplished. 
d. Conclusions 
 After having proposed an interpretation of Philippians 2:5-11, I now aim to sum up some 
conclusions that are important for understanding kenosis, and therefore that shed light on the 
notion of imago Dei and its implications for humanity. First of all, the exegesis that I have 
proposed is in line with the ethical interpretation of this passage, which is endorsed by a 
majority of scholars. Paul presents Jesus Christ to the Philippians as a role model to be 
followed.310 What is said about Jesus Christ is in direct connection with the previous verses (vv 
3-4), in which Paul asks the community of Philippi to do nothing from selfish ambition or 
conceit, and encourages each of them to look not for their own interests, but to the interests of 
others. Nonetheless, as Hurtado asserts, this is not to say that Paul is merely promoting a sort 
of “naïve ethical idealism,” or that he is suggesting simplistically that “all that a Christian has to 
do is to follow in the Master’s footsteps.”311 Paul is not pointing to an extrinsic role model, 
which has to be imitated – by the exercise of mere willpower – but rather he is stressing the 
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inner transformation that occurs in those who are being conformed to Jesus Christ’s image.312 
Therefore, Philippians are called to see in Jesus not only the basis of their behavior but also its 
pattern and direction. Accordingly, they are invited to conform to Jesus’ pattern of humble self-
giving, and obedience, not just as a moral general appeal, but on the basis of Jesus' actual 
authority and power, as Lord of all creation, which entails the gift of the Spirit as the power that 
makes this possible. The fact that the Father has both approved and vindicated Jesus’ kenosis, 
and self-giving love, makes of Jesus an authoritative example of service – the Lordly example as 
Hurtado asserts – to Philippians and by extension to all people. It is crucial to acknowledge the 
paraenetic character of the text – Paul presenting Jesus as a pattern of behavior – in order to 
perceive and draw out all its anthropological implications.  
 Secondly, Philippians 2:5-11 conceives of Jesus’ attitude and existence in a twofold 
movement of contraction and expansion, so to speak. On the one hand, Jesus does not consider 
his equality with God as meaning “grabbing” or “snatching,” nor does he see it as something to 
take advantage of for his own benefit. Therefore, it can be said that Jesus deliberately chooses 
a path of self-limitation, which implies the renunciation in his earthly life of privileges and 
honor to which he had every right.313 Indeed, by taking the he freely assumes 
the place of a person with no advantages, rights or privileges, without claiming any special 
treatment. This is certainly what the imagery of slave connotes in Paul's context. On the other 
hand, and contrary to the standard picture of oriental despots, Philippians asserts that divine 
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equality did not mean for Jesus Christ “getting,” but rather “giving,” which is properly 
expressed in self-giving love.314 Jesus Christ  himself – he poured out himself – and 
humbled himself for the sake of others. This is the other side of the twofold movement 
presented by Philippians. Jesus Christ has manifested the form of God by taking the form of a 
slave, and in so doing he has revealed not only what He is truly like, but also what it means to 
be God.315 In this sense, by his self-giving and self-emptying love, Jesus reveals that “God is not 
a grasping, self-centered being.”316  
I am aware that using the expression of self-limitation calls for some clarification. I 
intend by no means to endorse the viewpoint, which asserts that Christ has divested himself at 
the incarnation of some non-essential or relative divine attributes or properties such as 
omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence. I agree with scholars who hold this to be a 
wrong understanding of Jesus’ kenosis, which assumes that the verb  requires a direct 
object, namely, something Jesus would have divested himself of. However, Jesus does not give 
up anything of his divine condition, but rather he pours himself out through self-giving love, 
exactly indeed as an expression of his equality with God. Therefore, the expression of self-
limitation does not point to the loss of any divine property, but rather to the actual 
renunciation of privileges and rights that the act of taking the form of slave entails for Jesus. It 
does not have to do with the renunciation of something he already had – divine properties – 
but rather to the renunciation of something that he could have claimed as his, but he did not. 
For he did not take advantage of his equality with God for his own benefit, and hence this 
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implies an actual act of self-limitation.317 The other clarification about this language is that 
Jesus opts for this self-limitation freely. It is not that he is primarily confronted by an extrinsic 
limit imposed on him by reality or people, a limit hence that restricts Jesus´ liberty, preventing 
him from doing what he would like to do. It is rather a limit that is freely both established and 
assumed. In this sense, although he could have taken advantage of his equality with God for his 
own gain – and therefore he could have claimed rights, privileges, and special treatment – he 
deliberately poured out himself in self-giving love, taking the , humbling himself 
and being obedient to the extent of death on a cross. This downward mobility assumed by Jesus 
is directly related to his understanding of divine equality. God is not “acquisitive,” and Jesus’ 
behavior and attitude have been the appropriate expression of what divine love is. The 
exaltation of Jesus – hence the approval and vindication by the Father of his kenosis and self-
humbling pathway – confirms this as the true understanding and embodiment of divine 
equality. 
Finally, the last important conclusion from the exegesis of Philippians 2:5-11 for the 
understanding of the imago Dei is that Jesus’ kenosis not only has revealed God’s true nature, 
but it has also disclosed what being created in the image of God, and bearing God’s likeness 
mean for humanity. Along the same lines, Fee asserts that, in the context of Philippians 2:5-11, 
to be created in God’s image means to take the role of the slave for the sake of others.318 The 
parallel between Adam and Jesus has shown that when confronted by the same archetypal 
choice, it is Jesus – and not Adam – who has embodied the true image of God through his self-
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humbling path, and has allowed the Father to acknowledge, approve, and vindicate this 
distinctive way of understanding divine equality.  Jesus Christ has been exalted and has been 
given the name above all names – Lord – inasmuch as He has made manifest that God is not  
acquisitive, and that divine equality does not mean “getting” or “grabbing,” but rather “giving.” 
In this sense, the twofold movement of Jesus’ kenosis – self-limitation and self-giving – 
elucidates what the notion of imago Dei implies for humanity. Unlike Adam who tries to take 
advantage of his place within creation for his own gain, and tries to snatch equality with God, 
Jesus reveals the true image of God precisely because He freely refuses to use his equality with 
God for his own benefit, but on the contrary  and humbles himself, taking the form of 
a slave, and is obedient to the point of death on a cross. Being created in the image of God 
therefore implies the necessity for humanity to partake of a twofold movement of self-
limitation and self-giving love. Human beings are being conformed and renewed in the image of 
God inasmuch as they allow the Spirit of God to draw them into this twofold movement. This 
perspective is consistent with the Pauline use of the imago Dei, which asserts both that Jesus 
Christ is the true image of God, and that humanity is being progressively transformed or 
renewed in God’s image. The only way through which human beings can be the image of God is 
by becoming the image of Christ, who is the true image of God.  
Understanding the imago Dei through the lens of kenosis fulfills the requirements raised 
at the end of the first chapter, in order to be theologically fruitful in its capacity to voice the 
place and role of human beings within creation. Furthermore, understood as kenosis the notion 
of imago Dei is able to portray humanity at once in its relationship with God and other 
creatures, as well as also disclosing something about divine agency, and the telos toward which 
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the whole of creation is led by God. Moreover, it evinces both the dynamic and performative 
character of the image. Thus, the image is not only susceptible of being renewed – this is what 
Christ has accomplished – but it also entails consequences for humanity in its relationship with 
other creatures. 
We have seen how the notion of kenosis not only effectively intertwines the 
substantialist, relational, and functionalist interpretations of the imago Dei, but also serves as a 
specifier for them, insofar as it gives them concrete content and practical orientation for 
understanding humanity as created in the image of God. First, the notion of kenosis highlights 
the ontological character of the image, which affects humanity in its full bodily and spiritual 
unity. The image therefore is neither something extrinsic nor accessory to human beings, but 
rather essential for them. Like Jesus’ kenosis, it expresses what they really are. Nonetheless, the 
imago Dei should not be reduced to some human attribute, capacity, or quality, such as reason 
or will. In this sense, the notion of kenosis specifies the substantialist approach to the imago 
Dei, insofar as it makes clear that imago Dei refers not to a distinctive human capacity or 
attribute, but rather to a mode of existence. Just as Jesus’ kenosis affects his entire life in all its 
dimensions, imago Dei understood as kenosis implies that human beings are called to empty 
themselves through the twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving love for the sake of 
others.  
Secondly, the notion of kenosis serves as a specifier for the relational interpretation of 
the imago Dei insofar as it defines the twofold movement that must characterize and govern 
the relationship of humanity not only with God but also with other creatures. Jesus’ kenosis is 
essentially relational, inasmuch as it involves both Jesus’ obedience to the Father, and a 
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distinctive way of relating to others through his self-humbling path and the taking on the 
In the same way, understood as kenosis, the imago Dei means that human 
relationships with God, other humans, and other creatures, must necessarily be established 
through the twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving love. Self-limitation means that 
human beings should not aim to take advantage of their place within creation for their own 
benefit by “getting” or “snatching;” but following the example of Jesus they should understand 
their place within creation as an opportunity for ‘giving.’ Self-giving love means that human 
beings are called to pour out themselves ( even to the point of losing some alleged 
privileges and rights, for the sake of others and the rest of creation.  
Finally, the functionalist interpretation of the imago Dei is also specified by the notion of 
kenosis inasmuch as the latter discloses something crucial about divine agency. According to 
the functionalist understanding of the imago Dei, humanity acts as a representative of God on 
the earth insofar as it is invited to partake of God’s power and rule over the earth. Human 
beings participate in the divine governance, but they can never displace it. They exert a 
delegated authority which must imitate its source in the way it is exercised. Therefore, given 
that Jesus reveals the true image of God through his kenosis and his downward mobility – 
, self-humility and obedience – human beings must understand and embody 
their participation in God’s rule over creation in the same way. Therefore, the notion of kenosis, 
in its twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving love, provides not only a suitable way 
for connecting the three classical understandings of the imago Dei, but also the specific and 
distinctive content which enables theology to specify them. It is in this sense that the notion of 
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imago Dei, defined as kenosis, can stimulate us in our discernment of pathways to a true and 
fruitful life in the context of the current ecological crisis. 
2. Systematic Perspectives on Kenosis 
The exegesis of Philippians 2:5-11 has provided us with an understanding of the notion 
of kenosis as a twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving love. Jesus empties himself 
and takes the form of a slave assuming the status of a person with no advantages, rights or 
privileges. He does not understand his equality with God as something to take advantage of for 
his own benefit – in fact, he does not claim any special treatment – and through a downward 
mobility, so to speak, he reveals that God is not an acquisitive being and that self-giving love is 
the true embodiment of God’s power and dominion. The notion of kenosis – understood as self-
limitation and self-giving love – has also been used in systematic theology in order to 
characterize divine agency and the way God relates to creation, inasmuch as God is seen as the 
one who leads and empowers creation toward its final transformation and fulfillment. The 
notion of kenosis thus is now taken from its distinctive Christological setting, and is applied to 
the theme of creation, in order to disclose something about how God interacts with all 
creatures, not only in their origin - creatio ex nihilo - but also in their current journey toward 
fulfillment (creatio continua). Over the last decades, some theologians have been exploring the 
theme of divine causality, in dialogue with the scientific account of the story of the universe 
and life. It is in this context that the notion of kenosis has been taken up by some scholars as a 
suitable and useful notion in the effort to characterize God's agency and God's relationship with 
creation.  
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I turn now, therefore, to the use of the notion of kenosis in systematic theology. In 
doing so, I do not aim for an exhaustive review of all the authors who have drawn on this 
notion to expound their understanding of God's agency and the way God relates to creation. I 
rather intend to show that this notion provides both a suitable and a promising framework, 
which has enabled theologians to explore and account for the active presence of God within 
creation, not only as the origin of everything, but also as the one who currently guides creation 
toward its final transformation and fulfillment. To do this I will illustrate, mainly through two 
examples, how this notion – understood as a twofold movement of self-limitation and self-
giving love – has been used by Jürgen Moltmann and Denis Edwards to give an account of 
divine agency within creation. While the first has explored in different books and articles the 
link between theology and ecological issues, the latter has been instrumental in the 
development of ecotheology. As might be expected, the same diversity of interpretations that 
we encountered in the exegesis of Phil 2:5-11, is found in the use of the notion of kenosis in 
systematic theology. Authors certainly do not exactly concur in the way they use this notion for 
characterizing divine causality. Therefore, in choosing Moltmann and Edwards, I also intend to 
display some of these differences and distinctive nuances. The main goal of this section is to 
show that the notion of kenosis, inasmuch as it discloses primarily something crucial about 
God’s agency within creation,319 can then be considered as a legitimate anthropological notion, 
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which conveys a meaningful and timely understanding of the imago Dei. The way in which God 
relates to creation – assuming the unavoidable limits that theological language faces when 
talking about God – is crucial for getting an accurate and significant theological understanding 
of the imago Dei, in which humanity has been created and is progressively conformed through 
the Spirit.  
a. Jürgen Moltmann: zimzum, the Sabbath of Creation, and the Spirit of Life 
German theologian Jürgen Moltmann draws on the notion of kenosis in his attempt to 
renew the theological account of creation, and the image of God as Creator.320 He aims to 
provide a theological framework able to connect the work of theology with current ecological 
challenges. He asserts indeed that theology has contributed to the ecological crisis – not 
primarily as many believe because of its alleged anthropocentric view of creation rooted in the 
Bible – but rather to the extent that it has supported a system that fosters human dominion vis-
à-vis creation, which has at its roots the image of a distant and almighty God, namely, 
monarchical monotheism. He thinks that Renaissance thought and Nominalism offered a new 
picture of God that highlights one-sidedly God’s power and sovereignty over creation. 
Accordingly, “God is almighty, and potentia absoluta is the pre-eminent attribute of his divinity. 
Consequently God’s image on earth, the human being (which in actual practice meant the male) 
has to strive for power and domination so that he might acquire his divinity.”321  
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Therefore, Moltmann proposes a shift in the theology of creation, which can be 
summarized basically in two main points. On the one hand, he believes that theology must 
overcome the image of the world as a machine – a closed self-sufficient system, governed by 
laws established by an external and powerful god – by showing that the universe is an open 
system, and by asserting the relational character of every creature. The mechanistic view of the 
world ignores that things are inherently constituted by their relationships. According to 
Moltmann, every living thing reflects in its own specific way the Trinitarian mutual 
interpenetration – perichoresis – to the extent that they live “in one another and with one 
another, from one another and for one another.”322 He proposes a social understanding of the 
Trinity, as it models the interaction within creation, as a suitable starting point for a theology 
that counters the mechanistic view of the world, and is able to reawaken and restore in human 
beings a sense of the community of creation. On the other hand, Moltmann thinks that the 
mechanistic picture of creation and its one-sided stress on God’s transcendence “put an end to 
all ideas about God’s immanence.”323 Therefore, theology should take the indwelling Spirit in 
Creation as its starting point, if it wants to depict correctly the God/creation relationship. The 
world is in God, and God dwells in the world. Theology must emphasize a Trinitarian 
understanding of creation, rather than one that neglects the role of the Spirit and the Son 
within it. One can emphasize that the real distinction between God and creation does not entail 
a separation or competition but real immanence of God in creation. In this sense, Moltmann 
considers that panentheism is the most suitable framework for portraying the way creation 
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relates to God.324 An unbalanced emphasis on God’s transcendence leads to deism, whereas a 
one-sided accent on God’s immanence leads to pantheism. Unlike these approaches, the 
Trinitarian concept of creation manages to affirm altogether God’s intimacy and difference with 
the world.  For “in the panentheistic view, God, having created the world, also dwells in it, and 
conversely the world which he has created exists in him.”325  
It is therefore in the process of revising the theology of creation that Moltmann draws 
on the notion of kenosis, understood not only as self-limitation, but also as self-giving love. This 
notion enables theology to affirm and combine at once both God’s transcendence and God’s 
immanence. Starting from Christology – and from what kenosis has meant for Jesus Christ – 
Moltmann asks about the possible interpretation and meaning of the notion of kenosis not only 
for the act of creation, but also for the way in which God relates and is present to every 
creature. In this sense, he shows that the idea of kenosis, when introduced into the theology of 
creation – creatio ex nihilo and creatio continua – implies that God’s transcendence can be 
described especially by an act of self-limitation in order to make room for creation, and that 
God’s immanence is characterized by the indwelling of the Spirit in creation, who is present to 
all creatures through self-giving love. 
The idea of God’s self-limitation – as an expression of kenosis – appears in three 
different ways in Moltmann’s thought. First of all, it is through the notion of zimzum, which 
Moltmann takes from Jewish mysticism, in order to explain the theological notion of creatio ex 
nihilo. Moltmann draws on the work of the 16th-century Jewish writer Isaac Luria, interpreted 
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through the well-known expert in Jewish mysticism, Gershom Scholem.326 The notion of zimzum 
is traditionally understood as concentration and contraction, and it was used in relation to the 
Jewish doctrine of the Shekinah – namely, the dwelling or settling of the divine presence on 
earth – which affirms that the infinite God can contract God’s presence in order to dwell in the 
temple. Luria applied this notion to the relationship between God and creation, and 
consequently its meaning is enlarged by incorporating the idea of retreat or withdrawal. In the 
Kabbala of Luria’s school, zimzum is hence better understood not as the concentration of God 
at a point, but rather as God’s retreat away from a point.327 It is by an act of self-limitation or 
self-withdrawal that God concedes the necessary space for the existence of creation. As 
Moltmann asserts “it is only God´s withdrawal into himself which gives that nihil the space in 
which God then becomes creatively active (…) God creates the world by letting his world 
become and be in himself: let it be!”328 Moltmann believes that this is a meaningful way – if not 
the only way – of conceiving an extra Deum. Theologians indeed customarily make the 
distinction between God’s “inward” and God’s “outward,” without necessarily asking the critical 
question about how a realm outside an omnipresent God can be conceived at all. The notion of 
zimzum – self-limitation or self-withdrawal of God – therefore enables theology to reconcile the 
idea of creatio ex nihilo with God’s divinity without contradiction, and without falling into the 
pitfalls of pantheist emanationism. Moltmann states that God’s self-limitation can be seen, first 
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of all, in God’s self-determination to be the Creator of a non-divine world, inasmuch as “out of 
his infinite possibilities God realizes this particular one, and renounces all others.”329 God’s self-
determination to be the Creator implies hence an act of self-limitation; indeed it is “self-
determination for the purpose of self-limitation.”330 Nevertheless, the most important aspect of 
God’s self-limitation is disclosed through the idea of God’s self-withdrawal in order to make 
room for creation. Moltmann thinks that this idea points to a necessary correction in the 
theology of creation, for “God does not create merely by calling something into existence, or by 
setting something afoot. In a more profound sense he ‘creates’ by letting-be, by making room, 
and by withdrawing himself.”331 It is worth noting that Moltmann is aware of the limits of this 
kind of talking about God, insofar as he clearly asserts both that it is metaphoric language332 
and that he does not follow all the speculations in natural philosophy that develop out of the 
idea of God´s self-withdrawal.333 Aware of the problems that this language about God raises, 
Moltmann believes however that the notion of zimzum is a useful intellectual tool in order to 
think of creatio ex nihilo.334 In the next section of this chapter I will address some of the main 
critiques that the idea of God´s self-limitation – zimzum – has received. For the moment, let us 
keep in mind that Moltmann states that the creation of a world not divine is connected with a 
kenotic self-limitation on God’s part. 
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In addition to using the notion of zimzum in order to think theologically of creatio ex 
nihilo, Moltmann also draws on the idea of God´s self-limitation to conceive of the way in which 
God relates to creation and guides it toward its fulfillment (creatio continua). In this sense, he 
underscores primarily the notion of patience and the idea of a non-interventionist divine 
agency. Accordingly, Moltmann asserts that “God acts in the history of nature and human 
beings through his patient and silent presence, by way of which he gives those he has created 
space to unfold, time to develop, and power for their own movement.”335 In the same way as 
God has freely embodied an act of self-withdrawal in order to concede the necessary space for 
creation, God accompanies and guides creation toward its final transformation, making room 
and allowing creatures to unfold. Nonetheless, this is not to say that God is not involved in 
creation, but rather to acknowledge that, what is truly almighty is God’s love, and that patience 
and giving space to those who are loved, are some of the main features of real love. Waiting, 
therefore, is not a sign of disinterested passivity, but on the contrary, it is the highest form of 
interest in the other, inasmuch as waiting implies expecting, inviting, alluring, and enticing, as 
well as giving space and time to others in order to allow them to unfold and flourish. God’s 
kenosis – self-limitation – in the creation and preservation of all creatures points toward that 
“future which we trace out with the symbols of the Kingdom of God and the new creation, or 
‘world without end.’”336 
 Closely related to the ideas of God’s patience, and non-interventionist divine agency, 
Moltmann draws on the notion of God’s self-limitation in a third way, namely, through the 
image of the Sabbath as the crown of creation. The whole of creation points to the Sabbath 
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that exhibits God’s being. While God’s works express the divine will, the Sabbath renders 
manifest God’s existence within the world. This image of the Sabbath, according to Moltmann, 
evokes three major ideas. First of all, it reminds us that creation has an open future which looks 
to its completion. The biblical account of creation shows indeed that “only the Sabbath of 
creation is more than ‘very good;’ it is ‘hallowed,’ ‘sanctified,’ and therefore points to creation’s 
future glory.”337 In the Sabbath the consummation of the world is celebrated in anticipation. 
Secondly, the Sabbath is one of the two archetypal images of liberation that Israel has offered 
to the world – the other one is the Exodus. While the Sabbath is the symbol of inner liberty, rest 
and quietude, the Exodus is the symbol of external freedom. Accordingly, Moltmann asserts 
that “no political, social and economic exodus from oppression, degradation and exploitation 
really leads to the liberty of a humane world without the Sabbath, without the relinquishment 
of all works, without the serenity that finds rest in the presence of God.”338 In this sense, 
Christianity should understand its feast-day as an extension of the Jewish Sabbath, and in 
relation with the Kingdom of God that is the messianic fulfillment of the Israelite longing for 
completion. Finally, the Sabbath reminds us that God accompanies creation to its 
consummation “by letting be, by making room, and by withdrawing himself.”339 The Sabbath 
conveys the idea of God’s self-limitation or self-withdrawal to the extent that it is connected 
with God’s presence/absence and not with his action within creation. To sum up, Moltmann 
moves away from both the mechanistic view of the world and the monarchical deistic picture of 
God, in order to properly combine and express God's transcendence and immanence. He thinks 
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that the idea of kenosis – understood as self-limitation or self-withdrawal – is a meaningful 
theological way of conceiving of God's transcendence, which he explores through the notions of 
zimzum, a non-interventionist divine agency, and the image of the Sabbath as the crown of 
creation.  
 However, Moltmann is concerned not only with the theological understanding of God’s 
transcendence, but also with God’s immanence. In order to think of the latter he asserts that 
the notion of kenosis alludes also to self-giving love. He even speaks of a kenosis of the Spirit 
inasmuch as the Spirit – who is Godself – indwells in creation as the giver of life.340 Indeed, the 
operations of the Spirit, which are life-giving and life-affirming, can be recognized in everything 
that ministers to life and resists its destruction.341 The Spirit is present in the world and 
immanent in each individual system, and this is why the work of the Spirit can be described not 
only through the notions of “making,” “preserving,” “maintaining” and “perfecting,” but also 
through the ideas of “indwelling,” “sympathizing,” “participating,” “accompanying,” “enduring,” 
“glorifying,” which according to Moltmann describe “a cosmic community of living between 
God the Spirit and all his created beings.”342 Therefore, in addition to portraying divine agency 
within creation as patience and making room for creatures – which underline God’s self-
limitation and self-withdrawal – Moltmann also thinks of God’s action vis-à-vis God's creatures 
as self-giving love – the Spirit as live-giving – that leads creation toward its completion. As an 
open system, creation is therefore guided by the Spirit through patient love, which not only 
makes room for creatures to unfold, but also empowers them to self-transcend themselves 
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toward their fulfillment. The history of creation hence can be grasped only as “interplay 
between God’s transcendence in relation to the world, and his immanence in that world.”343 
The notion of kenosis enables Moltmann to give a meaningful theological account of both of 
them. 
b. Denis Edwards: non-interventionist divine agency and self-emptying love 
The work of Australian theologian Denis Edwards is another contemporary example of 
the use of the notion of self-emptying love – understood as a twofold movement of self-
limitation and self-giving – in order to characterize divine agency within creation.344 Edwards 
believes that Jesus’ incarnation, life, crucifixion, and resurrection disclose the meaning and 
scope of God’s power. Indeed, the Christ-event must be the paradigm for understanding divine 
causality within the world; for the “self-emptying love of Christ reveals what is at the heart of 
God. Self-emptying love is found to be characteristic of divine action.”345 In this sense, God’s 
power is not just any kind of neutral power, but it has to be understood as power-in-love,346 as 
has been eminently shown in Jesus’ kenosis. Self-emptying love is therefore what truly 
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characterizes divine agency within creation; and this love is embodied, according to Edwards, 
through both self-limitation and self-giving. 
The first feature of God’s action within the world thus is self-limitation. Edwards refers 
to this aspect of divine agency especially when trying to harmonize God’s care for creation and 
divine providence, on the one hand, with some disturbing elements of natural processes such 
as violence, predation, and suffering – which seem to directly contradict God's love, and care 
for creatures – on the other hand. Redefining divine power as self-limitation is vital for 
theologically grasping why God does not suppress natural selection, destruction, and 
oppression in both natural evolution and social processes. According to Edwards, therefore, 
theology must underline that one of the principal marks of divine causality within creation is 
self-limitation. For, “God accepts the limits of physical processes and of human freedom. The 
theology of incarnation and the theology of the cross point to a God of unthinkable 
vulnerability and self-limitation.”347 Edwards is certainly aware that this approach does not 
remove the ambiguity which characterizes natural and social processes, but believes that it 
nevertheless provides a meaningful framework to conceive theologically and simultaneously of 
God’s providence for creation, and the undeniable presence of violence and suffering in nature 
and society. At the heart of Edward’s approach lies the notion of a non-interventionist divine 
power, which means that God “does not intervene in the sense of acting to break into creation 
from outside, and God is not to be thought of as violating or undermining the laws of 
nature.”348 God freely accepts and respects the limits of finite processes and entities. Edwards 
assumes the distinction made by Aquinas between primary and secondary causality, and asserts 
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that God really comes to us, responds to us and provides for us only through secondary causes. 
Therefore, God’s self-emptying love necessarily involves a letting-be of the other – a making-
room for the other – in order to respect and not compromise the proper autonomy and 
integrity of the creature.349 Self-limitation is therefore a crucial aspect of divine agency within 
creation. 
Nonetheless, this is not to say that God is an aloof monarch, so to speak, who does not 
interact with creation. Acting through secondary causes does not mean that God is distant from 
and does not care for creation. Edwards thus elaborates on the second feature of God’s action 
in the world, which is self-giving love. He does so basically through the notion of the Spirit as 
life-giver, who empowers creatures and leads creation toward its fulfillment. Indeed, at the 
heart of the cosmological and evolutionary story there is the Spirit, who accompanies and 
sustains all creatures in their journey toward completion. In order to describe the presence of 
the Spirit in the ongoing process of creation, Edwards draws on two key concepts of Karl 
Rahner’s, namely creaturely self-transcendence and divine self-bestowal, and asserts that “it is 
God’s self-bestowal that enables and empowers creaturely self-transcendence,” and that this 
act of God “that enables evolutionary emergence can be understood (…) through the 
indwelling, life-giving Spirit.”350 Critical to this approach hence is the understanding of the 
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relationship between God and creatures in a non-competitive way – God is never in 
competition with creation and God’s power does not cancel the agency of creatures – but 
rather on the contrary, it is precisely divine love which “enables the flourishing of the integrity 
of natural processes and human freedom.”351 God’s self-emptying love is thus what allows 
evolutionary emergence as well as creaturely autonomy, inasmuch as God’s self-bestowal “is 
not only the goal of creation but also that which moves creation from within to the goal.”352 In 
this sense, God’s creative act must be construed not only as sustaining the universe in its 
existence, but also as enabling it to become.  
This perspective entails that the power of the Spirit, which maintains the integrity of 
creatures and enables them to flourish and develop, has to be understood as immanent. 
Edwards believes, along with many other theologians, that Trinitarian panentheism is the most 
suitable way to think of the relationship between God and the world, which implies that the 
Spirit is portrayed as “’making space’ within the divine relational life for a relational world to 
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evolve.”353 However, the Spirit is not a physical force or any kind of vitalism, which could be 
detected by science. The Spirit is the hidden dynamism involved in the origin of the whole 
universe, in its unfolding present, and in its open future. According to Edwards “the role of the 
Spirit with each creature is a relational and personal one. The Spirit of God creates a relation 
between each creature and the divine perichoretic communion that enables a creature to be 
and to become.”354 Thus, the work of the Spirit is described as this ability to relate with all 
creatures in a compassionate, self-limiting love that empowers them, and respects their 
autonomy. Edwards sometimes uses the image of the midwife in order to describe the role of 
the Spirit, who is therefore that force from within through which all things will be made new.355 
Theology cannot fully describe how this future will be, but it can assert that “that all things will 
be transfigured as they participate in the divine communion in their specific and differentiated 
ways.”356 Edwards believes that the way in which God relates to creation can be portrayed 
through different images, namely: “a painter at work on a canvas, a metaphor unfolding in the 
mind of a poet, a gardener developing a beautiful landscape, a host preparing a meal for 
friends.”357 All these images convey both the exploratory character of the work, and the 
opportunities and limitations that the given materials entail. Thus, it is God’s self-bestowal – 
through the indwelling life-giving Spirit – that enables creaturely self-transcendence toward its 
fulfillment, respecting its autonomy and integrity. To sum up, therefore, Edwards, on the one 
hand, asserts that by creating in love God freely accepts limitations, and respects the freedom 
and integrity of creation, and on the other hand, God not only sustains all creatures in their 
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existence, but also elicits and enables their self-transcendence toward their completion. God’s 
love empowers creation, and leads it toward its final transformation. Thus, God’s self-emptying 
love is embodied in a twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving. 
c. Conclusions 
Using the works of Moltmann and Edwards, have shown that the notion of kenosis when 
used in systematic theology can be understood as a twofold movement of self-limitation and 
self-giving. Along with many other theologians, they think that this notion is not only legitimate, 
but also suitable and fruitful for characterizing divine agency within creation. Building on my 
exposition of kenosis in Philippians, I now draw some general conclusions that are important for 
systematic theology as it understands how God relates to creatures, and can shed light on the 
notion of imago Dei and its implications for humanity. 
The first conclusion is that the understanding of kenosis through the lens of Christology 
should be the normative theological understanding of this notion. Indeed, the way in which 
systematic theology conceives of the idea of self-emptying love must be necessarily informed 
by the Christological discussion of it, not as an optional resource, but rather as its starting point 
and foundation. It is Jesus who has revealed God’s true nature, and also how divine agency 
within creation must be rightly portrayed. Accordingly, when used in other theological domains, 
such as the theology of creation, the notion of kenosis must keep its connection with 
Christology, from which it receives its deepest and proper meaning. Both Moltmann and 
Edwards, for instance, acknowledge the primacy of the Christological approach to what self-
emptying love means, and only then do they use this understanding to theologically explore 
how God the Father and the Spirit relate to creation.  
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It is worth noting that not all theological reflections have taken this path, and some, 
mainly inspired by the dialogue between theology and the scientific account of both the story 
of the universe and life in the world, have drawn on the idea of kenosis in order to describe 
divine agency without reading it through the hermeneutical lens of Christology.358 As a result, 
God’s power and God’s love are mistakenly seen as counterpoised and needing to be mutually 
tempered, as if God were omnipotent on the one hand, and merciful and loving on the other, 
and were constantly deciding whether to act out of power or out of love. Furthermore, in a 
certain sense, God’s freedom and love are thought of as being in competition with both human 
freedom and creation's autonomy, as though it were necessary that God move out of the way 
in order to allow all creatures and, especially, humanity to flourish. Therefore, in this 
perspective God ends up being just another cause among other causes within the world. This is 
why it is wrongly asserted that the notion of kenosis implies that God needs to restrict Godself, 
and surrender, even if partially, some of God’s main attributes. This confusion stems from 
philosophical and scientific perspectives that neglect the Christological focus on the notion of 
kenosis. For, when read accurately through the lens of Christology, kenosis does not convey any 
loss of divine properties, or that God's power and love are mutually exclusive opposites.359 On 
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the contrary, it is shown that what is really almighty is God's love, because God is power-in-
love, and this love does not threaten but rather is precisely what enables creatures to unfold 
and self-transcend toward their fulfillment.360 Therefore, the Christological understanding of 
kenosis has to be the normative understanding, which governs all other theological uses of this 
notion. 
The second conclusion is that kenosis in systematic theology is understood as a twofold 
movement of self-limitation and self-giving. This is directly related to the Christological meaning 
of it, which has been taken from the exegesis of Phil 2:5-11. The interpretation of this passage 
has shown that Jesus does not consider his equality with God as meaning “grabbing” or 
“snatching,” seeing it as something to take advantage of for his own benefit; hence we can say 
that he freely chooses a path of self-limitation, which entails the renunciation in his earthly life 
of honor and privileges to which he had every right. The kenotic movement of self-limitation is 
seen in systematic theology mainly as God’s act of making room for creation and letting 
creatures be. This supposes that God freely accepts and respects the limits of natural processes 
and entities. The movement of self-limitation is theologically conceived as a non-interventionist 
divine agency. Accordingly, the notions of patience and waiting are brought to the fore in order 
to characterize the way in which God relates to creation. God’s self-limitation is understood as 
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a manifestation and expression of God’s love, which is indeed power-in-love. This is not to say 
that God needs to get out of the way in order to allow creatures to unfold and flourish, without 
overwhelming them. It is rather to assert that one of the most remarkable features of love – in 
which a path of self-limitation can be identified – is that it makes room for what is loved, and 
lets it be, respecting its autonomy and integrity. Therefore, God's kenosis does not mean that 
God needs to restrict God's power in order not to nullify creatures, but rather it means that 
precisely because God loves creation – indeed God is power-in-love – a stance of self-limitation 
vis-à-vis creatures can be meaningfully asserted of God, on the basis of God’s self-revelation in 
Jesus Christ. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned, God’s self-limitation or self-withdrawal does not mean that 
God is absent from or uninvolved in the past, present, and future of creation. On the contrary, 
and this is the second movement of kenosis, God is the innermost principle of reality, which 
enables creatures not only to exist, but also to become and self-transcend toward their 
fulfillment. The images of the Spirit as life-giver and midwife are just two ways of expressing 
God's empowering action within creation, which is the result of God's self-bestowal. The 
kenosis of God in a theology of creation cannot mean that God is distant from or disinterested. 
On the contrary, it means that in self-emptying love, God cares for creation and leads it toward 
its completion. God’s self-bestowal not only sustains creation, but also moves it from within 
toward its final transformation. We can say therefore that God's self-limitation is a legitimate 
theological notion, only in relation to God’s self-emptying love, which empowers all creatures, 
and allows them to become. kenosis thus reveals something crucial for theological 
understanding of divine agency. 
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Finally, the last important conclusion from the use of kenosis in systematic theology is 
that it sheds new light on the theological meaning of the imago Dei, serving as a specifier for 
the three classical understandings of it, namely, substantialist, relational, and functional. If we 
want to understand what imago Dei really means, the first and most important theological 
question is: who is this God who has created creatures in God’s own image? Accordingly, what 
discloses who God is and what God does is potentially crucial for pinning down the meaning 
and content of the theological understanding of what being created in the image of God means 
for humanity. When applied to the theology of creation, the notion of kenosis offers a 
meaningful and inspiring understanding of the imago Dei as a twofold movement of self-
limitation and self-giving love. In this sense, being created in the image of God means for 
human beings, first of all, that they are called to make room for other creatures, and allow 
them to be and flourish. Because they find their origin ultimately in self-emptying love, they are 
invited to relate to creation as God does, respecting otherness and empowering it by love. Thus 
human beings as imago Dei must empty and limit themselves, not in the sense of losing or 
restricting their capacities, but rather and properly in the sense of fully embodying self-
emptying love, which not only respects limits and makes room for otherness, but also engages 
in life-giving relationships that desire other's well-being. Humanity must understand its power 
as power-in-love – maîtrise maîtrisée and douceur – which points to empowering others and 
enabling all creatures to move toward their fulfillment. Therefore, the twofold movement of 
self-limitation and self-giving, inasmuch as it expresses and embodies true self-emptying love, is 
crucial for the theological understanding of the imago Dei and its consequences for humanity.   
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The notion of kenosis – when applied to the theology of creation – also serves as a 
specifier for the three classical understandings of the imago Dei. First of all, kenosis specifies 
the substantialist approach to the imago Dei insofar as it makes manifest that the fact that 
human beings are God’s image-bearers refers to a mode of existence, namely, self-emptying 
love, which affects humanity in all its dimensions. In this sense, the comprehensive character of 
the image is acknowledged, inasmuch as it is not reduced to any distinctive human capacity or 
attribute. Secondly, the use of kenosis – for characterizing divine agency – specifies the 
relational interpretation of the imago Dei, insofar as it defines the twofold movement that must 
both orient and govern the relationship of humanity not only with God, but also with other 
creatures. The kind of relationship that humanity is called to establish with God and other 
creatures is clearly described as one that makes room for otherness, and gives life in order to 
enable others to flourish. Finally, the functionalist interpretation of the imago Dei is also 
specified by the use of kenosis in systematic theology, inasmuch as the latter discloses 
something crucial about divine agency, and therefore illuminates the way in which humanity 
must act as representative of God on earth. The power and role that humanity receives from 
God must be exercised as power-in-love, which not only freely respects limits, as well as the 
integrity and autonomy of all forms of life, making room for them, but also establishes life-
giving relationships which point ultimately toward other’s fulfillment. The notion of kenosis 
therefore – when applied to the theology of creation – provides a suitable framework for 
connecting the three classical theological understandings of the imago Dei, as well as serving 
them as a specifier. On this way the notion of imago Dei defined as kenosis can help us discern 
new pathways of true and fruitful living in the context of the current ecological crisis. 
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3. Kenosis: Limits and Strengths of an Image 
Nevertheless, kenosis and other notions that express the same pattern of divine self-
giving, such as self-sacrifice, have been highly criticized, and their alleged character as 
revelatory of humanity have been called into question. On the one hand, some feminist 
theologians have asserted that the pattern of self-emptying and self-abnegation can be quite 
problematic for women and so is far from helpful as a paradigm. The notion of kenosis in this 
sense can be beneficial only for men in healing their conception of God and power, and their 
tendency to portray reality in terms of hierarchy and domination.361 But it by no means shows 
how theology can empower women, or how it might relate to important feminist values in the 
understanding of God. On the other hand, understanding kenosis as making-room and self-
limitation has been criticized for implying that God’s freedom and power are in competition 
with human freedom and creation’s autonomy. I have already addressed this latter critique, 
and shown that it stems mainly from a misunderstanding of the nature of God’s self-limitation, 
which does not entail any loss of divine properties but is rather the expression of real love. Such 
power-in-love makes room for what is loved, respecting its autonomy and integrity. 
Nonetheless, the feminist critique of kenosis needs to be addressed more carefully because of 
its anthropological consequences. Therefore, I turn now, in conclusion, to this critique. I will 
describe its core argument and how some feminist theologians have responded to it by 
asserting the importance and relevance of kenosis in order to speak theologically of women. In 
doing so, I will show the strengths of this notion as revelatory of humanity. 
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a. Feminist criticism of the notion of kenosis 
Some feminist theologians have argued that kenosis as a theological notion for 
describing and inspiring humanity can have meaning only within the context of patriarchal 
assumptions.362 Daphne Hampson, for instance, asserts that Christian tradition has conceived of 
God throughout history mainly through two models or paradigms, namely, powerfulness and 
powerlessness. While the former depicts God as powerful, separate, distant and alone, which 
unsurprisingly concurs with the male structuring of reality, the latter portrays God as becoming 
powerless through the abnegation of powerfulness.363 In the paradigm of powerlessness, 
therefore, theology describes God as divesting Godself of power by means of a self-emptying 
process or kenosis. Hampson thinks that these two models have had an impact not only on how 
Christianity represents God, but they have also consequently affected the way believers 
conceive of both themselves and others. She asserts that these two paradigms are rooted in 
patriarchal assumptions; they have been deeply detrimental for women and are not useful for 
interpreting their reality. The model of powerlessness, with the consequent notion of kenosis, is 
especially inappropriate for women, inasmuch as a gospel of self-sacrifice has been historically 
used to justify the position of women, and “may indeed serve as the ‘opium’ of women, 
reinforcing the position to which a woman has already assigned herself, compounding her 
belief that ‘one should not put oneself forward’, and feeding a ‘martyr’ complex.”364 The 
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paradigm of powerlessness and kenosis can be seen at best, as a corrective of the male way of 
dealing with reality which is in terms of power, hierarchy, and domination. 
Accordingly, Hampson believes that women need another paradigm not only for 
interpreting their reality, but also for inspiring their practice, in which kenosis has no role to 
play. She calls this model empowerment, and thinks that it highlights precisely what is not 
envisaged in the masculine dichotomy of powerfulness and powerlessness, namely, the mutual 
empowerment of persons.365 Without significant images in Christian tradition, this paradigm of 
empowerment enables women to establish a centered self through relations that are open and 
mutually nurturing, as well as entails a notion of God that does not undermine human integrity 
and autonomy. On the contrary, God is conceived as the one who “enables us to become what 
we have it in us to be.”366 Feminist theology according to Hampson must therefore reject the 
paradigms of powerfulness and powerlessness in portraying God and interpreting reality. They 
are embedded in patriarchalist assumptions. By contrast, feminist theology needs to promote, 
develop, and embody the model of empowerment, which is in tune with feminist values, and 
decidedly points to the flourishing of women.  
Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker provide another example of the feminist 
critique of kenosis and other notions that share the same pattern of divine self-giving. In a well-
known article, these authors oppose the tendency to glorify suffering that they see within 
Christian tradition.367 They identify three distinctive ways in which Christian theology has 
reflected on the notion of atonement and its significance for believers, namely, the Christus 
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Victor approach, the satisfaction tradition originally formulated by Anselm, and the moral 
influence tradition which began with Abelard. Brown and Parker consider that these three 
theological traditions are flawed inasmuch as they grant redemptive value to suffering. 
Consequently, believers would be exhorted to imitate Jesus’ willingness to accept and undergo 
the suffering which is inflicted upon them because of its salvific character. Despite the fact that 
each of these three theological traditions thinks of the theological meaning of Jesus’ cross in a 
distinctive way, the resulting message is the same, namely, the glorification of suffering. The 
Christus Victor tradition downplays, so to speak, the magnitude and even reality of suffering 
insofar as it presents it as a necessary step to a new life. So, “God is pictured as working 
through suffering, pain, and even death to fulfill ‘his’ divine purpose.”368 The satisfaction 
approach glorifies suffering as it seems to imply that the disciple’s role is to suffer in the place 
of others in order to liberate them. Finally, the moral influence tradition, by asserting that 
Jesus, the innocent victim, is the highest proof of God’s mercy and love toward humanity, 
legitimizes the victimization of some in view of the conversion or edification of others.  
According to Brown and Parker, despite the fact that theologians have challenged and 
revised these three classical atonement theories over the 20th century, they have failed to 
provide a theological view of Jesus’ cross that decidedly denies any redemptive character of 
suffering, as they ultimately maintained the cross as an image of liberation. Since “suffering is 
never redemptive, and suffering cannot be redeemed,”369 the authors assert that Christian 
theology needs a profound revision if its goal is not to justify oppression and glorify suffering, 
but to liberate believers. Consequently they affirm that Christianity must get rid of any 
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interpretation of Jesus’ death that suggests that it has had salvific consequences, and therefore 
that the suffering of believers and also their self-sacrifice might have through mysterious ways 
a redemptive character. Jesus did not choose the cross, but rather he chose integrity and 
faithfulness to justice, radical love, and liberation even in the face of the threat of death. 
Therefore, according to Brown and Parker, to be a Christian is to opt for the fullness of life 
challenging every form of injustice and oppression, as well as to remain in faithfulness and 
integrity toward justice, radical love, and liberation, as Jesus did, even when one is threatened 
by suffering, violence, and death. In this viewpoint, suffering stems only from those who use 
their power to resist and oppose the human claim to the fullness of life, and who consequently 
create and maintain systems of injustice and oppression. This is the way in which suffering – 
including Jesus’ death – must be understood. It has no other theological meaning whatsoever.  
Although Parker and Brown do not directly question the notion of kenosis, but rather 
the way in which theology has interpreted suffering and self-sacrifice, their critique also hits 
this notion, inasmuch as the latter expresses a pattern of divine self-giving that can serve as an 
inspiration for humanity. Their critique therefore is similar to Hampson's concern, namely, that 
Christian theology has been a source of oppression and inequality for women. Either through 
the paradigms of powerfulness and powerlessness that it employs to portray God and to 
interpret the life of believers, or by means of its understanding of the notion of atonement, 
theology has not only collaborated with unjust and oppressive systems, especially with 
patriarchalism, but it has provided the theological rationale for their legitimation. The same 
core argument with distinctive nuances can be found in the work of other feminist theologians. 
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They concur that kenosis is not an appropriate anthropological notion for women, and that it 
does not offer a suitable framework to interpret their reality.  
The feminist critique of the notion of kenosis has to be seriously taken into account. It 
certainly points to what can be considered a true risk for Christian theology. A flawed 
interpretation of Jesus’ cross and death can foster a wrong victimization of believers, and a 
passive attitude in the face of suffering and inequality. Consequently, the theological pattern of 
divine self-giving, expressed in the notion of kenosis, can be improperly used to legitimize and 
sustain oppressive and unjust systems. Nonetheless, this critique should not imply that 
theological notions such as kenosis, sacrifice, and self-giving love must be discarded since they 
do not provide an adequate theological paradigm for women. This feminist criticism thus 
functions as a corrective for deficient interpretations of these notions. It raises a pertinent red 
flag that must be thoroughly considered, but that cannot entail the neglect or loss of some 
important aspects of Christian theology and its vision of humanity. It is in this sense that other 
voices within feminist theology have responded to this criticism, and have reflected on the 
fruitfulness and relevancy of these notions for women, when interpreting their reality and 
inspiring their action.  Authors such as Sarah Coakley, Erin Lothes Biviano, and Anna Mercedes 
have addressed theologically the feminist critique of the paradigm of divine self-giving as an 
anthropological model, which discloses crucial aspects of humanity and might guide human 
action within reality. I therefore turn now not only to the way in which these three authors 
respond to the critique of Hampson, Brown and Parker, but also to the way in which they depict 
the notions of kenosis, sacrifice, and the pattern of self-giving love as pertinent and meaningful 
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for women. It is worth noting immediately that I concur with the approach of these authors and 
their effort to show the theological relevance of these notions for women. 
British theologian Sarah Coakley deals with feminist criticism of kenosis especially by 
responding to Hampson’s post-Christian critique.370 In her response to Hampson, Coakley raises 
two main concerns. On the one hand, she thinks that Hampson misconstrues the theological 
meaning and scope of kenosis, and consequently her criticism hits only the way in which 
modern British kenotic Christology understands this notion and its theological consequences. 
On the other hand, Coakley perceives in Hampson’s approach what she considers to be a long-
term danger to Christian feminism, namely, the repression of all forms of vulnerability which 
results in the failure to theologically confront issues of fragility, suffering or self-emptying 
(kenosis) except in terms of victimology.371 
Coakley identifies at least six different ways in which kenosis has been interpreted 
throughout tradition, and asserts that only the version of German and British modern kenotic 
Christology implies a loss or renunciation of divine power. While Hampson’s description of 
kenosis as a paradigm of powerlessness that stems from an abnegation of power is in tune with 
this modern understanding, it is not in tune with the biblical and patristic interpretations of it. 
The former, in fact, asserts that the incarnation implies that Jesus temporarily or permanently 
relinquished the divine properties of omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence; the latter 
understandings of kenosis do not claim any loss of divine properties or attributes, but rather 
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portray Jesus either choosing never to have certain forms of power, or revealing the true 
nature of divine power to be intrinsically humble rather than grasping. Consequently, 
Hampson’s criticism calls into question only a very particular interpretation of kenosis. 
Coakley thinks that Hampson rightly unveils and opposes the gender overtones and 
implications of the way in which early twentieth-century British kenoticists, such as Frank 
Weston, P.T. Forsyth, and Charles Gore, understand kenosis. Their thought actually reveals 
gender stereotypes, which become evident not only through the analogies they use to explicate 
kenosis, but also through the invariable starting point of their analysis of this notion, namely 
the presumption of possessed power and influence. Nonetheless, Hampson’s criticism does not 
deal with other interpretations of kenosis, which according to Coakley are not only compatible 
with feminism, but are also vital to a “distinctively Christian manifestation of it, a manifestation 
which does not eschew, but embraces, the spiritual paradoxes of ‘losing one’s life in order to 
save it.’”372 
This brings us to the second concern which Coakley raises in reaction to Hampson’s 
criticism. She thinks that Hampson's theological stance not only fails to take into account other 
understandings of kenosis that do not involve any abnegation of power, but also is unable to 
encompass them, inasmuch as her thought is unfortunately permeated by gender stereotypes. 
This is why indeed, according to Hampson, the paradigm of powerlessness and the notion of 
kenosis would be helpful only for men as a corrective of the “male” problem of power. While 
Hampson seems to align all “males” with achieved, worldly power, and women with the lack of 
it, Coakley does not endorse essentialist and universalizing views that there are fixed “male” 
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and “female” approaches to God, human nature, and power. 373 As a result, Hampson, exactly 
like modern kenoticists, is unable to consider the possibility of power or strength in 
vulnerability. Hampson epitomizes in this respect what Coakley believes is a danger for 
Christian feminism, which is “ultimately the failure to embrace a feminist reconceptualizing of 
the power of the cross and resurrection.”374 This latter task is crucial if Christian feminism wants 
to face and give new expression to the biblical paradox of “losing one’s life in order to save it,” 
as well as if it wants to exhibit an understanding of the “self” of Christ that transcends gender 
stereotypes.  
Taking on the task of a feminist reframing of power, Coakley advances the notion of 
“power-in-vulnerability,” which she finds radically expressed and embodied in the “self” of 
Christ, in whom concurs “non-bullying divine ‘power’ with ‘self-effaced’ humanity.”375 This 
notion draws, in Coakley’s thought, on a reading of Chalcedon through the lens of the 
Christological school of Antioch, and on an interpretation of kenosis in which the “emptying” 
applies to Christ's human nature rather than to the divine.376 Coakley thinks that believers can 
experience this “power-in-vulnerability” especially when they enter into prayer, which is “the 
unique intersection of vulnerable, 'non-grasping' humanity and authentic divine power, itself 
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'made perfect in weakness.'”377 It is in prayer that believers are properly empowered by divine 
power, as they make space for God to be God. 
Erin Lothes Biviano is another theologian who has addressed the feminist criticism of 
the pattern of self-giving love as meaningful and timely for women.378 She does so by a retrieval 
and exploration of the notion of sacrifice as a crucial mark of discipleship for both men and 
women believers. Sacrifice must be understood as an act that “responds to the encounter of 
God’s grace in Jesus Christ and expresses one’s dedication to God through worship and by 
caring for the neighbor.”379 Accordingly, the core message of the notion of sacrifice within a 
Christian religious framework is dedication. Lothes Biviano shares feminist concerns about 
misconstruals of Jesus’ cross and death that can lead and have led to passive acceptance of 
suffering and victimhood. Nonetheless in her view this does not warrant abandoning the 
Christian notions of sacrifice and kenosis. On the contrary, these notions convey something 
crucial to the Christian message about humanity, which is expressed through the biblical 
paradox of losing one’s life to fully retrieve it.    
In fact, Lothes Biviano finds in the notion of kenosis an important source and theological 
foundation for her understanding of sacrifice. Although these notions are not synonyms, they 
both express a pattern of divine self-giving that may serve as inspiration for human self-giving. 
Drawing on the work of other theologians such as Arthur Peacocke and John Haught, Lothes 
Biviano interprets God’s creative action as kenotic, and thinks that precisely for this reason it 
becomes a model for sacrifice. God’s self-giving toward creation is a source of new life and 
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shows that “creativity and self-giving have a natural relationship.”380 As a result, the creative 
dimension of Christian sacrifice, its capacity to impact one’s self-realization, is clearly disclosed 
and highlighted. Sacrifice thus points not only to loss and suffering, but “to the realization of a 
new and fuller reality or identity by means of self-gift that seeks the well-being of self and 
other.”381 Accordingly, the notion of sacrifice is theologically meaningful and relevant not only 
for men, but also for women, and enables them to interpret their reality and discern their 
action. 
Finally, Lutheran theologian Anna Mercedes provides a third example of how women 
theologians have responded to the feminist criticism of kenosis, and have shown why the 
pattern of self-giving love is not disempowering for women but is, on the contrary, crucial for 
their fulfilment.382 On the one hand, she acknowledges the importance and relevance of the 
feminist critique of kenosis as it has been used to foster passivity in the face of suffering and 
contributed to women’s oppression. On the other hand, she is convinced that this notion helps 
believers to voice theologically their self-giving desires, which can be a real source of an 
authentic assertion of the self, and may trigger particular ways of resisting and confronting 
abuse. Mercedes’s core argument is that kenosis is marked not only by agapeic love but also by 
eros and hence by a self-giving which brings self-satisfaction. Accordingly, “self-giving may be 
born, not of a lack of self-interest, but of an intensity of it.”383 In this sense, a self-giving attitude 
is not always a sign of a self-abnegating life or a capitulation before the abusers. It can rather be 
the expression of a self-affirming and passionate life that not only challenges oppression 
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through many strategies of resistance, but also embodies one's deep desires and the pleasure 
of caring for others.  
Drawing on the psychological literature about survivors’ strength and resistance even 
amidst their victimizations, Mercedes’ is able to highlight the kenotic tendencies as self-
affirming and strengthening in the lives of abuse survivors. She thinks that the theological 
recognition of the assertiveness and strength of kenotic acts can help people feel their inner 
power, and may offer abused people a sense of renewed and holy dignity.384 In this context, 
Mercedes believes that the feminist critique of kenosis, although well-intended, may 
disempower women whose self-giving attitude is a mark of their own integrity and 
manifestation of their resistance to oppression. Paradoxically, feminist criticism of kenosis can 
produce more guilt instead of liberation and make women feel responsible for their own 
suffering. In contrast, the theological assertion of the importance and relevance of kenosis can 
help in recognizing self-giving and care for others as empowering and as an expression of 
resistance in the face of oppression. All believers can be inspired by this notion, which has the 
capacity to voice their own desires and help them in asserting their selves. 
b. Conclusions 
The notion of kenosis is therefore a meaningful and timely anthropological model for 
women as for men. The work of Coakley, Lothes Biviano, and Mercedes has shown that feminist 
criticism of this notion, while pointing to the actual risk that it may be used to maintain 
oppression and suffering, fails to recognize the potential of kenosis for empowering women and 
voicing their deeper desires. It should be clear by now that the feminist critique deals with only 
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one interpretation of kenosis, understood as abnegation of power, which is rooted in gender 
stereotypes. At the same time, by recognizing self-giving only as a nullification of the self in the 
face of oppression and suffering, this criticism does not take into account the actual power of 
this pattern to inspire people's lives, trigger strategies of resistance before abuse, and foster 
dynamics of self-affirmation. 385  
In addition to the response of these three theologians, it can be said that the 
understanding of kenosis advanced by German and British modern kenotic Christology has been 
clearly dismissed in this project, as it has been proven to be flawed. Furthermore, Hampson’s 
description of the paradigm of empowerment is closely akin to some features of how this 
dissertation interprets kenosis. As a result, her argument works as an invitation to enlarge 
narrow understandings of kenosis and oppose any misuse of it, but it by no means succeeds in 
theologically substantiating its dismissal. The model of empowerment which she proposes as 
meaningful and necessary for women is already encompassed by the notion of kenosis that 
reveals God as power-in-love. 
Once kenosis has been defined from a Christological and systematic perspective as self-
limitation and self-giving love, and once the study of the feminist criticism has shown that it is a 
meaningful anthropological notion for all believers, as a way of concluding this chapter I intend 
to show some of the strengths of this notion in its understanding of God and in its depiction of 
humanity. In doing so, I aim to take into account both some of the pending tasks which have 
been identified within ecotheology, and many necessary connections which have been 
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suggested by a number of theologians in order to establish a suitable link between ecological 
sensitivity and theological reflection.  
I believe that the notion of kenosis offers five major strengths as revelatory of God and 
therefore of what imago Dei means for humanity. First, the interpretation of imago Dei as 
kenosis allows for a clear connection between the themes of Creation and Incarnation-
Redemption and for a unifying Christian narrative. In this sense, Creation and Incarnation-
Redemption are two moments of the single act of God. They are “two moments and phases in 
the real world of the unique, even though internally differentiated, process of god’s self-
renunciation and self-expression into what is other than himself.”386 By assuming the 
perspective of the Scotist school, the classical narrative of the Christian faith can be enriched. 
While the latter stresses the fall and understands the Incarnation principally in relation to it, the 
former emphasizes God’s self-communication as the primordial goal of divine activity. As a 
result of this, the history of the universe is always and everywhere a story of salvation.  
Second, the kenotic perspective of the imago Dei allows for a meaningful exploration of 
divine agency and the way God relates to the whole cosmos. This approach supports a non-
interventionist understanding of divine agency, which is more suitable in dealing with themes 
such as suffering within the evolutionary process. In addition, it permits one to counter the 
presuppositions of classical theism in its conception of divine power. Divine power is not the 
sum of all the "omni-attributes" that one can think of; it is, rather, God’s generative and 
transformative self-emptying love, which is power-in-love. 
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As the next chapter will show, this interpretation of imago Dei allows for a meaningful 
exploration of humanity in its different dimensions, and this is its third strength. In this sense, 
imago Dei defines not only the relationship between human beings and other creatures, but is 
rather meant to inspire a meaningful understanding of the complex relationships among the 
Creator, humanity and the rest of creatures. The imago Dei motif can thereby be used in 
exploring the personal, social, and environmental aspects of human life, and it can be detached 
from its narrow understanding as dominium terrae. The notion of kenosis hence allows for a 
fruitful exploration of the three ecological dimensions of human existence – personal, social, 
and environmental – and for visualizing the way in which right relations with oneself, others, 
other creatures, and God can be established. 
This interpretation of imago Dei also has clear ethical implications, and this is its fourth 
strength. Other images such as priest of creation, stewardship, or community of creation, suffer 
from the same deficiency of ambiguity in their implications. They do not provide clear-cut 
criteria for discerning paths to a true and fruitful life. Conversely, kenosis in its double meaning 
of self-limitation and self-giving love offers inspiring orientations for embodying ecologically 
friendly ways of life. Although the ethical implications of kenosis as an ecological image will not 
be fully drawn in this project, there will be some hints of this over the last chapter.  
Finally, opting for an understanding of imago Dei as kenosis allows for a Christological 
emphasis in its interpretation. This perspective stresses the biblical stance which presents 
Christ as the true image of God. It follows the conviction of Vatican II that the mystery of 
humanity is fully revealed only in the mystery of the incarnate Word. The Christological 
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approach to imago Dei unveils new elements in its interpretation and scope. The themes of 
soteriology and eschatology can be explored in their cosmic resonances.  
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IV. Kenosis as an Ecological Image: A Theological Exploration 
The previous chapter has asserted basically three main points. First, the theological 
understanding of imago Dei throughout history can be grouped into three lines of 
interpretation, namely, substantialist, relational, and functionalist. These distinctive 
perspectives should not be seen as watertight compartments or as mutually exclusive, for on 
the contrary they complement each other, enabling theology to spell out three aspects of what 
imago Dei connotes, which combine the specific nuances of all its biblical occurrences. Despite 
their different emphases, the recognition of both the dynamic and performative character of 
the imago Dei in humanity is a crucial common trait of these three interpretations. Thus, the 
image is not only susceptible of being renewed – this is what the Christ-event accomplished – 
but it also entails consequences for humanity in its relationship with other creatures. Human 
beings are the image of God on the earth insofar as they are called to share in God’s 
governance and care for creation.  
Secondly, when understood in terms of kenosis, the imago Dei exhibits all its ecological 
strength, and it shows itself as a timely, meaningful, and sound understanding of humanity for 
our time. Kenosis indeed not only effectively intertwines the substantialist, relational, and 
functionalist interpretations of the imago Dei, but also serves as a specifier for them since it 
provides them with concrete content and practical orientation for understanding humanity as 
created in the image of God. Deeply rooted in Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection (Phil 2:5-11), 
kenosis gives expression to a twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving love. On the 
one hand, self-limitation neither points to any loss of divine properties nor implies that God has 
to move out of the way to allow creatures to flourish. It rather means that Jesus freely chooses 
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the renunciation in his earthly life of honor and privileges to which he had every right, and does 
not consider his equality with God as something to take advantage of for his own benefit. 
Moreover, self-limitation also means that God freely accepts and respects the limits of natural 
processes and entities through a non-interventionist divine agency, making room for creatures 
and letting them be and flourish. On the other hand, self-giving love asserts that divine equality 
did not mean for Jesus Christ “getting,” but rather “giving,” as he poured himself out and 
humbled himself for the sake of others. Furthermore, divine self-giving love means that God is 
not absent or distant from creation, but rather cares for it and leads it toward its fulfillment. 
God’s self-bestowal not only sustains creation, but also moves it from within toward its final 
transformation. Accordingly, kenosis is the true manifestation of divine power, which is power-
in-love, and involves a twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving love. In this sense, 
beyond the simplistic “power vs weakness” binary based on the creaturely conception of power 
and weakness, kenosis reveals that real self-giving always involves a kind of limitation, which 
does not have anything to do with absence, impotence, or non-involvement. Rather, the 
limitation that self-giving entails is the limitation as faithfulness. In the case of God, this self-
limitation stems from Jesus’ own faithfulness to his downward mobility – kenosis,  
, humility, and obedience – and from God’s own faithfulness to the freedom and 
flourishing of the free creature, which is at the same time God’s fundamental faithfulness to 
Godself as self-giving love. 
Finally, kenosis is a meaningful and timely anthropological model for all human beings 
with no exception, for it reveals something crucial for a theological understanding of divine 
agency. Consequently, imago Dei interpreted as kenosis discloses important features of what 
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being God’s image-bearer means for humanity. Being created in the image of God therefore 
implies the necessity for humanity to partake of a twofold movement of self-limitation and self-
giving love. Human beings are being conformed and renewed in the image of God inasmuch as 
they allow the Spirit of God to draw them into this twofold movement. Kenosis defines not only 
the relationship between human beings and other creatures, but is rather meant to inspire a 
meaningful understanding of the complex relationships among the Creator, humanity, and the 
rest of creatures. It allows for a fruitful exploration of the three ecological dimensions of human 
existence – personal, social, and environmental – and for visualizing the way in which right 
relations with oneself, others, other creatures, and God can be established. As a result, the 
dynamic and performative character of the imago Dei is well highlighted, and its ethical 
implications established. Although the move from a broad anthropological model to the 
specifics of policies and action is always a difficult and complex one, I believe that kenosis in its 
double meaning of self-limitation and self-giving love offers relevant and inspiring orientations 
for discerning and embodying ecologically friendly ways of life. 
 Accordingly, in this chapter I turn to kenosis as an image revelatory of humanity. The 
chapter consists in exploring the fruitfulness of this notion and its ability to shed light upon 
humanity through the three dimensions of ecology characterized in the first chapter, namely, 
personal, social, and environmental. Indeed, the chapter is structured upon and revolves 
around these three ecological dimensions. It is thus a constructive theological exploration 
which shows why and how kenosis is a meaningful, sound, and timely interpretation of the 
imago Dei motif, inasmuch as it helps in fostering and sustaining an ecologically friendly 
understanding of humanity, and provides guidelines in the search for paths to a true and fruitful 
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life. I will concentrate, first of all, on the personal dimension of ecology. After highlighting the 
necessity of ecological conversion and a new ethos, I will explore the notions of limit and 
asceticism as two important anthropological features that kenosis offers to personal ecology, 
and that may inspire us in searching and discerning new ways of life. On the one hand, the 
notion of limit, which is a constitutive element of humanity, will be defined neither as external 
restriction, nor as mere physical or moral boundary, but it will be regarded rather as an intrinsic 
component of all relationships. There is no relationship without limits, for they are an essential 
instrument for establishing and shaping any relationship. Therefore, the imago Dei is deepened 
in human beings, insofar as they are able to discern, recognize, and respect certain limits, which 
arise not simply as extrinsic divine interdictions, but that stem rather from their faithfulness 
due to their common vocation. These limits entail that humanity makes room for other 
creatures and cares for their integrity and fulfillment. On the other hand, the notion of 
asceticism will be defined as performances designed to inaugurate an alternative culture, to 
enable different relationships, and to create a new identity.387 In this sense, imago Dei 
understood as kenosis involves not only an intellectual re-imagination of humanity, which is 
definitely something needed nowadays, but also and especially new practices and ways of 
interacting and living. Kenosis has to do with embodiment, and requires that humanity abandon 
certain deeply ingrained ways of life, in order to embrace other modes of existence that are 
more ecologically friendly. I will show that the notions of limit and asceticism call for a constant 
discernment conceived as ecological wisdom, which may help us in identifying and keeping the 
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limits that are constitutive of relationships that care for others, for their integrity and 
fulfillment.  
Then, in the second part of this chapter, I will explore how imago Dei understood as 
kenosis can shed light upon humanity through the lens of the social dimension of ecology. I will 
address the issue of the images that may help us in our searching for and voicing new ways of 
social interaction and life. The concept of “civilization of poverty” coined by philosopher Ignacio 
Ellacuría will be particularly examined. On the one hand, this concept expresses, better than 
other notions such as "another world is possible,” the dimension of conflict that inevitably is 
part of the discernment of a new lifestyle, especially within the context of both the consumerist 
and the throwaway culture. On the other hand, it not only connects explicitly the current social 
challenges with environmental issues, avoiding a restricted understanding of ecology as just 
environment, but also provides some clear criteria for the governance of the so-called “global 
commons,” that dismiss the false dilemma of choosing between caring for nature or caring for 
those in need. Rooted in the social dimension of ecology, the concept of “civilization of 
poverty” is in tune with the twofold movement of kenosis of self-limitation and self-giving love.  
Finally, in the last section of this chapter, I will explore how kenosis can be useful and 
suitable when reflecting on the role and place of humanity within creation. The notion of 
stewardship has been especially important in this respect, inasmuch as it has become a sort of 
default position among many theologians and church authorities for depicting the relationship 
between humanity and other creatures.  Nevertheless, although it has been crucial in linking 
ecological sensitivity with theological reflection, it has drawbacks as well. After tracing its 
origins and pondering its advantages and downsides, I will show how kenosis both offers a 
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corrective to the notion of stewardship, and enhances what is already good in it. Inasmuch as 
kenosis in its double meaning of self-limitation and self-giving love entails clear practical 
consequences, it complements greatly the notion of stewardship. It will thereby be shown how 
this alliance between these two images heightens what is good in each of them, in order to 
inspire us in discerning and embodying an ecologically friendly lifestyle. 
In summary, in the context of the ecological crisis, the chapter aims to provide a re-
imagination of humanity through the notion of kenosis. Its main question is what a kenotic 
anthropology would look like in the face of the current ecological challenges. The chapter 
intends to both highlight some human features and attitudes, which need to be emphasized 
nowadays, and revise the way humanity thinks of and establishes its relation with God and 
other creatures.  Without any claim to be exhaustive, I hope to show the fruitfulness and 
inspiring character of kenosis as an anthropological image, which helps theology not only to 
reframe its intellectual understanding of humanity, but also to discern and propose new ways 
of life. Kenosis therefore helps to shape people’s imagination, and the way believers portray 
and make practical sense of the Christian depiction of humanity. 
A) Personal Ecology: Ecological conversion 
As mentioned, the notion of ecology points to the manner in which humans not only 
conceive of but also embody their way of inhabiting the world. This is why ecology must be 
understood at least through three interwoven dimensions which mutually affect each other, 
namely, personal, social, and environmental. These three ecological dimensions are like 
concentric circles that mutually interact and shape the way in which humanity both portrays 
and lives its existence upon the earth.  Ecological crisis means, therefore, that we are living a 
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critical moment in which our lifestyle and the values that sustain it are being judged and called 
into question for their destructive results. It is a crisis inasmuch as we are confronted with the 
current and future life-threatening scenarios, which can be drawn as unavoidable 
consequences of human practices and beliefs, and humanity needs therefore to make a 
decision about it. In doing so, we need not only practical criteria but also inspiring and sound 
images about human life upon the earth that may enlighten our discernment of pathways to a 
true and fruitful life. As John of Pergamon puts it, we need “not an ethic, but an ethos. Not a 
programme, but an attitude and a mentality. Not a legislation, but a culture.”388 
If the ecological crisis requires both a Christian questioning of beliefs and attitudes that 
have fostered this crisis, and an ecological reform of Christianity, then the question about what 
must be revised and changed in the Christian understanding of humanity and its practical 
implications is crucial. Starting with the personal dimension of ecology, we can explore how 
kenosis helps theology in taking up this task of revision and change, which aims toward a 
theological anthropology able to inspire ecologically friendly practices, and to reframe 
especially the relationship between humanity and other creatures.  
As defined in the first chapter, personal ecology focuses on the basic subjectification 
process of every individual and the consequences that that entails for his or her interaction 
with others and the environment. It refers therefore to the domain of personal interactions of 
each individual, encompassing the whole array of sustainable and healthy dynamics and ways 
of living, which nurture the flourishing and fulfillment of human beings. Personal ecology 
therefore focuses on the primal interaction of every individual with him/herself, and the social 
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and environmental consequences that this interaction implies. From a theological standpoint, 
personal ecology aims toward personal flourishing and fulfillment. Some topics that pertain to 
the personal dimension of ecology are the way people think of and organize their everyday life, 
the pace of life, working and leisure time, consumption habits and the discernment of what is 
necessary for maintenance, the use of space and housing, the choice of means of 
transportation, and the way people relate to their own bodies. As a result, to raise the question 
about how kenosis may have an impact on the personal dimension of ecology is to ask about 
how this notion may change the perception we have of ourselves, and the way we think of and 
perform our role within creation. A change is needed in the manner we grasp and imagine our 
living on the earth. The ecological crisis is not merely a technological one since, as Conradie 
asserts, the problem lies not outside but inside ourselves, not in the ecosystem but in the 
human heart, in the collective psyche. Hence, what is required hence is a fundamental change 
of orientation, a metanoia.389 
1. Ecological Conversion 
Church authorities and theologians have been increasingly calling for ecological 
conversion in the last decades. John Paul II asserts, for instance, that we must encourage and 
support the ecological conversion which has made humanity more sensitive to the catastrophe 
to which it has been heading. According to him, one of the causes of the ecological crisis is that 
human beings unfortunately are no longer the Creator’s stewards, but autonomous despots, 
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who are finally beginning to understand that they must stop at the edge of the abyss.390 
Humanity has been unfaithful to God's plan toward creation, and has forgotten its task of 
continuing God's work of life and peace, and ruling the world in righteousness and holiness. 
This is why ecological conversion implies rediscovering the right place and role of humanity 
within creation, who exerts a delegated authority that must be in conformity with the Creator’s 
plan.  
In a joint statement issued in 2002, John Paul II and the Ecumenical Patriarch 
Bartholomew I insisted again on the importance and necessity for conversion if humanity wants 
to successfully deal with the current environment challenges. For the problem is not simply 
economic or technological, but rather moral and spiritual; and we need an inner change of 
heart, a genuine conversion in Christ, which can lead humanity to a change in lifestyle and of 
unsustainable patterns of consumption and production.391 Again ecological conversion has to 
do with retrieving the proper place of humanity in creation, and recognizing of failure both to 
fulfill the mandate of being the Creator’s stewards, and to cooperate with God in realizing more 
and more fully the divine purpose for creation. This is why an act of repentance is needed on 
the part of humanity.  
Pope Francis has also reminded us of the importance of an ecological conversion, 
asserting that living our vocation of being protectors of God’s creation is something essential 
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and not an optional or secondary aspect of our Christian experience. The effects of a true and 
deep encounter with Jesus Christ will necessarily become evident in the way humanity relates 
to the world.392 An ecological conversion implies for humanity the awareness that each 
creature reflects something of God and has a message to convey to us, on the one hand, and 
the security that Christ has taken unto himself this material world and now, risen, is intimately 
present to each being, surrounding it with his affection and penetrating it with his light, on the 
other.393 Pope Francis affirms that human beings have to recognize that God not only has 
created the world, but has also written into it an order and dynamism that humanity should not 
ignore. This is why ecological conversion has to do primarily with the right understanding of the 
place and role of humanity within creation, and with acting accordingly. What is needed is the 
recognition of our errors, sins, faults and failures in building a healthy relationship with 
creation, and a heartfelt repentance and desire to change.394 We should not understand our 
superiority as a reason for personal glory or irresponsible dominion, but rather as a different 
capacity which, in its turn, entails a serious responsibility stemming from our faith.395 What is at 
stake therefore is how humanity conceives of its vocation and task within creation. 
The calling for ecological conversion is therefore directly related to the acknowledgment 
of the right place of humanity in relationship to God and other creatures. It is eminently an 
anthropological challenge which requires that humanity revise all that is harmful in its thinking 
and acting for the flourishing of other creatures, and embrace a new way of portraying its role 
within creation, and a new ecologically friendly lifestyle. This is not merely a turning toward 
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nature, “but the awareness of the interdependence of all living things, including humans, 
rooted in a deep sense of God as Creator.”396 The acknowledgement of the interconnectedness 
of all creatures has been indeed proposed by many theologians as a cornerstone for ecological 
conversion. It is also highly emphasized by Laudato Si’, which again and again reminds that 
everything in the world is connected. Similarly, other theologians assert that humanity needs to 
retrieve first of all its earthiness or consciousness of belonging to the earth community. While 
Moltmann, for instance, states that human beings are imago mundi, and they can only exist in 
community with all other created beings and can only understand themselves in that 
community,397 Edwards declares that human beings are made from stardust, and they have to 
be seen always as rooted within the community of life.398 In this sense, ecological conversion 
requires that human beings nurture their belonging to a wider community, which goes far 
beyond humanity, and the acknowledgment of their dependence on and necessity of other 
creatures for their life and fulfillment.  
Nevertheless, although the consciousness of being part of the community of creation 
with all other creatures, and of sharing with them the same creatureliness are crucial for an 
ecological conversion, they are not strong enough to ensure a real transformation in people's 
minds and lifestyles. Acknowledging dependency on other creatures and recognizing that 
humanity belongs to the larger earth community do not necessarily entail any ethical 
commitment or specific behavior. No clear moral obligation follows from the assertion of the 
interconnectedness of everything in the world. Relations can span a large array of types, and 
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they can even be oppressive. The awareness of the web of interconnection among all creatures 
certainly underlines both the breadth of the consequences of human action on the earth, and 
the necessity of other creatures that human beings need in order to survive and develop. Yet, 
ecotheology requires more than that to be able to shake up people's imagination and help 
them to discern pathways to true life. As Sally McFague puts it “we are part of the whole, and 
we need to internalize that insight as a first step toward living truthfully, rightly, on our planet. 
But we need more than a sense of oneness with the earth to live appropriately on it.”399 
This is why I believe that the interpretation of imago Dei as kenosis offers some insights 
that help ecotheology to reframe theological anthropology. Without a doubt human 
uniqueness needs to be thought of in terms of our rootedness and relatedness with other 
creatures, but the language of kinship and the earth community, in speaking of the bond 
between human beings and the rest of creation, falls short of shaping a theological framework 
suitable enough in order to revise and change theological anthropology. Accordingly, I believe, 
in tune with Celia Deane-Drummond, that even kinship is still insufficient for a theological 
interpretation of how humans connect with other animals, and that traditional language, such 
as the image of God, may be useful if suitably qualified.400 Kenosis provides exactly the kind of 
understanding of the imago Dei that is needed today, which carries an ethical component 
which can illuminate the relation between humanity and other creatures, as well as foster 
among humans an ecological commitment toward the flourishing of all kinds of life. As a result, 
the dynamic and performative character of the image is adequately put forward and its 
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ontological, relational, and functional features are well combined. Imago Dei as kenosis enables 
ecotheology to rethink the place and role of humanity within creation, emphasizing the 
necessary human accountability that stems from its particular vocation on earth. Ecological 
conversion has to do therefore not only with awareness of our creatureliness and the 
membership to the earth community, but also with what makes us different and therefore 
morally accountable to God for the well-being of creation. 
2. Personal Ecology: the Respect of Limits 
The call for ecological conversion resonates with Saint Paul’s invitation to the Philippians 
to have in themselves what Jesus Christ’s mind or attitude was (Phil 2:5). As mentioned the 
verb  can be understood to refer to a change of the opinion one has about oneself and 
others, which should be totally different from the one proposed by the mundane values of 
selfishness, conceit, and self-interest to which Paul alludes in the preceding verses. In this 
sense, the center of gravity of this verb is not just the materiality of Jesus Christ’s action, but 
rather a way of being, a manner of considering oneself and others, according to the spirit of 
humility and self-emptying love which will be presented in the following verses. What therefore 
can kenosis offer to a fruitful and meaningful understanding of humanity in the context of the 
ecological crisis? What are the insights that can help in reframing theological anthropology and 
the interpretation of the imago Dei?  
The first element that stems from kenosis to a timely depiction of humanity is the 
category of limit. Despite the fact that this category may be spontaneously and narrowly 
associated with restriction and prohibition, it is a promising source for renewing the theological 
understanding of humanity. For it is a polysemous notion that when connected with kenosis 
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reveals all its ecological strength in order to foster an ecologically friendly understanding of 
human beings.  
The category of limit is frequently invoked as an important component in dealing with 
current ecological challenges not only within theology but also in the context of scientific, 
political, and economic reflection on ecology. Theologians draw upon this notion in order to 
emphasize the existence of boundaries which must be respected to avoid the development and 
increase of ecological disasters. Indeed, at the root of the current crisis lies the transgression 
and forgetfulness of certain limits which are crucial in maintaining creation’s well-being. Pope 
Francis, for instance, asserts that “a fragile world, entrusted by God to human care, challenges 
us to devise intelligent ways of directing, developing and limiting our power.”401 The notion of 
limit therefore is a timely anthropological category for renewing Christian understanding of 
humanity within the context of creation. 
a. Kenotic anthropology: discerning and respecting limits 
Limits can span a large array of types depending on their origins and the features of the 
boundary that they establish. So, it is important to determine what kind of limit may be 
instrumental in revising theological anthropology through the lens of ecological sensibility, and 
to differentiate it from other boundaries which are present in human life and interaction within 
the earth community. Theological reflection on ecology indeed draws on different meanings 
and kinds of limits aiming to connect environmental challenges with Christian doctrine, and 
foster ecological commitment among believers. This variety of meanings is present, for 
instance, in the rhetoric of Pope Francis’ encyclical Laudato Si’. While it is true that all these 
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references to the category of limit, when put together as a system, help in dealing with 
ecological challenges from a theological viewpoint, I believe that it is nonetheless important to 
point out not only their differences and particular emphases but also their anthropological 
implications. In doing so, I aim to highlight the kind of limit that the notion of kenosis 
propounds, which may be inspiring and fruitful for transforming the way we conceive of our 
place and role on earth, and for discerning and embodying more ecologically friendly lifestyles. 
A first use of the notion of limit refers to physical or ecological boundaries. The complex 
web of interactions within ecosystems and the biological, chemical, and physical functioning of 
the earth entail certain limits of what is and what is not possible on it, if the well-being of 
species and natural processes is to be respected and not greatly disturbed. Some of these limits 
are impossible to overcome, and hence represent a permanent boundary which wakens 
humanity from the illusion of infinite and unlimited growth. This is the case, for instance, of the 
availability of nonrenewable natural resources such as fresh water, or the maximum amount of 
toxic particles that the air of a given place can hold without becoming extremely dangerous for 
or incompatible with life. These examples show the existence of natural or ecological limits 
which humanity needs to respect. Pope Francis asserts that the idea of infinite or unlimited 
growth is based precisely on the denial of these limits, and on the false notion that an infinite 
quantity of energy and resources are available, that it is possible to renew them quickly, and 
that the negative effects of the exploitation of the natural order can be easily absorbed.402 
Nevertheless, the recognition of the limits of our planet, not geographical but ecological, has 
been a relatively new consciousness. We have gone from believing in the unlimited capabilities 
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of nature to the awareness of many breakpoints in our process of interaction with the 
biosphere. Today we realize with renewed force that the earth can no longer endure the 
pressure and the frantic pace of production which our way of life imposes. In itself, this 
awareness is not a purely negative experience. It is an occasion to question and transform our 
relationship with nature, with others, and with God, and therefore is the first essential step 
toward an ecological conversion, a metanoia. Accordingly, we need to foster what David Orr 
has called ecological literacy, namely, the knowledge not only about how nature works, its 
multiple inner connections, and therefore its limits, but also the practical attitude of using this 
knowledge in order to care for the world.403 Increasing our ecological literacy certainly would 
have a positive impact on our sense of dependency on and belonging to the earth community, 
which are two important components for renewing theological anthropology. 
A second use of the notion of limit refers to a moral imperative. It is a limit therefore 
which is set up through the recognition and acceptance of a given right or principle that must 
be followed and protected. This kind of limit is symbolically represented in Christianity by the 
divine prohibition against eating from the tree of knowledge, as well as by the vegetable diet 
that God assigns to human beings in Genesis 1. Christian tradition has also consistently asserted 
the centrality of the common good as well as the universal destination of all goods, and thus 
the right of everyone to their use, as a crucial principle of the whole ethical and social order.404 
Lately it is the justice and solidarity toward future generations that has begun to be identified 
as an important principle and criterion in dealing with ecological issues. Laudato Si’ also refers 
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to ethical limits specially when speaking about scientific investigation and the technocratic 
paradigm which has permeated all ambits of human life, and needs a moral framework that can 
orient and regulate their use. Pope Francis rightly argues that “a technology severed from 
ethics will not easily be able to limit its own power.”405 He thinks that it is crucial to recognize 
and assert some universally valid principles if the laws which stem from them are not to be 
seen as mere arbitrary impositions or obstacles to be avoided.406 The limit as a moral 
imperative requires that humanity be able to discern, formulate, and respect some universally 
valid ethical principles, which derive not only from the human vocation within creation, but also 
from the natural order of things. The ecological crisis is hence an opportunity to deepen the 
purpose and meaning of human action in the world, which is a key element for the renovation 
of theological anthropology. 
Theological reflection on ecology also draws on the category of limit as ignorance or lack 
of knowledge. There is much that we just do not know about the interplay among species, the 
functioning of natural processes, the evolution and development of life, and the history and 
destiny of the universe. There is a real “cloud of unknowing” that both constantly reminds us of 
the limited access we have to the complex web of interactions within the world, and should 
elicit a humble recognition of this ignorance. Science is not only inherently unable to account 
for all the processes and systems in nature – asserting the opposite would be just an obstinate 
denial of scientific limits – but it is also incapable of offering all possible effective solutions in 
dealing with ecological challenges. Laudato Si’ recalls that “it cannot be maintained that 
empirical science provides a complete explanation of life, the interplay of all creatures and the 
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whole of reality. This would be to breach the limits imposed by its own methodology.”407 This is 
not to forget or downplay the tremendous progress and development that science and 
technology have brought to human life, for instance, in curing diseases or steadily improving 
life comfort and well-being. In this sense, science and its practical applications have overcome 
many limitations and changed the boundaries of what seemed impossible in the past. 
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that we have a limited knowledge about how the universe and 
nature work. There is much information that lies beyond our capacities and desires for 
deciphering the world. Reality is far more complex than what science attempts to explain, and 
its technical applications more limited than we often think. To deny such limitations is to 
remain in a promethean understanding of humanity, which goes hand to hand with a hubristic 
attempt to manipulate the world.408 
The limit is also conceived of as a legal frontier. The call to humanity to respect certain 
limits can also be understood as an invitation to comply with the laws and regulations which 
aim to protect and preserve the well-being of nature. International agreements and a large 
diversity of local policies have been increasingly established in order to regulate the use of 
some specific goods and resources such as water, to restrict some actions which can be harmful 
or dangerous for life and the well-being of species such as pollution, and to prohibit other 
actions which are considered detrimental to the proper preservation of and care for 
ecosystems and creatures. Despite the fact that there is a general awareness that we need to 
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set up new regulations and legal frameworks for governing common goods such as the oceans, 
the air, and climate, negotiations among countries have been extremely hard and have shown 
little progress, or at least not the advancement that we need. We are certainly lacking not only 
universally valid laws and binding legal agreements, but also international institutions which 
may effectively supervise the compliance of these legal limits. Laudato Si’, for instance, asserts 
that we need, on the one hand, global regulatory norms to impose obligations and prevent 
unacceptable actions such as when powerful companies dump contaminated waste or offshore 
polluting industries in other countries,409 and, on the other hand, an agreement on systems of 
governance for the whole range of so-called “global commons.”410 The fact that human action 
on the earth and its consequences has increasingly become cumulative and irreversible requires 
new legal agreements and globally valid laws which may secure the well-being of nature, and 
the preservation of and care for the life of species and ecosystems. Establishing the conditions 
for an ecologically friendly life necessarily supposes the formulation and respect of these legal 
frontiers. 
 Finally, the notion of limit is also used in theological reflection on ecology understood as 
human fallibility or human blindness both to recognize their true capacities and to accept 
themselves as limited creatures. No wonder therefore that human sin has been narratively 
expressed in terms of pride and reluctance to observe the limits which God establishes for 
them. At the same time, the fact that human reason, will, and action do not always concur is a 
sign of a limit which is inescapably part of our existence. In this sense, this last connotation of 
the notion of limit refers in theological terms to what is at the root of the current ecological 
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crisis. Humanity both in its fallibility and its incapacity to respect boundaries is one of the main 
causes of the ecological challenges we face today. Pope Francis recalls that sin is manifested in 
the rupture of the three vital relationships with God, neighbor, and the earth itself, in which 
human life is grounded. The harmony between the Creator, humanity, and creation as a whole 
was indeed disrupted by our presuming to take the place of God and refusing to acknowledge 
our creaturely limitations.411 He also asserts that the limit understood as human fallibility or 
blindness is sometimes expressed in the misconception we hold about our role and place within 
creation,412 and in the incapacity to acknowledge our own limitations and to grasp the gravity 
of the challenges now before us.413 In this sense, ecological conversion is hence a turning of the 
head, so to speak, toward the blind spots of our way of depicting human action and purpose on 
earth. The existence of a limit understood as human fallibility and blindness implies that there 
will be no successful way of dealing with the ecological crisis without sincere repentance and an 
acute awareness of our limitations.  
 In order to take up the ecological challenges from a theological viewpoint, ecotheology 
therefore makes use of the category of limit through these five connotations, namely, 
ecological or physical impossibility, moral imperative, ignorance or lack of knowledge, legal 
boundary, and human fallibility and blindness. Nevertheless, I believe that kenosis propounds a 
different kind of limit, which can nurture our imagination and illuminate our discernment in 
searching for new ways of life. What is most characteristic of this limit is that it is not imposed 
from without, in the sense of exteriority or inevitability, but it is rather a limit that is freely 
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discerned, established, and respected. Indeed, by taking the form of a slave, Jesus freely 
assumes the place of a person with no advantages, rights, or privileges, without claiming any 
special treatment. He deliberately poured out himself in self-giving love, humbling himself and 
being obedient to the extent of death on a cross.  Recalling the conclusions of the previous 
chapter on kenosis, it can hence be said that the limit which this notion puts forward is tightly 
related to the refusal to use one’s own capacities or condition just for one’s own benefit or 
advantage. On the contrary, the act of self-limitation is for the sake of the flourishing and well-
being of others, which is the purpose of divine self-giving love. The limit that stems from 
kenosis is also connected with the act of making room for other creatures, which means not 
only to respect their autonomy and integrity, allowing them to be and flourish, but also to 
establish life-giving relationships with them so that they may move toward their fulfillment. 
Kenosis therefore stimulates the discernment and respect of certain limits which, even though 
they entail self-limitation, are tightly related to the establishment of relationships with other 
people and creatures that point toward their flourishment and fulfillment.  
 There is no relationship without limits, for they are an essential instrument for 
establishing and shaping any relationship. All relationships, no matter their type, such as 
relations of friendship, labor, kinship, citizenship, love, and any other relationship implies 
certain limits, which are constitutive inasmuch as they enable and define these relations. This is 
the ultimate meaning and function of the limit that God establishes for humanity in Genesis 
about the tree of knowledge. This limit does not stem from a caprice or from a desire to keep 
what is seen as divine privilege, but it rather is the clear manifestation of God’s will of 
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establishing a relationship with humanity.414 What God intends through the prohibition of 
eating of the tree of knowledge is that humanity, by ratifying and respecting this limit, accepts 
to have a free and conscious relationship with God. In this sense, the limit propounded by 
kenosis is neither an external restriction nor a mere physical or moral boundary, but is rather a 
limit which arises from the discernment of what it means to be faithful to what we are and we 
are called to be as God’s image-bearers. 
 In terms of personal ecology therefore kenosis raises the question of what kind of self-
limitation we need to embrace in our lives if we want to be faithful to what Jesus reveals as the 
true image of God. The search for a new lifestyle supposes that we ask ourselves about the type 
of limits we need to discern, set up, and respect vis-à-vis not only our consumption of resources 
such as energy, water, food, and other goods, but also our pace of life, working and leisure 
time, the use of space and housing, the choice of means of transportation, the way we relate to 
our own bodies, and many other ambits of our personal life. This self-limitation stems from the 
faithfulness toward the flourishment and well-being of other people and other creatures. Our 
discernment has to address as well the issue of our capacities and position within both society 
and the earth community, aiming like Jesus to not use them solely for our own personal benefit 
or interest. We are therefore constantly confronted with the same archetypal choice as Adam 
and Jesus, knowing that it is the latter and not the former who has embodied the true image of 
God through his self-humbling path, and has allowed the Father to acknowledge, approve, and 
vindicate this distinctive way of understanding divine equality. Indeed, unlike Adam, who tries 
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to take advantage of his place within creation for his own gain, and tries to snatch equality with 
God, Jesus reveals the true image of God precisely because He freely refuses to use his equality 
with God for his own benefit, but on the contrary  and humbles himself, taking the 
form of a slave, and is obedient to the point of death on a cross. The notion of limit, therefore, 
needs not to be seen as something merely negative, but it can rather be the expression of 
faithfulness and authentic love. As a result, the most interesting insight is that kenosis offers a 
theological interpretation of the imago Dei, which not only triggers important questions and 
discernments, but also can also warrant and legitimate their implications. Kenosis activates, 
inspires, and illuminates from a theological viewpoint our quest for new ways of life in the 
context of the current ecological crisis. 
 South African theologian Ernst Conradie also assigns an important role to the notion of 
limit for the desirable renewal of theological anthropology. He does so by challenging what he 
considers to be an uncritical assumption or starting point in many theological depictions of 
humanity, in which human beings are conceived of as being at home on earth. This thesis that 
the earth is God's household, and humanity is at home on earth is theologically proposed in 
order to emphasize basically three main ideas, namely, 1) the interconnectedness of everything 
within creation, and hence that the well-being of humanity is inseparably linked with that of all 
life on earth, 2) the intrinsic belonging of human beings to the earth community, and 3) 
therefore that they must respect and protect other creatures, allowing the whole household of 
God to flourish. While Conradie acknowledges the strength of the household of God as a root 
metaphor for ecotheology, he believes that the human sense of belonging to the earth cannot 
be derived simply from the awareness that we are inextricably bound to the ecosystems in 
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which we live. He thinks that this sense of belonging should be understood as the very content 
of an eschatological longing, since “it is only through the Christian longing for the new earth 
that we can discover our belonging, in body and in soul, to this earth. The earth may therefore 
be our one and only house but it is not our home yet.”415 It is at this point that Conradie draws 
on the category of limit as an important anthropological notion to define humanity. Human 
beings are not yet at home since they not only experience suffering, but are also constrained by 
the reality of their finitude. Accordingly, many believe that theological anthropology must 
emphasize human finitude, and that humanity must recognize and accept both human and 
planetary limitations. This would be to know and respect our place on earth, which is our home. 
Human beings need to learn to live within their limits. Conversely, Conradie asserts that the 
acceptance of human finitude should not be understood as an all-too-easy acquiescence to our 
human limits. He believes that “such an acceptance of limits and constraints carries the risk of a 
resignation to injustice,” and therefore “a willingness to test boundaries, to question whether 
limits are truly inevitable, may be required.”416 As a result, the renewal of theological 
anthropology through the lens of ecological sensitivity requires more than a simple reminder, 
recognition, and acceptance of human limits.  
Conradie thinks that the distinctiveness of humanity should not be defined merely in 
terms of the awareness and acceptance of its finitude, but rather the history of human beings – 
and of each individual person – may be described as a “journey of discovery” of the boundaries 
                                                     
415
 Ernst Conradie, An Ecological Christian Anthropology: At Home on Earth? (Aldershot, Hants, England; 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 13. (italics in original) 
416
 Ibid., 138. 
250 
 
of our existence.417 Human beings participate in the restless journey of the cosmos, and this 
entails for them that they not only progressively discover some limits, but also that they 
explore, challenge, and shift these limits. Human beings also conjecture about what lies beyond 
such limits, and ultimately recognize some of them as final, which allows for humanity “the 
rediscovery, reappropriation, reformation, and renewal of what lies within such boundaries.”418 
In sum, Conradie believes that the strategic move in order to revise theological anthropology is 
not merely to highlight human and planetary finitude, and that humanity must learn to live 
within these limits, since it is at home on earth, but rather to maintain that humanity is not at 
home on earth yet – which is God´s household – and that they are on the journey of testing, 
questioning, shifting, and sometimes accepting as final the limits which they encounter in their 
existence. 
 The category of limit is hence instrumental for reshaping theological anthropology. 
While I agree with Conradie that it is not sufficient enough for this purpose just to insist on the 
limitations of human existence and of the planet, I part company with him on his portrayal of 
human beings in relation to the limits that they encounter through their lives. Instead of 
bringing out the human experience and ability for discovering, challenging, and shifting limits, 
we rather need to emphasize our capacity for discerning, establishing, and respecting some 
limits. I certainly speak of limits which are not inevitable or imposed from without, but of limits 
that we set up freely and purposely aiming to be faithful to our identity of being God’s image- 
bearers. Kenosis therefore enables theology to enter into the conversation about the limits and 
changes of human lifestyle on earth which humanity needs to define and keep so as to honor 
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the fact that it is created in the image of God. Interpreting the imago Dei as kenosis provides a 
theological framework that not only insists on the human belonging to the earth community 
and on the interconnectedness of everything within creation, but also and primarily 
underscores that we are called to conceive of and live our humanity in terms of Jesus' kenosis, 
which implies the twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving love. Thus human beings 
as imago Dei must empty and limit themselves, not in the sense of losing or restricting their 
capacities, but rather and properly in the sense of fully embodying self-emptying love, which 
not only respects limits and makes room for otherness, but also engages in life-giving 
relationships that desire the other's well-being. Humanity must understand its power as power-
in-love – maîtrise maîtrisée and douceur –419 which points to empowering others and enabling 
all creatures to move toward their fulfillment. Therefore, the twofold movement of self-
limitation and self-giving, inasmuch as it expresses and embodies true self-emptying love, is 
crucial for the renewal of theological understanding of the imago Dei and its consequences for 
humanity.   
b. Kenotic anthropology: broadening limits 
 British Biblical scholars David Horrel, Cherryl Hunt, and Christopher Southgate have also 
proposed kenosis as an important anthropological notion for the renewal of theological 
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anthropology and ethics.420 They do so from a reading of Paul through an ecological lens. 
Drawing on the interpretation of the two Pauline texts most frequently cited in ecotheological 
discussions – Romans 8:19-23 and Colossians 1:15-20421 – they argue that Paul provides an 
eschatologically oriented theological narrative, in which God’s saving act in Christ of 
transforming and redeeming encompasses the whole of creation and not just humans. 
Furthermore, Paul’s narrative suggests a special role for humanity within this divine act of 
cosmic reconciliation. The authors think that this is not to overstate the human care of creation, 
but rather to unveil the ecological implications of Paul’s theology, in which “there is a key 
connection to be inferred between the liberated life of the children of God and the liberation of 
the nonhuman creation.”422  
 Horrell, Hunt, and Southgate show that the way in which Paul expresses this crucial role 
of humanity in God’s reconciling act is through the notion of the believer’s participation in 
Christ. This participation consists of a sharing in the pattern of Jesus’ paradigmatic story of self-
giving for others, which Paul summarizes tellingly in Phil 2:5-11.423 Accordingly, the authors 
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propose that it is possible to discern in Paul’s theological narrative some ethical consequences 
which can shape and inform our response to current ecological challenges. They believe that 
kenosis can act as a unifying theological concept for this ethical implication and that “a 
paradigm of ethical kenosis might well stand at the heart of an ecological ethics that stands in 
faithful continuity with the Pauline tradition.”424  
 According to the authors this ethical kenosis, that stems from Paul´s highly Christological 
ethics, is defined by two main principles or meta-norms, namely, other-regard and corporate 
solidarity.425 The principle of other-regard entails that it is a theologically warranted move to 
extend the community of moral concern to ‘all things,’ asserting that nonhuman creatures 
should be counted as ‘others’ worthy of moral concern. Furthermore, Christ’s self-emptying 
also serves as an ethical paradigm, providing motivation and legitimation for humans to place 
the survival needs, or ‘goods,’ of other species at a higher priority than humanity’s own 
nonessential resource requirements.426 This does not mean that the good of another species, or 
of individuals within another species, should rank more highly, or even equally, with the good 
of humans, but it rather implies, on the one hand, that we need to broaden the limits of our 
moral concern in order to include other creatures – all things – and, on the other hand, that 
these “’others’ are worthy precisely of a costly, generous, and self-limiting regard from humans 
(…) such that the flourishing of creation is not only measured in terms of its ability to support 
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human flourishing.”427 Intimately related to the principle of other-regard, the meta-norm of 
‘corporate solidarity’ involves the recognition that every creature has a part in the community 
of Christ´s redemptive purpose, as well as the recognition of our fellowship and 
interdependence with all creatures. Corporate solidarity thus points to the acknowledgement 
of “our dependence on other creatures, and how it binds us together with them, as receivers of 
their gifts, and, one hopes, as generous givers of our gifts to them.”428 This sense of community 
and interdependence, as well as the certainty of our common path to salvation should elicit 
particular ethical concerns toward the vulnerable, the voiceless, the weak, namely, toward 
those who see their fulfillment and well-being threatened. As a result, not only future human 
generations, but also future generations of nonhuman species whose flourishing is under 
profound threat, and whose voice is barely heard, are the new poor, which are particularly of 
concern to God.429 Thus, these two principles or meta-norms give form to ethical kenosis, and 
imply that we must broaden the limits of our moral concern in order to include other creatures, 
indeed all things, and to care for their flourishing and well-being. 
Fleshing out the implications for humanity of this ethical kenosis, the authors assert that 
after the example of Christ there are at least three facets of kenosis. The first one is kenosis of 
aspiration which means that we are called not to make of status a “snatching-matter,” not to 
aspire to high status, but rather to look to the interests of others.430 As Southgate puts it “the 
consequence of such grasping is at once to fail to respect fully the status of the other creature, 
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and to fail to receive our situation as gift from God.”431 In other words, kenosis of aspiration 
suggests that like Jesus we should not aim to use our own capacities or position in society only 
for our own benefit and at the expense of others, but that we should rather be able to 
relinquish for the sake of the well-being of the earth community even what may seem to be our 
acquired rights or what we think we deserve as human beings. Along with kenosis of aspiration, 
the authors state that we should put in practice a kenosis of appetite, which means that we 
have to be attentive to those disordered appetites that harm our freedom to contemplate 
appropriately, and relate lovingly to, the nonhuman creation in order to restrict and reorient 
them. This kenosis of appetite is necessary since disordered appetites drive us to consume 
more of the world’s fullness than is our share, and it should therefore be applied to our 
sometimes excessive expectancies of comfort and to our understanding of well-being, 
authentic basic needs, and lifestyle. Finally, the third facet of kenosis is what the authors called 
kenosis of acquisitiveness. It means that we need to revise not only our desires or ambitions, 
but also and especially the actual way we relate to the world’s goods and resources such as 
energy, food, water, land, and air. It means that we must order “our acquisition of the material 
trappings of life, which again are often acquired at the expense of the well-being of other 
creatures.”432 These three facets of kenosis do not necessarily tell us which choices or decisions 
to make, and this is indeed a characteristic of this ethical kenosis; nonetheless they activate and 
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nurture in us the discernment and searching of new ways of life, as well as theologically 
legitimate their consequences and implications.433 
In tune with what this ecological reading of Paul asserts, I believe that kenosis, as an 
interpretation of the imago Dei,  not only entails the discernment, establishment, and respect 
of certain limits, which suppose a real attitude of self-limitation, but also and directly connected 
with the former, it implies an act of self-giving love, which pushes us to broaden the limits of 
our moral concern so as to include other creatures – the whole earth community – and 
consider them worthy of our selfless action and care. Therefore, despite the fact that the move 
from a broad anthropological model to the specifics of choices and actions is always a difficult 
and complex one, I believe that kenosis in its double meaning of self-limitation and self-giving 
love offers relevant and inspiring orientations for discerning and embodying ecologically 
friendly ways of life. It theologically opens up the possibility of thinking differently, which 
definitely plays a part in acting differently. 
 Sallie McFague in her most recent book also draws on the notion of kenosis as a new 
anthropological paradigm, which not only runs against the market-capitalist depiction of 
humanity, but it also has ethical implications that may help us to deal with the current 
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ecological crisis.434 In this sense, kenosis can be instrumental in order to imagine, interpret, feel, 
and moralize within an alternative paradigm. McFague thinks that, while the self-emptying 
pattern might have been seen in other times as a peculiarly religious way of being in the world, 
nowadays it might be the germ of a personal, professional, and public ethic for the twenty-first 
century.435 Kenosis is an understanding of the self and power as facilitating and enhancing the 
well-being and flourishing of others, rather than domination and control of these others. 
Kenosis allows a theological narrative in which “words like restraint, sharing, limits, boundaries 
are central, and words like limitless, expansion, growth, development, which have ruled our 
personal, political, and market lives for centuries, move to the margins.”436 Kenosis therefore is 
a crucial notion for the needed renewal of theological anthropology consistent with the current 
ecological crisis and the search for new more ecologically friendly ways of living. 
 McFague proposes a fourfold process so that people can move from belief to action in 
dealing with the ecological challenges. She draws on three historical characters namely, John 
Woolman, Dorothy Day, and Simone Weil, who help her both in illustrating this four-step 
process and in depicting the way in which true self-emptying love may be concretely embodied. 
The four steps are 1) experiences of voluntary poverty, 2) the focus of one’s attention on the 
needs of others, 3) the gradual development of a “universal self,” and 4) the new model of the 
universal self operates at both the personal and public levels. What is most interesting in 
McFague’s work for the sake of this project is that she also exhibits an understanding of kenosis 
as a twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving love.  
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The first step of the process she describes – the movement toward voluntary poverty – 
is a necessary preparation to a new view of the self, since it can be a powerful wake-up 
experience undercutting our sense of privilege and power in the context of a consumer culture 
in which we define ourselves by our possessions. She thinks that voluntary poverty epitomizes 
the kenotic or self-emptying path of Jesus, for the “goal of voluntary poverty was to create in its 
practitioners a sensibility, a way of being in the world, that had to do above all with the quality 
of being or relating that was humble and dispossessed, that was without pretense and that 
made no claim to rights and privileges for themselves.”437 Voluntary poverty therefore points to 
self-limitation in the sense of renouncing of what may seem to be humanly acquired rights 
within the earth community, of limiting undue desires and expectations in the use of goods and 
resources, of giving up all material things which are not truly essential for our well-being, and of 
not using one's own position or capacities only for one's own benefit. As a result, the “secret of 
voluntary poverty is that it starts this process of redefining power as control (possessions, 
prestige, and even life itself) to understand power as love.”438 There is no real kenotic self-
emptying love without the choice and experience of a certain self-limitation. Kenosis requires 
that we discern, establish, and respect some limits.439  
The other three steps identified by McFague – the focus of one’s attention on the needs 
of others, which will end up developing a sort of “universal self” that will have an impact at 
both personal and public levels – point to the inclusion of other creatures into the sphere of 
human moral concern. As with the Pauline meta-norm of other-regard described above, 
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McFague thinks that the story of Woolman, Day, and Weil shows that it is a theologically 
warranted move to broaden the usual limits of human moral concern in order to include the 
rest of creation and to assert that nonhuman creatures should be counted as others worthy of 
moral concern.440 The universal self develops “as the line constituting one’s concern 
(compassion or empathy) moves from its narrow focus on the ego (and the one’s nearest and 
dearest) to reach out further and further until there is no life left: even a caterpillar counts.”441 
It is enhanced in us inasmuch it increases in us the sense of the self as composed of, embodied 
in, and dependent on, other beings, both human and nonhuman.442 Therefore, the movement 
from belief to action in dealing with ecological challenges demands that we go from a narrow, 
egotistic understanding of fulfillment of the subject – myself – to “an expanded inclusiveness of 
mutual flourishing that is only possible through the self-emptying of each subject in the dance 
of give-and-take that characterizes life at all stages – biological, human, cosmic, and divine.”443  
Therefore, kenosis implies that we not only enter the path of self-limitation, but also are 
able to widen the limits of our moral concern beyond the so-called human family, so as to value 
and care for the whole earth community. In other words, kenosis requires that we are willing to 
practice self-emptying love for the good and well-being of all others. In fact, although kenosis is 
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not a natural phenomenon the theme of dying to contribute to life beyond one’s own is 
certainly present in the way nature works; however it is only at the human level that this is 
conscious; “only with us can the pattern that we and all others necessarily participate in also 
become one that we embrace.”444  
c. Kenotic anthropology: asceticism and embodiment 
Along with highlighting the importance of discerning, establishing, and respecting some 
limits, and of widening the circle of our moral concern so as to include all members of the earth 
community, it is crucial to underscore that kenosis requires that these perspectives be practiced 
and translated into our daily lives. As mentioned, theology is concerned not only about 
orthodoxy, but it also aims for orthopraxis, so as to shape people’s imagination and the way 
believers portray and make practical sense of the principal notions and images of Christianity. 
Kenosis as an interpretation of imago Dei thus intends to inspire not only a change in the way 
we conceive of our role and place within creation, but also and equally important a conversion 
in our attitudes, practices, and lifestyle. In this sense, I believe that asceticism is a notion which 
can both group and encompass different practices and actions that, being inspired by Jesus' 
self-giving path, are in tune with the searching and exploration of more ecologically friendly 
ways of life.445  
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It is true that asceticism may be seen as a term laden with negative associations such as 
withdrawal from the world and repression, and that some may suspect that it encourages 
harmful practices for the body as well as an unfair appreciation of the latter. Nonetheless, it is 
also true that the voices calling for asceticism in our lives increasingly multiply. In this case, 
asceticism is broadly understood as different forms of self-restraint and austerity, as a 
necessary means to deal with the current ecological challenges. Sarah Coakley, for instance, 
distinguishes between a true asceticism and a false repression. She thinks that a revived, 
purged, and lived form of ascetical life is necessary, since it helps us discern and reorient all 
desires such as the desire to dominate, to subjugate, to consume, and own, as well as those 
good longings and instincts, such as the desire to love, for justice, empathy, and altruism and 
also a concern for the common good.446 In his presentation of Laudato Si’, John Zizioulas, 
Metropolitan of Pergamon, has also emphasized that we urgently need an ecological 
asceticism, for “the spirit and the ethos of asceticism can and must be adopted if our planet is 
to survive.”447 Along the same lines I believe that the term asceticism can not only be detached 
from negative associations, but it can also meaningfully encompass and link a large array of 
practices, attitudes, and efforts of people, who are currently exploring new and alternative 
lifestyles.448 
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In doing so, asceticism should not be reduced to only its historical concretion in the life 
of the monks at the dawn of religious life. It should not therefore be reduced to and exclusively 
associated with their religious practices relating to social withdrawal, restriction of food, 
regulation of sexuality, sleep deprivation, and the formation of religious community. Rather, 
asceticism is a much more widespread experience and practice, both nowadays and throughout 
history.449 Asceticism has been defined in different ways, and it is true that it is a hard task to 
advance a cross-cultural valid definition.450 Nonetheless, I believe that the approach provided 
by Richard Valantasis is not only meaningful, but also useful in order to embrace all those 
current practices and attitudes oriented toward the searching for and embodiment of new 
ways of life in the context of the ecological crisis. He defines asceticism as “performances 
within a dominant social environmental intended to inaugurate a new subjectivity, different 
social relations, and an alternative symbolic universe.”451 
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There are three crucial aspects in this definition, namely, performances, intention, and 
symbolic universe. As to performances, asceticism revolves around practice and embodiment. 
In other words, it has to do with doing differently, and not merely with a new way of conceiving 
of reality. While the early Christian monks developed a particular set of behaviors historically 
considered as ascetic, such as fasting and sleep deprivation, today's call for ecological 
asceticism raises the question about the type, sphere, and scope of performances that may be 
explored and embodied, so as to render visible and real an ecologically friendly lifestyle.452 
These performances can be related to our use of water, food, energy, land, and means of 
transportation, as well as to the styles and manners which guide our social interactions. They 
can also be related to our patterns of consumption and production, as well as to our choices for 
work, recreation, and living place. Since they are concrete actions, they are both communicable 
and imitable. Accordingly, a wide array of actions and attitudes can be adopted as a 
manifestation of ecological asceticism which aims at an ecologically friendly lifestyle.  
Secondly, it is precisely their intention that distinguishes these performances as ascetic. 
In this sense, no action, no matter its austerity or harshness, can be considered in itself as 
ascetic regardless of its purpose. Ascetic actions are not ends in themselves, but rather means 
toward a new subjectivity, different social relations, and an alternative symbolic universe. This 
is why asceticism is always a deliberate and voluntary performance. Valantasis asserts that 
“asceticism (…) aims to resist dominant givens. Asceticism constructs itself as alternative, 
perhaps subversively so, to a perceived or real dominant context (…) Asceticism always defines 
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itself as resistant or withdrawn from a perceived or real dominant context.”453 Ecological 
asceticism therefore intends to challenge the values, beliefs, and practices, which underlie the 
ecological crisis, such as the throw-away culture, on the one hand, and to foster, establish, and 
inaugurate new ways of life which may not only fruitfully deal with the current ecological 
challenges, but also meaningfully express the human dependency on, and belonging to the 
earth community, as well as the human care for other creatures’ flourishing and well-being. 
Therefore, the intention of these ascetic practices is not merely negative, in the sense of 
opposing and resisting a dominant culture or status quo, but it is also positive inasmuch as 
these practices point to opening up new perspectives for personal lifestyle and social 
interactions. This is why discernment is a key element within ecological asceticism.  
Finally, as the definition provided by Valantasis suggests, ascetic practices intend to 
create an alternative symbolic universe able to nurture, sustain, and legitimize them. The 
nascent new subjectivity and the alternative social arrangement, which stem from ascetic 
performances, certainly need legitimation. Accordingly, asceticism resists and defies a given 
dominant culture not only in the realm of practice, but also and equally important in the realm 
of ideas. Valantasis states that “the ascetical symbolic universe always operates in the presence 
of other universes, and, therefore, it is always consciously developed and maintained as an 
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opposing force.”454 A circular movement can be thus identified from practice to a new 
understanding of reality and vice-versa. They mutually justify and enhance each other. 455  
Drawing on this definition of asceticism, kenosis can be instrumental in dealing with the 
current ecological challenges, not only because it can inspire and elicit a particular set of 
practices, but also insofar as it offers them a theological legitimation. The interpretation of the 
imago Dei as kenosis can be a source of fruitful ascetic practices, which may resist and confront 
those values, beliefs, and attitudes that underlie the ecological crisis. The twofold movement of 
kenosis – self-limitation and self-giving love – operates at the three levels of the definition of 
asceticism. Understood through the lens of both Christology and the theology of creation, 
kenosis exhibits a particular set of actions, which are related to making room for others 
respecting their autonomy and integrity, to renounce the use of one’s own power and position 
in society exclusively for only one’s own benefit, to establish life-giving relationships, and to 
take the place of the one who serves and cares for the well-being and flourishing of all the 
members of the earth community. Jesus´ self-emptying and self-humbling path, as well as God’s 
kenosis in relation to creation, have the ability to prompt and guide ecological asceticism in its 
exploration and embodiment of a different way of doing things, namely, alternative ecologically 
friendly lifestyles. Kenosis also enables people to theologically justify and legitimate these 
actions on the basis of an understanding of humanity that takes its foundation in God´s self-
revelation in Jesus Christ. Thus, it helps theology to shape a symbolic universe able to explain 
and sustain ecological asceticism.  
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Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew I has been a prominent advocate of an ascetic ethos as 
a necessary human response to all problems originated by the present crisis.456 Indeed, it can 
be said that the absence of a true ascetic life is at the root of the challenges we face nowadays. 
Asceticism is one way of life that comes from the Christian heritage and that proves itself not 
only relevant but also currently vital for counteracting those attitudes and practices which are 
detrimental for the flourishing of the earth community as a whole. 
According to Bartholomew, asceticism is a suitable corrective for our culture of wasting, 
inasmuch as it counters selfishness and self-centeredness, and fosters our sense of gratitude 
and the rediscovery of beauty. Asceticism is accordingly a path toward freedom, a way of 
liberation; and “the ascetic is the one who is free, uncontrolled by attitudes that abuse the 
world, uncompelled by ways that use the world, characterized by self-control and by the ability 
to say ‘no’ or ‘enough.’ It [the ascetic way] is moving away from what we want as individuals to 
what the world needs as a whole. It is valuing everything for itself, and not simply for ourselves. 
It is regaining a sense of wonder and being filled with a sense of goodness.”457 Asceticism is 
therefore always a voluntary and deliberate path, which stems from an honest reflection on 
and a radical reversal of our attitudes and practices. In this sense, asceticism is not a flight from 
society and the world, but rather as Bartholomew asserts, is “a communal attitude of mind and 
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a way of life that lead to the respectful use, not abuse, of material goods.”458 It is more 
concerned with engagement with, and political and social action in, the world than with flight 
from it, so as to nurture a religious life. It implies that one moves from only one’s needs and 
desires, to what the earth community requires as a whole. An ascetic ethos hence brings about 
the widening of limits of our moral concern in order to include and care for the well-being and 
flourishing of all creatures.  
Although Bartholomew does not directly associate kenosis with asceticism, he asserts 
that the latter is tightly related to Jesus’ cross and the call to all disciples to carry their crosses. 
He asserts that “the cross is the singular, ultimate, and absolute solution to the ecological crisis. 
The cross reminds us of the reality of human failure and of the need for a cosmic repentance. In 
order to alter our attitudes and lifestyles, what is required is nothing less than a radical reversal 
of our perspectives and practices.”459 He proposes the cross as the guiding symbol for the 
needed transformation of minds and practices so as to effectively deal with the ecological crisis. 
Therefore, I believe that it is a warranted move to connect asceticism with kenosis. The latter 
raises the concept of asceticism, which is able to encompass all current attitudes and 
performances which aim to explore and inaugurate alternative modes of life that not only take 
into account our dependence on and belonging to the earth community, but also are concrete 
expressions of our caring for the whole of the earth.  
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Ascetic ethos is for all humans, since self-limitation and self-giving is a way of loving; 
they are the expression of love for all humanity and for all creatures. It is not an invitation to 
look toward the past and just imitate what the monks at the dawn of religious life did. Rather, it 
is a call to translate into daily life what kenosis may inspire and elicit in us as a transformation 
of the way we conceive of our role and place within creation, and as a modification of our 
practices and attitudes toward all the members of the earth community, other humans 
included. I subscribe to what Kallistos Ware asserts about asceticism, which is “universal in its 
scope – not an elite enterprise but a vocation for all. It is not a curious aberration, distorting our 
personhood, but it reveals to us our own true nature (…) without asceticism none of us is 
authentically human.”460 Imago Dei as kenosis expresses indeed what we are and what we are 
called to be as God’s image-bearers. In the context of the ecological crisis, an ascetic ethos is 
certainly part of what kenosis demands from us, so as to allow this image to be progressively 
imprinted in us by the Spirit.  
 
B) Social Ecology: the Civilization of Poverty 
Renewing therefore theological anthropology within the context of the ecological crisis, 
along with making possible ecological conversion at the personal level requires that we are able 
to discern, establish, and respect certain limits, are capable of widening the circle of our moral 
concern in order to include all members of the earth community and care for them, and finally 
are willing to explore and embody an ascetic ethos translating into daily life the practices and 
ways of living which kenosis as an ecological image inspires and elicits in us. Nonetheless, as 
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Laudato Si’ recalls “the ecological conversion needed to bring about lasting change is also a 
community conversion.”461 Indeed there will be no real transformation of the way we inhabit 
the world if we do not revise our social interactions, and the values and attitudes which nurture 
and command the bond between us. The way in which social interaction is conceived of, 
organized, and embodied by individuals certainly pertains to any ecological analysis of human 
existence. It has been well demonstrated as well that the social interaction between human 
beings affects and influences the nature-humanity relationship. It is clear that the exploitative 
practices vis-à-vis nature, are just an extension or expression of a pattern of domination among 
humans, and that environmental problems and their consequences often touch the poorest 
among the poor. Hence, tackling environmental challenges implies addressing social issues as 
well. Likewise, dealing with social inequalities and injustices requires taking into account 
environmental problems. This is something that Catholic social teaching has consistently 
asserted and that the last papal encyclical emphasizes as it maintains that “a true ecological 
approach always becomes a social approach; it must integrate questions of justice in debates 
on the environment, so as to hear both the cry of the earth and the cry of the poor.”462 As the 
first chapter has shown it is a false dilemma thus to think that we need to choose between 
prioritizing environmental challenges or social inequality and injustices. Dealing with the former 
necessarily entails dealing with the latter.  
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1. The search for notions and images 
The social dimension of ecology is rendered visible in different topics such as forced 
migration for environmental causes, city planning, world hunger and the production and 
distribution of food, production and access to drinking water, energy generation and use, the 
management of waste, models of production and consumption, and security and health in 
relation to dangerous diseases. Accordingly, these different examples raise the question about 
a suitable theological narrative able to inspire and nurture social transformation. In the same 
way that the reflection on the notion of limit and the ascetic ethos helps us translate into daily 
life the implications of kenosis for personal ecology, theology needs to find some overarching 
images or concepts capable not only of providing concrete content for social renewal, but also 
of depicting and imagining the way that an ecologically friendly social interaction looks. Put 
differently, while kenosis – the movement of self-limitation and self-giving love – may well be 
applied to personal ecology through both deliberately discerning, establishing, and keeping 
some limits, as well as exploring and embodying an ascetic ethos, theology has to provide some 
notions and images which are the translation of kenosis and its consequences into social life. In 
order to be useful and fruitful these notions and images have to be able to clearly show the 
path and goal of the needed social transformation toward a society with an ecologically friendly 
lifestyle, as well as to shape and trigger our imagination in order to picture alternative 
ecologically mindful ways of interacting among us and of our inhabiting the world. 
There are certainly already some notions and images which have been proposed 
nowadays as responses to the ecological crisis. They aim to voice new modes of life, different to 
those which have been at the root of the challenges we face today, and to guide accordingly 
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the social transformation that we need if we want to seriously take into account, and 
successfully deal with the current crisis. One of these notions recently has been “another world 
is possible” which is the motto of the World Social Forum. The latter is an open space – as the 
forum defines itself – which gathers non-partisan and non-governmental organizations, and 
motivates a decentralized debate, reflection, proposals-building, experiences-exchange, and 
networking in order to put in place concrete actions toward a more solidary, democratic, and 
fair world, as an alternative to neoliberalism. Accordingly, the World Social Forum – which 
meets annually since 2001, usually in parallel to the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting – 
conceives of itself as a conscious exploration of and searching for new ways of social interaction 
and life, opposing the social and environmental harm which stems from the pursuit of a global 
neoliberalist system. This is why the Forum asserts that we especially have to establish 
alternative modes of production and consumption, since another world is not only possible but 
in the current circumstances is also rather something needed.  
Another example of notions and images that intend at present to confront the global 
economic system and offer alternatives ways of living is the worldwide movement of fair trade. 
With a rich and diverse history depending on countries which span through decades, this social 
movement aims to help producers in developing countries achieve better trading conditions, 
and to promote sustainability. This last goal relates not only to care for the environment within 
the production and distribution process, but also to respect for human rights and the 
compliance with basic standards of working conditions, such as a fair wage. As a result, the 
movement seeks to promote greater equity in international trading markets, along with 
securing the rights of marginalized producers and workers in developing countries. The social 
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movement for fair trade encompasses a large array of associations and NGOs as well as 
including different organizations which certify the products that respect the principles of fair 
trade in their production and distribution processes. Despite the inevitable criticism that both 
the World Social Forum and the fair trade movement have raised, they serve to illustrate the 
current searching for notions and images that may inspire us in putting into practice alternative 
lifestyles, and may indicate the goal of social transformation. 
Nonetheless, I believe that these two examples fall short in providing an overarching 
image strong enough to guide and shape the needed revision of our social interactions and 
ways of life. The motto “another world is possible” underscores both the urgency of finding 
alternative lifestyles and the hope that it is possible, but it does not offer a clear content and a 
picture of how this new world should look like, aside from the fact that it should be different 
from the one shaped by neoliberalist economy, whereas the fair trade movement is not able to 
sustain a global social transformation inasmuch as it is focused on and restricted to only one 
aspect (though a very important one), of our social interactions, namely, trading. As a result, 
neither of the two meets simultaneously the requirements of providing specific content for the 
goal and the path of social transformation, and of encompassing all nuances and aspects of 
human life within their thrust toward a new world. 
2. The civilization of poverty: Ignacio Ellacuría’s legacy 
Accordingly, I believe that the notion of “the civilization of poverty” coined and 
proposed by Ignacio Ellacuría S.J. – philosopher and theologian of liberation –463 can be a great 
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and relevant source of inspiration nowadays. It not only provides concrete content for social 
transformation that is not a mere call for renewal, but also can function as an overarching 
image or horizon which helps us to recognize the interconnection between social and 
environmental challenges, and offers a special and well delineated goal to be attained if we are 
to effectively respond to the ecological crisis. “The civilization of poverty” is a notion that is 
found within Ellacuría’s mature writings, and which he developed and deepened over the last 
seven years of his life, before his assassination in 1989. Although he does not strongly associate 
this notion with the ecological crisis – which at that time was still in the process of getting 
global acknowledgement – I believe that the “civilization of poverty” is a sound and timely way 
of expressing the consequences and implications of kenosis for social ecology. In this sense, it 
captures well that which kenosis as an ecological image can contribute to the transformation of 
our social interactions and the establishment of a social ecologically friendly lifestyle. The 
civilization of poverty helps to build a theological narrative of self-limitation and self-giving love, 
and meaningfully translates into daily life the change of minds, attitudes, and practices which 
kenosis can advance and substantiate within social ecology. 
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 Ellacuría makes reference to the notion of civilization of poverty in four articles, which 
span from 1982 to 1989.464 Although, he does not systematically define the civilization of 
poverty, he does provide sufficient elements and insights which allow us to understand what he 
conveys by this notion, and the main features of this civilization. Ellacuría was not only aware of 
the novelty of this concept, but he also thought that it was the necessary response to the evil 
consequences of, and the social inequality produced by capitalist civilization.465 The civilization 
of poverty indeed has to be understood as dialectically opposed and in response to the 
civilization of wealth. Ellacuría aims to emphasize through the use of the notion of poverty the 
dialectical relationship between wealth and poverty, and not poverty in itself, for “in a world 
sinfully shaped by the dynamism of capital and wealth, it is necessary to stir up a different 
dynamism that will overcome it salvifically.”466 Accordingly, the civilization of poverty cannot be 
rightly understood if it is disconnected from the civilization of wealth, which is actually its 
opposite. The former, therefore, as a horizon and goal, seeks not merely the improvement or 
tweaking of the latter, but rather its overcoming. For the civilization of wealth is now causing 
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constantly greater and graver ills, so “what must be favored is not just its correction but its 
replacement by something better, by its contrary – that is, by a civilization of poverty.”467  
 It is worth citing at length Ellacuría’s appreciation of the civilization of wealth:  
“the civilization of wealth and of capital is the one that, in the final analysis, 
proposes the private accumulation of the greatest possible capital on the part of 
individual, groups, multinationals, states, or groups of states, as the fundamental 
basis of development. Likewise, the possessive accumulation– whether by 
individuals or families – of the greatest possible degree of wealth, serves as the 
fundamental basis for their own security and for the possibility of ever growing 
consumption as the basis for their own happiness.”468  
What ultimately drives the civilization of wealth is therefore the accumulation of riches. 
This is the leading principle which this civilization proposes for the unfolding of history that 
consequently becomes the goal and the horizon of individuals and families’ lives. Ellacuría 
thinks that the omnipresent and all-pervasive search for wealth has clearly become a principle 
of dehumanization with harmful and negative consequences for the relationship between 
countries and people, for the daily life of millions of individuals, and certainly also for the 
relationship between humanity and nature. This is not to deny that the capitalist system has 
brought benefits to humanity such as scientific and technical development that should be 
preserved and furthered, but rather to recognize that it has produced greater evils and that the 
self-correction processes that the civilization of wealth has are not sufficient to reverse its 
destructive course. The civilization of wealth, on the one hand, has proven itself as unable to 
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meet people’s basic needs, and on the other hand, it has increased the breach both between 
rich countries and people, and their poor counterparts.  
The civilization of wealth therefore has to be judged by its real implications. Ellacuría 
offers two images for exposing these consequences. The first one is the image of an inverted 
mirror. He asserts that the poor countries and people are like an inverted mirror in which the 
first world sees its deepest truth, the one that it is trying to hide or disguise. The second one is 
the stool test. The living conditions within the poor countries and the existence of crucified 
people shows the true state of the health of the first world. This is what appears in the stool 
examination of the first world.469 Although Ellacuría emphasizes mainly the exploitation among 
people and the poor living conditions created by the civilization of wealth, he does underline 
the harm and aggression which this civilization entails for nature. The latter should not be seen 
merely as raw material or a place to invest. 
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Along with the factual incapacity to meet people's basic needs and the increasing of the 
distance between rich and poor within societies and the world, the civilization of wealth entails 
a dehumanizing dynamic which, having wealth as the supreme value, suffocates humanities 
deepest capacities, creativity, and solidarity. Ellacuría thinks that this pull toward a profound 
dehumanization manifests itself, for instance, in  
“abusive and/or superficial and alienating ways of seeking one´s own security and 
happiness by means of private accumulation, of consumption, and of 
entertainment; submission to the laws of the consumer market promoted by 
advertising – in effect, sheer propaganda – in every kind of activity, including the 
cultural; and a manifest lack of solidarity in the individual, the family, and the state 
with regard to other individuals, families, or states.”470  
This historical dynamic of competitive individualism can thus be considered as a moral 
and humanistic failure.471 This is why Ellacuría insisted on the idea that history needs to be 
turned back, subverted, and sent in a different direction.472 
One of the key arguments which Ellacuría put forward to dismiss the civilization of 
wealth is that it is not universalizable. Drawing on the Kantian categorical imperative, which 
states that people should act in such a way that they could desire that the maxim of their action 
would become a universal law – and therefore the goodness of any given action is directly 
related to the possibility being universally performed – Ellacuría declares the immorality of the 
civilization of wealth. In fact, the lifestyle proposed by the latter cannot be materially 
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universalized, and even if this was possible, it would not be desirable. On the one hand, “there 
are not enough resources on earth today to let all countries achieve the same level of 
production and consumption as that of the countries called wealthy,” and, on the other hand, 
the civilization of wealth “implies a maximum degree of a lack of solidarity with the greater part 
of human beings and of peoples of the world, especially with those most in need.”473 Ellacuría 
goes on to the point of calling this civilization anti-Christian, and contrary to the Christian 
utopia and hope, namely, the kingdom of God.474 Accordingly, he believes that the reservations 
in the New Testament regarding wealth, power, and worldly honors, “along with its emphatic 
proclamation of poverty, service, and the humiliation of the cross, can and should be translated 
into the realm of the visible and the social,”475 not only at the personal level, but also as a 
model for society. The civilization of wealth must be therefore replaced and overcome by the 
civilization of poverty, which is in tune with Jesus' message, and more in accord with the 
exigencies and dynamisms of the Reign of God.  
 The Christian utopia, in fact, advocates for and animates a historical realization of a new 
humanity and a new earth, which includes a social, political, economic, and cultural 
transformation of reality.476 It is in this context that Ellacuría introduces the notion of the 
“civilization of poverty,” which is certainly more akin to the Christian utopia than the civilization 
of wealth. The new order has to be based on the fundamental New Testament principle “that 
all might have life and have it more abundantly” (John 10:10).477 This is not to say that what the 
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fullness of life consists in is clear, or that the path toward it is unambiguously delineated, 
nonetheless what is clear is that the civilization of wealth is not going historically in that 
direction.  
 It is worth citing at length Ellacuría’s definition of the civilization of poverty,478 which 
“founded on a materialist humanism transformed by Christian light and inspiration, 
rejects the accumulation of capital as the engine of history and the possession and 
enjoyment of wealth as the principle of humanization. It makes the universal 
satisfaction of basic needs the principle of development and the growth of shared 
solidarity the foundation of humanization.”479  
Three elements can be identified in this definition. First of all, as mentioned, Ellacuría 
counterpoises the civilization of poverty to the civilization of wealth in both its searching for 
richness as what ultimately drives history, and the possession and enjoyment of wealth as the 
principle of humanization. The civilization of poverty does not aim for universal pauperization, 
but rather it looks for the establishment of a different global project for humanity, a different 
set of values to configure the world, in which the basic values of the Gospel and of the Kingdom 
of God are realized. Thus, it has to do with the overcoming of the current state of things and 
not merely with the improvement of what does not work within the civilization of wealth. The 
idea that the civilization of poverty should be founded on a materialist humanism transformed 
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by Christian light and inspiration, points to unveiling the harmful consequences of the economic 
materialism already verifiable in history, and to proposing as the dynamizing principle of history 
“the dignifying of work, of work that will have as its principal object not the production of 
capital but the perfecting of the human being.”480 In fact, Ellacuría associates the civilization of 
poverty, in a more sociological perspective and in light with John Paul II’s encyclical Laborem 
Exercens, with the establishment of a civilization of work.481  
 This drives us to the second element of Ellacuría’s definition of the civilization of 
poverty, which unlike the civilization of wealth does not aim at the greatest accumulation of 
richness as the engine of history, but rather at the universal satisfaction of basic needs. 
Although aware that which may be considered as basic need may vary among different 
cultures, Ellacuria believes that it suffices to look at the conditions of extreme poverty or 
destitution to concur with the identification of these basic needs as “proper nourishment, 
minimal housing, basic healthcare, primary education, sufficient employment, and so forth.”482 
Having the universal satisfaction of basic needs as its principle of development, the civilization 
of poverty aims for a state of affairs which guarantees “the freedom of personal choices, and an 
environment of personal and community creativity that permits the emergence of new forms of 
life and culture, new relationships with nature, with others, with oneself, and with God.”483 In 
other words, the civilization of poverty sets the permanent and secure satisfaction of basic 
needs of all humanity as an essential goal of history and a sine qua non for any sort of 
development, however, once this is achieved, it makes the free development, of the individual 
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and of peoples the main driving force of history. Accordingly, it does not tend toward the 
uniformization of cultures and societies – as the civilization of wealth does through the global 
imposition of the laws of the economic marketplace to all human spheres – but it rather aspire 
both to liberate human creativity, and to respect and develop the entire wealth of peoples.  
 The third element of Ellacuría’s definition of the civilization of poverty is that this 
civilization proposes as its humanizing principle not the possession and enjoyment of wealth, 
but rather the growth of shared solidarity.484 While the civilization of wealth has put in place a 
dynamic of closed and competitive individualism, which is certainly detrimental not only for 
humans but for the entire world, the civilization of poverty fosters and sustains a “civilization of 
austerity, of sharing, of communication of goods and lives, of human creativity, as the 
blossoming of an inward grace.”485 In this sense, the civilization of poverty stimulates the 
cultivation of essential virtues such as selflessness, self-giving, and the sharing of one's own 
things. The civilization of wealth has to be overcome, therefore, not only because it entails 
exploitation among people, and destruction vis-a-vis nature, but also and especially because it 
nurtures a dehumanizing dynamic, which is at the antipodes of the values of Jesus' 
proclamation of the Kingdom of God. 
 It should be clear by now that the use of the word “civilization” is meant to convey a 
general state of things, a general order for living, with a specific dynamism which not only 
configures and unites the different aspects of daily life, but also guides its development. 
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Therefore, it does not refer only to the economic dimension of our social interaction. As 
civilization, thus, it encompasses all spheres of people's life, namely, economic, social, political, 
and cultural. At the beginning, Ellacuria thought to use the word culture instead of civilization 
but, being told that 'culture of poverty' had a pejorative connotation within anthropological 
sciences, he ultimately chose the concept of civilization.486 As to the notion of poverty, in light 
of the distinctions made by the Latin-American bishops at Medellín, Ellacuría understood it in 
various senses:487 1) as real poverty, defined as the lack of those goods required to satisfy the 
most basic needs of human beings; 2) as spiritual openness to God and one of the evangelical 
counsels of perfection; and 3) as solidarity with the poor and commitment to their struggle for 
justice. While real poverty is a product of the civilization of wealth, and it has to be addressed 
and overcome, the other two meanings have a positive sense, and they are closely intertwined 
within Ellacuria's concept of the civilization of poverty. The latter has indeed become a 
historical necessity for overcoming the harm caused by the civilization of wealth, and 
promoting higher forms of humanity. Poverty can be assumed actively and willingly as a use 
and distribution of the goods of the earth that it makes it possible for everyone to have access 
to material and cultural means to have a truly human life. This poverty, according to Ellacuría, 
“is what really gives space to the spirit, which will no longer be drowned by the desire to have 
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more than other, by the lustful longing to have all sorts of superfluities, when most of humanity 
lacks what is most necessary.”488 
 As to the sources of the idea of the civilization of poverty, it is worth noting that 
Ellacuría draws, in addition to the historical Jesus presented by the Gospels, on the meditation 
of the two standards of the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises.489 In this meditation Saint Ignatius 
introduces two roads to which all people are confronted in their life. The first one is the path 
that leads to damnation and to the opposite of fullness of life. It has three steps, starting from 
coveting of riches, then, to attaining the empty honors of the world, and finally to overweening 
pride, which leads to all other vices.490 The second path, the one that guides to fulfillment and 
salvation, is also marked by three steps, namely, poverty, the, desire for reproaches or 
contempt, and finally humility. These three steps lead to all other virtues. Saint Ignatius, 
therefore, dialectically counterpoises three pairs: poverty as opposed to riches; insults or 
contempt as opposed to the honor of this world; humility as opposed to pride.491 Ellacuría 
extends and applies to the social order what Saint Ignatius proposes for individuals. While the 
path that starts with actual poverty leads to integral humanization, the one that begins with 
coveting riches ends with the opposite total dehumanization. In the same way, Ellacuría 
dialectically counterpoises the civilization of wealth and the civilization of poverty. The latter 
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entails a humanizing dynamic, which heals and liberates people from the harm caused by the 
civilization of wealth. 
 Ellacuría emphasizes that it is vital that we undertake the overcoming of the civilization 
of wealth. On the one hand, we need “to create economic, political, and cultural models that 
can enable a civilization of labor to replace a civilization of capital.”492 On the other hand, it is 
crucial to allow a fundamental characteristic of the civilization of poverty to grow positively 
stronger, in contrast to the closed and competitive individualism of the society of wealth.493 We 
are therefore called to participate in this overcoming of the civilization of wealth, and of its 
detrimental consequences, in order to move toward a civilization of poverty; a general state of 
things, a global way of living and interaction which is in tune with Christian utopia. 
 Although Ellacuría does not strongly associate the concept of the civilization of poverty 
with the ecological crisis, it is clear that they are related. Theologian Martin Maier, for instance, 
has explicitly connected the notion of “civilization of poverty” to the environmental challenges 
we face nowadays. He thinks that Ellacuría anticipates the idea of global common goods, which 
has become very important in contemporary debates over development.494 In fact, Ellacuría 
asserts that “the great benefits of nature – the air, the seas and beaches, the mountains, and 
forests, the rivers and lakes, in general all the natural resources for production, use and 
enjoyment – need not be privately appropriated by any individual person, group, or nation, and 
in fact they are the grand medium of communication and common living.”495 On this point, 
Ellacuría is totally in tune with Catholic social teaching and its principles of the universal 
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destination of common goods and the social responsibility of private property, which have to 
serve the poor first and foremost.496 Moreover, inasmuch as the civilization of poverty makes 
the universal satisfaction of basic needs the principle of development, it can be identified as 
one of the resources to satisfactorily deal with the ecological crisis, especially in the context of 
the recognition of the natural environment as a collective good, and patrimony of all humanity 
and responsibility of everyone.497 As a result, I believe that it is a theologically warranted move 
to connect the concept of the “civilization of poverty” and its implications with the social 
dimension of ecology, which in turn makes evident the tightly relation between environmental 
and social challenges. 
3. Kenosis and the civilization of poverty 
From the previous analysis, I think that it is manifest that the concept of the “civilization 
of poverty” translates into the social level what kenosis may inspire and suggest for our social 
interaction. It is not that this concept exhausts everything that kenosis implies for our social 
transformation, but it is undeniably meaningful in this respect. On the one hand, it aims at a 
new configuration of social life able to eradicate any kind of exclusion and discrimination, which 
positively means to foster and promote those dynamics that nurture the wellbeing and 
fulfillment of all. The civilization of poverty in fact sets the growth of shared solidarity as the 
foundation of humanization. On the other hand, as mentioned, the notion of poverty does not 
point to universal pauperization, but rather it aims at the establishment of a different set of 
values to configure the world, in which the damaging consequences of the civilization of wealth 
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can be resisted and counteracted. In this sense, I believe that the civilization of poverty is 
consistent with Jesus’ kenosis; not for nothing Phil 2:5-11 is commonly associated with 2 Cor 8:9 
which says that our Lord Jesus Christ, though he was rich, yet for your sakes became poor, so 
that by his poverty you might become rich. Poverty is not an end in itself, but it rather pursues 
the enrichment of others. This is what Jesus intends by taking the role and place of a slave – 
freely assuming the place of a person with no advantages, rights or 
privileges, without claiming any special treatment. Jesus’ kenosis and voluntary poverty is not a 
depersonalizing process, but is rather the path toward full and abundant life for all. Along the 
same lines, the civilization of poverty is instrumental for building a theological narrative of self-
limitation and self-giving love, which can guide the needed transformation of minds, attitudes, 
and practice toward an ecologically friendly social interaction. 
Consequently, the civilization of poverty is a meaningful horizon which helps us to 
recognize the tight connection between social and environmental injustice, and provides a clear 
goal to be attained if we are to deal effectively with the ecological crisis, namely, the universal 
satisfaction of basic needs. The manifestations of the ecological crisis presented in the first 
chapter – water, waste, migration, and food – accentuate the pertinent and relevant character 
of the civilization of poverty inasmuch as it focuses on securing that all human beings can see 
their basic needs met.498 It is in light of Jesus’ kenosis that the civilization of poverty acquires its 
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deepest meaning and becomes a suitable concept for expressing the consequences of this 
downward mobility within the social realm. What Ellacuría proposes through this notion 
strongly resonates with what Philippians 2 asserts about Jesus.  
If ecological conversion has to happen also at the social level, theology needs not only 
inspiring ways of conceiving of our social interaction, but also images or concepts that may 
function as beacons so as to shed light upon our discernment, and portray what an ecological 
friendly social interaction would look like. If we look at the theme of human work, for instance, 
we note that the civilization of poverty, inasmuch as it advocates for an economy based on real 
work and not on mere financial speculation, is totally in tune with what Laudato Si´ asserts 
about the current necessity of protecting employment. Pope Francis reminds us that any 
approach to integral ecology has to take account of the value of labor. According to him work 
should not be led merely by the search for wealth, but it should rather be the setting for rich 
personal growth, “where many aspects of life enter into play: creativity, planning for the future, 
developing our talents, living out our values, relating to others, giving glory to God.”499 The 
civilization of poverty, therefore, proves itself as a suitable overarching image for driving the 
needed social transformation. It certainly helps theology to voice what kenosis – as an 
ecological image – means for our social interaction and life. 
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C) Environmental Ecology: Cosmic Humility 
Having shown how kenosis is an inspiring, timely, and meaningful ecological image for 
personal and social ecology, I turn now to environmental ecology. As mentioned, this ecological 
dimension is by far the one that has been largely deepened and studied, to the extent that 
some erroneously consider the terms of ecology and environment as synonymous. The 
theological challenge again is to identify and draw upon images and notions which can guide 
not only an ecologically friendly representation of the relationship between humanity and other 
creatures, but also a way of living oriented toward the wellbeing, flourishing, and fulfillment of 
the entire earth community. In this last part, I aim to revise the notions of steward and 
stewardship which have become a sort of default position for many theologians when 
interpreting the imago Dei, and speaking of the role and place of human beings vis-à-vis other 
creatures. Despite the fact that this notion has been instrumental for connecting theological 
reflection with the ecological challenges, it has drawbacks as well, especially for what it does 
not say or it seems to imply. Accordingly, I believe that kenosis works as a suitable corrective for 
and a complement to the notion of stewardship. The former enables theology both to highlight 
the best of the latter, and to clear up its inherent ambiguity and put into words what it does not 
say. In this sense, after tracing the emergence of this notion within recent theological 
reflection, its importance for linking Christian faith to environmental challenges, and its 
advantages and downsides, I will concentrate on showing how kenosis corrects the notion of 
stewardship, heightens what is good in it, and provides other insights which serve as a 
significant complement for it in portraying the relationship between humanity and other 
creatures.  I will finish this part by spelling out, through the lens of kenosis, the role and place of 
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human beings within the earth community. The main goal is to prove the fruitfulness of kenosis 
as an anthropological and ecological image. 
1. Imago Dei as stewardship 
In the last decades, theology has been increasingly performing the double task which 
the ecological crisis requires of it. On the one hand, it has been raising critiques that stem from 
Christian faith toward the values, practices, and lifestyle that underlie the current challenges. 
On the other hand, it has been undertaking the needed ecological reform of Christianity which 
the crisis shows as inevitable. Hence, one of the important tasks has been the search for new 
and inspiring root metaphors able to portray both the God-creation relationship (divine agency) 
and the link between human beings and the rest of creation – their role and place – on the one 
hand, and to stimulate ecologically friendly thoughts and deeds, on the other hand. Many are 
the images and notions that have been proposed and explored in this respect, such as 
caretakers, guardians, priests of creation, earthkeepers, co-creators, and stewards. All these 
images certainly disclose a particular understanding of divine agency, the purpose of creation, 
the relationships between humanity and its Creator, and between humanity and the rest of the 
earth community. 
The notion of stewardship has attracted greater consensus – more than other images 
and concepts – when depicting the role and place of human beings which God has assigned to 
them vis-à-vis other creatures. It has been indeed widely used within Christianity, and the 
Catholic magisterium and theology constantly refer to it to express the human vocation and 
divine call that human beings must exercise within creation. They are called to be responsible 
stewards of creation who are accountable before God for their stewardship. 
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a. The notion of steward within the Catholic magisterium 
The notion of stewardship is being frequently used in Catholic theology. The document 
of the International Theological Commission about the interpretation of the imago Dei, for 
instance, takes it as one of its overarching images, the other being communion.500 The 
commission asserts that responsible stewardship is one of the great strands out of which the 
fabric of the doctrine of the imago Dei is woven. Human beings exercise their role of stewards 
of the created world by way of participation in the divine rule, and therefore they are always 
subject to it and accountable before God. The document enumerates three ways through which 
humanity performs this entrusted stewardship, namely, “by gaining scientific understanding of 
the universe, by caring responsibly for the natural world (including animals and the 
environment), and by guarding their own biological integrity.”501 Drawing on the interpretation 
of the imago Dei in Gaudium et Spes no. 34, the document states that the concept of 
humanity’s rule or sovereignty plays an important role in Christian theology. God has appointed 
human beings as God’s stewards in the manner of the master in the Gospel parables. 
Accordingly, the document asserts that humanity, which is “the only creature willed expressly 
by God for his own sake occupies a unique place at the summit of visible creation (Gen. 1:26; 
2:20; Ps 8:6-7, Wisdom 9:2-3).”502 
In the same way, the Catechism draws on the notion of stewardship both for explaining 
the meaning of the imago Dei and for representing the relationship between humanity and 
other creatures. It says that it is God’s plan that human beings have the vocation of subduing 
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the earth as stewards of God. In fact, “God calls man and woman, made in the image of the 
Creator ‘who loves everything that exists’, to share in his providence toward other creatures; 
hence their responsibility for the world God has entrusted to them.”503 Speaking of the 
universal destination and private ownership of goods, the Catechism states that the earth and 
its resources have been entrusted to the stewardship of humanity, which aims at the common 
good and the universal satisfaction of basic needs.504 Animals as well are under the governance 
of human beings. They may be used for food and clothing, and to serve the just satisfaction of 
human needs. However, humanity must show them kindness.505 When it comes to define 
human vocation and task within creation, the Catechism therefore advances the notion of 
stewardship. 
The magisterium of the last three popes has brought the image of the steward to the 
fore in order to characterize the role and place of humanity within the earth community. John 
Paul II – who led and supervised the writing of the Catechism – also makes use of this notion for 
describing the calling that God makes to humanity vis-à-vis other creatures. In a general 
audience, entitled “God made man the steward of creation,” he asserts that human beings are 
stewards of God’s kingdom, who are called to continue the Creator’s work, a work of life and 
peace.506 Humanity must exercise this task with wisdom and love, and rule the world in holiness 
and righteousness. Recalling the necessity of ecological conversion, John Paul II states that the 
current crisis can be explained by the fact that human beings are no longer Creator’s stewards, 
but have become autonomous despots. They have failed to fulfill their role of stewards 
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inasmuch as they have not aimed at making the existence of creatures more dignified, at 
protecting the fundamental good of life in all its manifestations, and at preparing for future 
generations an environment more in conformity with the Creator’s plan.507 In a joint 
declaration with Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew I, John Paul II comes again to this idea and 
expresses that at the root of the social and environmental crisis lies human betrayal of the 
mandate God has given us: “to be stewards called to collaborate with God in watching over 
creation in holiness and wisdom.”508 In this sense, the crisis reminds us that human beings have 
not been entrusted with unlimited power over creation, but rather they are only stewards of 
the common heritage.509 Although the message that John Paul II issued in 1990 for the 
celebration of the world day of peace – “Peace with God the Creator, Peace with all of 
Creation” – does not contain the notions of steward or stewardship, but it does display the 
same concept or understanding of the role and place of humanity within the earth community. 
It says that human beings – who have been made in the image of God – have to exercise their 
dominion over the earth with wisdom and love. God entrusted the whole of creation to 
humanity.510 In different times and contexts, therefore, John Paul II has drawn on the notions of 
steward and stewardship for interpreting the imago Dei and depicting the relationship between 
human beings and other creatures. 
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Benedict XVI has also used the image of the steward for characterizing the calling that 
God has made to humanity. In his encyclical “Caritas in Veritate,” he reminds us that human 
beings are responsible for the whole of creation, and they legitimately exercise a “responsible 
stewardship over nature, in order to protect it, to enjoy its fruits and to cultivate it in new ways, 
with the assistance of advanced technologies, so that it can worthily accommodate and feed 
the world’s population.” Human stewardship, in this sense, aims at the protection of the entire 
earth community, and the right satisfaction of human basic needs.511 Benedict XVI returns to 
the same ideas in his message for the celebration of the World Day of Peace in 2008 – “The 
Human Family, a Community of Peace” – which asserts that human stewardship over creation 
must mirror the creative love of God, and that in order to be effective it needs dialogue and 
cooperation from all nations.512 Two years later, in the context of the same celebration, 
Benedict XVI issued a new message – “If You Want to Cultivate Peace, Protect Creation” – 
which affirms that humanity has the duty to exercise responsible stewardship over creation, to 
care for it and to cultivate it. According to this message, to be stewards of God is what it means 
to be created in the image of God and called to have dominion over creation. Unfortunately, 
many people in different countries and areas of our planet are experiencing increased hardship 
precisely because of the negligence of many others to exercise responsible stewardship over 
creation.513 The message emphasizes that this role of a steward and administrator with 
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responsibility over creation, is a role which human beings must certainly not abuse, but also 
one which they may not abdicate.514 Therefore, Pope Benedict stays within the same semantic 
field as Pope John Paul II – especially with the image of the steward – when it comes to explain 
what it means to be God's image-bearers and the implications of that for the relationship 
between humanity and other creatures. 
Pope Francis in turn has also employed the notions of steward and stewardship in order 
to portray the task of human beings within creation. In his first apostolic exhortation – 
“Evangelii Gaudium” – he states that human beings are not only the beneficiaries but also the 
stewards of other creatures.515 It is worth noting that the word “steward” is usually translated 
into Spanish as “administrador.” However, in the Spanish version of this exhortation the word 
used is “custodio” which can be literally translated into English as “custodian.” The two words 
certainly have different meanings and overtones. The French version draws on the notion of 
“gardien de la création,” which is closer to custodian than to steward.  
Francis returns again to the image of a steward both in the letter he issued in 2015 for 
the establishment of September 1st as the world day of prayer for the care of creation, joining 
the custom of the Orthodox Church, and in the message delivered on the celebration of this day 
one year later.516 In these two texts again the concepts used in English, Spanish, and French are 
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not the same, namely, “steward,” “custodio,” and “gardien” respectively, which have different 
meanings and connotations. Francis believes that this day of prayer for the care of creation will 
be a fitting opportunity for communities and believers to “reaffirm their personal vocation to 
be stewards of creation, to thank God for the wonderful handiwork which he has entrusted to 
our care, and to implore his help for the protection of creation as well as his pardon for the sins 
committed against the world in which we live.”517 
In his last encyclical – Laudato Si’ – Pope Francis gets fully into the theological reflection 
on ecology. Although the text focuses primarily on an ethics of care and insists on our duty of 
protecting our common home, it does propose the notion of steward when it comes to describe 
the role and place of humanity within the earth community. Criticizing excessive modern 
anthropocentrism, which deifies the technocratic paradigm and fails to find the true place of 
humanity in this world, Pope Francis asserts that “our ‘dominion’ over the universe should be 
understood more properly in the sense of responsible stewardship.”518 It is worth noting that 
this time the three versions - English, Spanish, and French - concur with using the same concept 
– responsible steward, administrador responsable, and administrateur responsable – for 
describing the human task vis-a-vis other creatures. Further on, the text returns to the notion of 
stewardship in the context of asserting the importance of contemplation and sacraments to 
discover the presence and action of God in all things. It states that “the Eucharist is also a 
source of light and motivation for our concerns for the environment, directing us to be 
stewards of all creation.”519 Therefore, although Laudato Si’ highlights the ethics of care as the 
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way through which humanity should accomplish its role vis-à-vis other creatures, and identifies 
the acts of caring, protecting, overseeing, and preserving as an important part of this ethics, it 
does maintain the notion of steward as the overarching image which is able to express what it 
means to be God's image-bearer and to be entrusted with the whole of creation. 
The Catholic magisterium therefore has been using preferentially and consistently in the 
last decades the notions of steward and stewardship in order to define and represent the place 
in which God has put human beings within the earth community, and the task they have been 
assigned in relation to other creatures. 
b. The origins and foundation of this notion 
The inevitable question is, therefore, where does the notion of steward come from? 
And, how has it entered theological reflection, especially for expressing the calling humanity 
has received from God vis-a-vis creation? 
As mentioned in the first chapter, Willis Jenkins identifies the strategy of Christian 
stewardship as one of the strategies of Christian environmental ethics, through which Christian 
theology has been connecting environmental issues to Christian doctrine and moral experience. 
He asserts that “stewardship emerged as a discrete theological discourse in the 1980s, 
supporting a public Christian environmentalism especially associated with evangelical 
Protestantism.”520 Before that, over the 1970s, some theologians began developing the biblical 
trope of stewardship in theological response to the environmental crisis, and John Passmore 
published in 1974 Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions, 
where he presents two traditional views that deny humanity to have unlimited dominion over 
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nature. While the first one sees human beings as stewards, actively responsible as God’s 
representatives for the care of the world, the second one sees man as cooperating with nature 
in an attempt to perfect it.521 The metaphor of the steward, therefore, starts to be used within 
theological reflection for voicing the task of humanity in relation to other creatures in the 1970s 
within American Protestantism, and more systematically in the 1980s.  
Nevertheless, some show that the use of the notions of steward and stewardship for 
characterizing the role of human beings within the earth community can be traced back as early 
as Calvin, and more properly to the seventeenth-century English chief justice Matthew Hale 
who is the first who extended these concepts to human responsibility for the natural 
environment, as he asserts in his book of 1677 – The Primitive Origination of Mankind, 
Considered and Examined according to the Light of Nature –  that “in relation therefore to this 
inferior world of brutes and vegetables, the end of man’s creation was, that he should be the 
viceroy of the great God of Heaven and Earth in this inferior world; his steward, villicus, bailiff, 
or farmer of this goodly farm of the lower world” whose charge is “to preserve the face of the 
Earth in beauty, usefulness, and fruitfulness.”522 Richard Bauckham also ascribes the first use of 
the image of a steward to Hale, who used it for portraying the proper human relationship to the 
rest of creation. Bauckham thinks that in that context, stewardship was an alternative to the 
excessively anthropocentric Baconian view, inasmuch “it recognized ethical obligations arising 
from nature’s intrinsic value as created by God for God’s glory, not merely for human 
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benefit.”523 Humans must administer creation justly and without cruelty. However, despite this 
early use of the metaphor of a steward for expressing the role and place of humanity given by 
God, it will not be used again more systematically in theology until the 1970s.  
Before that decade, the metaphor of the steward was first used in the 1950s and 1960s 
in relation to church campaigns for more resources, primarily money but also time and talents. 
In that context, therefore, the use of this notion meaning the wise use of money, time, and 
talents came to be widely accepted. Clare Palmer thinks that from this usage, the idea of 
human beings as stewards was applied to their relationship with other creatures. Accordingly, 
“it was probably this availability of the metaphor that first led to its wide application to the 
natural world. It could easily be extended from money, talents, and human resources, to refer 
to (so called) natural resources.”524 Humanity is called to wisely administer God’s creation. 
Human beings are accountable before God, who remains as the actual owner of everything. The 
ecological crisis was hence the occasion to broaden the use of the notions of steward and 
stewardship, in order to embrace the human relationship not only to money, material 
resources, and time, but also to the entire earth community.  
Canadian theologian John Douglas Hall has been one of the main advocates of the 
notion of steward as accurate and suitable for interpreting what it means for human beings to 
be God´s image-bearers in relation to the rest of creation. He has certainly also been one of the 
first to theologically found this notion more systematically.525 Hall asserts that Hebrew ontology 
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has been historically overshadowed within Christianity by Greek ontology. While the latter, in 
its vision of the self, is hierarchical, substantialistic, static, spiritualistic, and dualistic, the former 
conceives of the self as being-in-relation. Accordingly, a substantialistic and spiritualistic 
interpretation of the imago Dei – which usually identifies reason and will as what distinguishes 
human beings from other creatures – has fostered in humanity a sense of superiority and has 
legitimated dominion vis-à-vis other creatures. This interpretation of the imago Dei is based on 
a one-sided affirmation of the distinction and unicity of humanity within creation. Instead, 
according to Hall, a relational understanding of being enables theology to maintain the tension 
between identification and distinction when speaking of human beings in their relationship to 
the rest of the earth community. 
As a result, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Hall proposes a relational 
interpretation of the imago Dei where humanity “images (used as verb) its Creator because and 
insofar as it is ‘turned toward’ God. To be imago Dei does not mean to have something but to 
be and do something: to image God.”526 Thus, the imago Dei must not be understood in terms 
of a constitutive human supremacy over other creatures, but rather as a particular vocation, 
task and responsibility. Hall believes that the image of a steward encompasses and holds 
together all the main components of the ontology of communion, namely, the dialectic 
between identification and distinction between human and other creatures, a sound 
interpretation of the imago Dei, the recognition of the creaturely character of human beings, 
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and the portrayal of humanity as God’s representative and counterpart within creation. In other 
words, the notion of steward gives expression both to our ultimate identity and to our 
responsibility vis-à-vis the earth community. It stands between an extreme anthropocentrism, 
which overlooks human dependence upon and shared traits with other creatures, and a 
biocentrism, which in turn fails to acknowledge the particular role, place, and responsibility of 
humanity within creation.527 The notions of steward and stewardship therefore point primarily 
not to an action, but rather to a way of being before God, and before other creatures. 
According to Hall, the notion of steward evolves within Scriptures from a literal sense – 
the literal description of an office or functioning – to a metaphorical meaning in which “the 
‘other’ whose affairs the steward is to manage is God.”528 He thinks that this metaphorical 
understanding is a highly evocative and appropriate medium to communicate the Gospel 
nowadays. This is why, the symbolic role of the steward is considered by many as “the Gospel in 
miniature.”529 Accordingly, Hall asserts that the metaphor of the steward has theological, 
Christological, ecclesiological, and certainly anthropological implications. While Jesus can be 
seen as the steward of God’s varied grace, the Church can be conceived of as the disciple 
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community which is being incorporated into the work of Jesus – the great steward. As to the 
anthropological consequences of the metaphor of the steward, Hall asserts that it is not that 
we achieve the stewardly status through our works or imitation of Christ, but rather “we are 
graciously brought into a stewarding of God’s grace that has already been enacted by God’s 
chief steward.”530 We are thus progressively incorporated through the Spirit into Jesus’ 
stewardship. As a result, not only the gratuitous and ontological character of the imago Dei 
within humanity is highlighted, but also its performative and dynamic dimensions.  
Hall shows that the metaphor of the steward belongs to the most ancient Judeo-
Christian heritage. It is offered to us by Scriptures and the early Church, and it provides a useful 
intellectual tool in order to grasp the whole thrust and meaning of the Christian message, and 
to discern what it means to be Christian in this world. This is why Hall asserts that in the context 
of the ecological crisis “stewardship is no longer just a nice ideal. It has become a social and 
political necessity.”531 
 
2. Stewards of creation: ecological and theological criticism 
Despite the fact that steward and stewardship have become widely used notions for 
interpreting the imago Dei and voicing the place and role of humanity within creation, they 
have also been extensively criticized, especially for what they do not clarify and seem to imply 
in their portrayal of human beings in relation to other creatures. Many theologians have 
pointed out that the metaphor of the steward has become a sort of default position when 
theologically speaking of the task of humanity within the earth community, although it has clear 
                                                     
530
 Ibid., 44. 
531
 Hall, “Stewardship as Key to a Theology of Nature,” 143. 
302 
 
drawbacks. It seems that it has been uncritically assumed as the best way of expressing what it 
means to be God’s image-bearers in the midst of creation.532 This is not to deny that it has been 
instrumental in connecting theological reflection to ecological challenges. It has provided 
indeed an alternative model to the one that stresses human domination and exploitation over 
nature, inasmuch as it strongly asserts that human beings are accountable to God – the true 
owner – for the way they administer creation. Nevertheless, it also has limitations that need to 
be taken into account, so as to complement and balance steward and stewardship with other 
theological images and notions. 
The criticism against the metaphor of the steward revolves around three mains points. 
Firstly, it is seen as a non-biblical image, which also assumes a managerial language foreign to 
the Scriptures. Although it is true that the office of the steward exists and is exercised by some 
figures – like Joseph – throughout the Old Testament, and that the New Testament 
incorporates this notion in some parables and Pauline letters, these references speak neither of 
humanity as God's steward nor of humanity as being entrusted with the administration of 
creation.533 The original use of stewardship within theology – and its usage beyond the 
theological realm – is tightly associated with money and resources, and this connotation of 
instrumental management entails that the spontaneous understanding of it, is that the rest of 
the natural world is there for us to be used. Although stewardship puts a limit on a limitless 
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exploitation inasmuch as it conveys that humanity is accountable to God, it remains, as Clare 
Palmer denounces, that nature appears to be merely our resource for human benefit and 
use.534 Moreover, it opens the door to a deistic interpretation of the God-Creation relationship, 
in which God is viewed as the original Creator who has then handed creation over to humanity, 
which is in charge of its administration. It seems that God, therefore, has stopped God’s work of 
creation and human beings have taken the baton. In this viewpoint, far from meaning caring 
and protection, stewardship can be easily understood just as the human task of creating their 
own world.  
Secondly, the metaphor of the steward does not seem to be strong enough to lead the 
renovation of theological anthropology in its representation of the role and task of humanity in 
the earth community. For many, it remains within an anthropocentric perspective which 
separates human beings from other creatures, and puts them in the highest rank of a 
hierarchical portrayal of beings. In this sense, non-human nature remains unavoidably 
subordinate and other in its relationship to humanity. As Anne Clifford recalls, the notion of 
stewardship does not “sufficiently attends to the fact that we human are the ecological crisis; it 
is we who are the major cause for the imbalances in the ecosphere.”535 In fact, the notion of 
stewardship easily prompts us to the “metaphor of scientific control and technological 
management which so dominates environmental management procedures, and with such 
ecologically deleterious consequences.”536 This is why others propose that theology must 
retrieve other biblical paradigms, which do not conceive of human beings as above or outside, 
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but rather within nature. While the notion of companionship has been brought up by the 
brothers Himes, inasmuch as this notion enables theology to elaborate an environmental ethic 
grounded on a relational anthropology,537 Paul Santmire, along the same lines, advocates for a 
biblical theology of partnership with nature, which is certainly more faithful than the theology 
of stewardship to the richness and complexities of the biblical witness.538 Richard Bauckham 
also thinks that stewardship must be supplemented with the Christian awareness “of mutuality, 
interdependence, friendliness and confraternity between human beings and other creatures of 
God.”539 The metaphor of the steward conveys thus anthropocentric overtones that overlook 
some biblical data, and are unhelpful for revising the theological understanding of the role and 
place of humanity within creation, in the midst of the current ecological crisis. 
Finally, stewardship is criticized for its lack of specific content, and its pretension that 
humanity actually has the necessary knowledge and capacity to administer nature. On the one 
hand, the calling to administer creation does not provide clear-cut goals and does not 
necessarily point to the wellbeing and fulfillment of the whole creation. To do so, given that it 
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does not exhibit an inherent criterion to orient the appropriate administration, stewardship 
requires other images or notions, which offer guidelines, and establish criteria for discernment 
of what it means to be God’s steward vis-à-vis other creatures.540 However, on the other hand, 
the idea that God has entrusted humanity with the administration of creation entails two 
problematic assumptions, namely, that nature necessarily needs humanity for its wellbeing and 
flourishment, and that humanity actually possess the knowledge and ability to control and 
oversee all natural processes. Then, it may well be just another expression of human hubris.541 
In this sense, the notion of stewardship leans toward what human beings must do and perform 
as God’s stewards, but it neither voices human ignorance about nature, nor fosters humility 
and respect before the complexity and richness of the rest of creation. The metaphor of the 
steward displays a partial viewpoint as we “should not consider the special human role within 
creation only in terms of intervention and change, but also in terms of restraint and letting 
be.”542 In this sense, Richard Bauckham advocates for what he calls cosmic humility – a biblical 
theme – in the portraying of humanity before God and within the wider community of the 
earth.543 In the two polarities, the one between intervening and letting be, and the one 
between knowledge to control and humility to accept ignorance, the notion of stewardship tips 
the balance in favor of human mastery over nature. 
In sum, although it has become a sort of default position for many theologians, and also 
for the magisterium of the Catholic Church, the notion of stewardship is neither evident nor 
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unproblematic when trying to theologically represent the place and role of humanity within the 
earth community. It has certainly been instrumental in raising Christian awareness of the 
ecological crisis, and in incorporating accountability to God in the human interaction with other 
creatures. Nevertheless, it does need to be complemented with other notions and images, 
since it is “one limited part of the picture and not the whole.”544 Accordingly, I personally 
believe that kenosis, as a sound, meaningful, and timely interpretation of the imago Dei 
theological motif, is a suitable corrective and complement for the theology of stewardship. 
3. Revising stewardship: kenosis as an ecological image 
I do not think that the notions of steward and stewardship should be abandoned when 
trying to theologically express what it means to be God’s image-bearers and the role and place 
of humanity within creation. They clearly incorporate an ethical dimension in the interpretation 
of the imago Dei which is not only suitable, but also faithful to the biblical data. Human beings 
are accountable to God in their relationship with other creatures. They have a delegated power 
and authority. The image of the steward entails real limitations for humanity in its relationship 
with the rest of creation. Nevertheless, it needs other theological images and notions so as to 
exhibit specific content and assume clear goals. 
It should be clear by now, that kenosis offers exactly the kind of corrective and 
complement that stewardship necessitates. The former provide three elements that the latter 
lacks of. Firstly, kenosis propounds a different kind of limit, which can shake up our imagination 
up and shed light upon our discernments in the search for new ways of life. While the notion of 
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stewardship sets out a moral limit, which emerges from the fact that human beings are 
accountable to God for their administration of creation, kenosis displays a limit that is freely 
discerned, established, and respected in light of Jesus’ self-giving love. In this sense, it activates 
and fosters ways of thinking, discernments, and attitudes, other than those that stewardship 
does. Kenosis portrays us in medias res, in the midst of a complex web of relationships made of 
processes of receiving, being nurtured, and sustained, but also processes of giving, limiting 
oneself, and letting-be. This viewpoint does not start with the person considered alone as a 
monad, but it sees every individual as already involved in kenotic relationships, receiving, 
giving, and making room for others. Thus, on the one hand, kenosis expresses better than the 
notion of stewardship our belonging to the earth community and our similarity with all 
creatures, and, on the other hand, it raises questions and discernments about our limits and 
self-giving attitudes well beyond what the metaphor of the steward can lead us toward. In 
other words, it voices better our identification with and distinction from other creatures. As a 
result, both the ethical and the performative dimensions of the imago Dei remain, but they 
acquire a different perspective and orientation. We are not mere stewards, extrinsically 
connected to other creatures, but we are rather tied up with the rest of creation through a 
myriad of ways of getting, receiving, and also giving and letting-be. 
Secondly, the Christological meaning of kenosis as well as its usage in the theology of 
creation, makes clear that our relationship with other creatures should point toward the 
wellbeing and fulfillment of the entire earth community. While stewardship is rightly criticized 
for its lack of specific content, kenosis exhibits a clear orientation toward the flourishment of 
the whole creation. Through self-limitation and self-giving love we are called to understand and 
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exercise our power as power-in-love, which points to empowering others and enabling all 
creatures to move toward their fulfillment. Kenosis means that we not only freely set out and 
respect certain limits, as well as the integrity and autonomy of all forms of life, making room for 
them, but also establish life-giving relationships which aim ultimately at others’ wellbeing and 
flourishment. The act of self-limitation is for the sake of the fulfillment and wellbeing of others, 
which is the purpose of divine self-giving love. Kenosis serves therefore as a specifier for an 
otherwise empty notion of stewardship. 
Finally, kenosis is not something that we do, but rather something which happens to us 
within an encounter. Being created in the image of God implies for humanity the necessity to 
partake of a twofold movement of self-limitation and self-giving love. However, this is not 
something that we must bring about through mere will-power, but rather we are being 
conformed and renewed in the image of God inasmuch as we allow the Spirit of God to draw us 
into this twofold movement. While the notion of stewardship is likely to be interpreted in a 
deistic way, and hence “God can be removed from the scene as humans beings are given 
oversight of the earth and move to center stage in the drama of creation,”545 kenosis makes 
present not only a distinctive understanding of divine agency in the God-creation relationship, 
but also puts at the center Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection, and so it reminds us that it is 
Jesus who has revealed God’s true nature, and what it means to be truly human. Conversely to 
what the notion of stewardship may seem to imply, kenosis is not just “our business,” but it is a 
twofold movement – self-limitation and self-giving love – in which we are driven by the Spirit of 
God. Accordingly, being more in tune with the contemporary understanding of God’s grace 
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than the metaphor of the steward, kenosis defines not only the relationship between human 
beings and other creatures, but is rather meant to inspire a meaningful and timely 
understanding of the complex relationships among the Creator, humanity and the rest of 
creatures. 
Getting to the end of this project, I hope that I have been able to show that the notion 
of kenosis must come to the fore in theological reflection on humanity before the current 
ecological crisis. It is a meaningful, sound, and timely interpretation of the imago Dei, which not 
only intertwines the substantialist, relational, and functional understanding of what it means to 
be God’s image-bearers, but it also serves them as specifier, giving them specific content and 
orientation. It is Jesus’ own kenosis that reveals the true face of divine power – power in love – 
which decidedly aims at the wellbeing and fulfillment of creation. This twofold movement of 
self-limitation and self-giving love can certainly inspire the desirable renovation in theological 
anthropology. We need a new way of portraying humanity in relationship with other creatures 
and inhabiting the world. We are also looking for new ways of living that may lead us to true 
and fruitful life. Kenosis offers us a meaningful and timely image; one that deserves to be 
considered and deepened in the face of the challenges we are to deal with nowadays. Kenosis 
certainly enables theology to activate and foster discernments within the spheres of personal, 
social, and environmental ecology, which not only can change views that disconnect human 
beings from the rest of creation by ascribing to them an ambiguous dominion over other 
creatures, but it also can lead us toward more ecologically friendly ways of living. 
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